

РОССИЙСКИЙ ПАГУОШСКИЙ КОМИТЕТ
ПРИ ПРЕЗИДИУМЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ АКАДЕМИИ НАУК
МОСКОВСКИЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ ИНСТИТУТ
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ
(МГИМО УНИВЕРСИТЕТ) МИД РОССИИ
ЦЕНТР ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ
ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ

**ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЕ И РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЕ
ПРОБЛЕМЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА**

Санкт-Петербург
Медиапапир
2018

УДК 327
ББК 66.4
Г54

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Глобальные и региональные проблемы безопасности и перспективы сотрудничества: сборник научных статей / отв. ред. А.И. Никитин. – СПб.: Медиапапир, 2018. – 214 с.

Настоящая публикация представляет собой сборник научных статей сотрудников академических институтов, а также докладов, представленных на 62-й международной Пагуошской конференции ученых «Противостояние новым ядерным угрозам» и 10-й конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения «Мировой ядерный порядок: глобальные и региональные проблемы безопасности и перспективы сотрудничества», которые состоялись в г. Астане (Казахстан) в августе 2017 г. Собранные в сборнике работы рассматривают вопросы, касающиеся современного мирового порядка и ключевых аспектов международной безопасности на национальном, региональном и глобальном уровнях. В публикации отражен взгляд как опытных, так и молодых ученых и экспертов на острые международные проблемы.

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ISBN 978-5-00110-055-3

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MOSCOW STATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (MGIMO UNIVERSITY) OF THE MINISTRY
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CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY
ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR
COOPERATION**

St. Petersburg
Mediapapir
2018

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Global and Regional Security Issues and Prospects for Cooperation: Collection of scientific articles / ed. by A. I. Nikitin. — St. Petersburg: Mediapapir, 2018. — 214 p.

The current publication is a collection of scientific articles by Russian researchers as well as reports presented at the 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs “Confronting New Nuclear Dangers” and the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference “Nuclear World Order: Global and Regional Security Issues and Prospects for Cooperation” both of which took place in Astana, Kazakhstan, in August 2017. The papers presented address the issues relating to the current world order and key areas of international security at a national, regional and global level. The collection of articles reflects the vision of both experienced and young scholars and experts on major international problems.

ISBN 978-5-00110-055-3

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ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Предлагаемый сборник включает в себя научные статьи в области международной безопасности, контроля над вооружениями и нераспространения ядерного оружия. Многие публикуемые работы были представлены в качестве докладов и сообщений на 62-й Пагуошской конференции ученых, которая состоялась в г. Астане с 25-го по 29-е августа 2017 года, а также в ходе предшествовавшей ей 10-й конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения «Мировой ядерный порядок: глобальные и региональные проблемы безопасности и перспективы сотрудничества».

Авторы — ученые, эксперты из Великобритании, Израиля, Киргизии, Пакистана и России — исследуют актуальность теории ядерного сдерживания в контексте новых угроз международной безопасности, перспективы ядерного разоружения, региональные проблемы безопасности. Рассматриваются также такие проблемы, как разработка новых видов обычных вооружений, приближающихся к ядерному оружию по своей разрушительной силе и последствиям для гражданского населения, и роль гражданского общества, научного и экспертного сообществ в ядерном разоружении.

В первой части сборника, посвященной современным проблемам мирового ядерного порядка, затрагиваются темы переосмысления значения ядерного оружия в мировой политике. Во второй части сборника уделяется внимание поиску решения региональных проблем безопасности, анализируются проблемы безопасности в Европе, на Ближнем Востоке и в Центральной Азии. Представлены точки зрения ученых на перспективы ядерного разоружения и основные влияющие на него факторы, предложены новые подходы к решению многолетних региональных проблем безопасности. Локальные проблемы анализируются в глобальном контексте,

в котором, как отмечается, существует острая необходимость снижения напряженности и продолжения диалога.

Пагуошское движение ученых основано в 1957 году как международная неправительственная научная организация. Ее основополагающим документом стал Манифест Рассела-Эйнштейна 1955 года. Важнейшей особенностью всех Пагуошских конференций является приверженность их участников исключительно научному и междисциплинарному подходу к поиску путей решения глобальных проблем человечества. Все это способствует плодотворной работе по выработке рекомендаций для высшего политического руководства государств и крупнейших международных организаций (ООН и ее специализированных учреждений, МАГАТЭ, ВОЗ и других) с целью решения глобальных проблем, стоящих перед человечеством.

Предупреждение человечеству, высказанное в Манифесте, сохраняет свою актуальность в контексте сегодняшнего глобального мира: «Перед нами лежит путь непрерывного прогресса, счастья, знания и мудрости. Изберём ли мы вместо этого смерть только потому, что не можем забыть наших ссор? Мы обращаемся как люди к людям: помните о том, что вы принадлежите к роду человеческому и забудьте обо всём остальном».

Пагуошское движение ученых, удостоенное в 1995 году Нобелевской премии мира «за большие достижения, направленные на снижение роли ядерного оружия в мировой политике, и за многолетние усилия по запрещению этого вида оружия», продолжает вносить существенный вклад в процесс разоружения и нераспространения ядерного оружия, играет существенную роль в урегулировании региональных конфликтов в различных регионах мира. Важное место в дискуссиях на Пагуошских форумах занимают вопросы укрепления международного и межрегионального научного сотрудничества, развития методов научной дипломатии.

Международное студенческое и молодежное Пагуошское движение представляет собой глобальное и междисциплинарное объединение студентов и молодых ученых, занимающихся исследованиями в области фундаментальных и общественных наук, технологий и этики. Будучи независимым в определении областей деятель-

ности, Международное студенческое и молодежное Пагуошское движение поддерживает тесные отношения с Пагуошским движением ученых, оставаясь приверженным духу и идеалам Манифеста Рассела-Эйнштейна. 10-я конференция Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения в г. Астане объединила порядка 50 студентов и молодых специалистов из 20 стран (Великобритания, Венгрия, Германия, Израиль, Индия, Индонезия, Иордания, Иран, Италия, Казахстан, Канада, КНР, Нидерланды, Пакистан, Россия, Саудовская Аравия, США, Тунис, Швейцария, Япония).

Настоящее издание представляет читателю некоторые новые идеи и подходы к исследованию современных проблем международной и региональной безопасности, нераспространения ядерного оружия и контроля над вооружениями со стороны участников международного научного и экспертного сообщества, объединенного общей целью построения безопасного и справедливого мира на планете.

Редколлегия

PREFACE

The present collection of articles consists of research papers in the field of international security, arms control and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of articles within the current publication were presented as reports and communications at the 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs “Confronting New Nuclear Dangers” and the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference, both of which took place in Astana, Kazakhstan, in August 2017.

The authors — researchers and experts from Israel, Kirghizia, Pakistan, Russia and the United Kingdom — examine the relevance of nuclear deterrence theory in the context of new threats to international security; prospects for nuclear disarmament; regional security issues. The publication deals with such topics as the development of new types of conventional weapons approaching nuclear weapons capacities in terms of their destructive power and consequences for the civilian population; role of civil society, scientific and expert communities in supporting nuclear disarmament.

The first part of the collection, devoted to the contemporary problems of the nuclear world order, touches upon such topic as rethinking of the salience of nuclear weapons in world politics. The second part of the collection focuses on the solutions to regional security problems, analyzes strategic environment in Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. It provides experts’ views on the prospects for nuclear disarmament and the main factors influencing it, as well as offers new approaches to the resolution of long-term regional security issues. Local problems are analyzed in a global context, which is influenced by an urgent need to reduce tensions and continue dialogue.

The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs was founded in 1957 as an international non-governmental scientific organization. Its founding document was the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto. The most important feature of all Pugwash meetings is the commitment of their participants to an exclusively scientific and interdisciplinary approach to the search for solutions to global issues. All this contributes to the fruitful work on the development of

recommendations for senior figures in national governments, major international organizations (the UN and its specialized agencies, IAEA, WHO, and others) in order to solve global problems facing humanity.

The warning to the humanity expressed in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto remains as relevant as ever in today's globalized world: "There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest".

In 1995 the Pugwash Conferences on Sciences and World Affairs were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and, in the longer run, to eliminate such arms". Pugwash keeps contributing in a significant way into the process of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and plays important role in the settlement of regional conflicts across the world. An important place in the discussions at the Pugwash forums is occupied by the issues of strengthening international and interregional scientific cooperation, the development of methods of scientific diplomacy.

International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) is a global and interdisciplinary network of students and young professionals concerned with the interface of science, technology, society and ethics. Although independent in its scope and policies, ISYP has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and remains committed to the spirit and ideals of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. The 10th International Student/Young Pugwash Conference in Astana brought together more than 30 students and young professionals from 20 countries (United Kingdom, Hungary, Germany, Israel, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Iran, Italy, Kazakhstan, Canada, China, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the USA, Tunisia, Switzerland, Japan).

The publication presents to the readers new ideas and approaches in relation to modern challenges to international and regional security, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control on behalf of the international scientific and expert community united around the shared objective of building a secure and fair world.

Editorial board

ЧАСТЬ I. СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ МИРОВОЙ ЯДЕРНОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ

Роль обычных вооружений в ядерном уравнении

Кевин Милетич

The Role of Conventional Weapons in the Nuclear Disarmament Equation

Kevin Miletic

This paper aims to address an issue that usually only features in the margins of disarmament debates. This issue is the role of conventional weapons in the nuclear disarmament equation.

It is no secret that certain countries perceive conventional weapons as a major threat to their national security. For them, nuclear deterrence is a means to offset a perceived conventional inferiority by threatening nuclear retaliation in the event of a major conventional attack.

This argument has become firmly anchored in the military doctrine of these countries and used as a primary reason for the justification of nuclear deterrence policy and the subsequent retention of nuclear weapons.

This paper will look at how the conventional-nuclear relationship works. More precisely, it will look at points of divergence where nuclear and conventional are opposed to each other i.e. military doctrines; and points of convergence where nuclear disarmament and conventional arms control negotiations were conducted in parallel, like in the late 80s and early 90s with INF 1987, CFE 1990, START I 1991, CWC 1993.

The US-led Revolution in Military Affairs

For many observers, the US-demonstrated ability to incapacitate an enemy from afar using a combination of sophisticated sensors and precision-guided munitions in Operation Desert Storm marked the start of

a US-led Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with network-centric warfare at its core.¹ Network-centric warfare is based on the integration of command and control, reconnaissance, information processing, and target acquisition functions in order to be able to carry out coordinated strikes across great distances and react in real time to developments in the combat zone.² Following this logic, advanced conventional weapons were identified as weapons of choice given their high degree of precision, automatic target acquisition and reduced signatures.

As noted by Futter, Zala & Moore, almost three decades after the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs, advances in military technology and engineering have allowed the development of an array of advanced precision conventional weaponry that is increasingly prominent at the strategic level.³ Without going too much into details, this includes various conventional weapons systems such as existing cruise missiles, drones, guided gravity bombs, missile defense systems like Aegis⁴ and THAAD⁵, stealthy delivery platforms, together with integrated surveillance, coordination and targeting; and emerging systems such as hypersonic boost-glide weapons which would give a conventional global strike capability; hypersonic cruise missiles, orbital weapons, anti-satellite forces, advanced guidance systems, as well as cyber capabilities.

¹ Haas M. The Proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. *CSS Analysis in Security Policy*. December 2013, no. 145, 4 p. Available at: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-145-EN.pdf> (accessed 15.01.2018).

² Ibid.

³ Futter A, Zala B., Moore G. M. Correspondence: Conventional prompt global strike: Arms racing and strategic stability in a post-unipolar world. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2015, vol. 22, no. 3-4, , pp. 291-299.

⁴The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (Aegis BMD or ABMD) is a US Department of Defense programme developed to provide missile defense against short to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Aegis BMD (also known as Sea-Based Midcourse) is designed to intercept ballistic missiles post-boost phase and prior to reentry.

⁵Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is an American anti-ballistic missile defense system designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (descent or reentry).

Perceived Threat

This gradual process of placing a far greater reliance upon advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking as well as practice, specifically through a larger role for ballistic missile defences, advanced conventional strike programs, and sophisticated command, control and monitoring capabilities, has been viewed with concern by other countries, especially Russia and China.¹

There seems to be a widespread belief among Russian and Chinese strategists that advanced conventional weapons pose a significant threat to them and that they are lagging behind the US in their development.²

James Acton listed different types of concern linked to advanced conventional weapons:³

- Advanced conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons in a conflict, thereby providing its possessor with more options and giving it a decisive edge over adversaries more limited qualitatively in their means to wage war. Indeed, their operational flexibility allows for a wide range of operations on both tactical and strategic levels without breaking the nuclear taboo.
- The possibility of a conventional “first strike”, in combination with ballistic missile defense systems, could seriously undermine the survivability of the enemy’s nuclear forces.
- Advanced conventional weapons programs are just too sophisticated to be about any state other than nuclear power states. Alexei Arbatov, for example, argues that “Russians just cannot believe that such complicated and expensive systems are only meant to target terrorists, who can be dealt with by much cheaper and simpler weapons”⁴.

¹ Futter A., Zala B. Advanced US Conventional Weapons And Nuclear Disarmament. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2013, vol. 20, no 1, pp. 107-122.

² Acton J.M. Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2015, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 141-154.

³ Ibid

⁴ Arbatov A. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control. *Carnegie Paper*, March 2011, pp. 20-21. He goes on to add that, “Ohio-class submarines [some of which have been converted to carry cruise missiles] are designed to stay on patrol for long periods of time and to remain undetectable even to sophisticated

- Early-warning radars would provide much less warning of a boost-glide attack than a ballistic missile attack, thereby running the risk of being caught off guard.

As argued by Futter and Zala, the central problem is that US superiority in advanced conventional weaponry makes it very difficult for any US rival to agree to work toward a nuclear-free world when such a move, already made difficult by existing conventional imbalances, will magnify US hard power. More specifically, the close link between nuclear reductions and increases in conventional capabilities essentially works to decrease US vulnerability in a nuclear disarmed world, while at the same time increasing the vulnerability of its current or future rivals and adversaries.¹ These observations were recently echoed in a 2016 report by the International Security Board — a US Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with advice and recommendations on a framework for strategic stability — warning that technological advances pose challenges to strategic stability based on nuclear deterrence, as these developments “have the potential to replicate, offset, or mitigate the strategic effects of nuclear weapons”².

Impact on Military Doctrine and Procurement Policies

Russian and Chinese views on advanced conventional weapons — hypersonic ones in particular — appear to be influencing their military doctrine and procurement policies.

The 2014 Military Doctrine of The Russian Federation lists “the establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the global strike concept,

anti-submarine warfare systems, and heavy bombers are capable of penetrating advanced air defenses. Rogue states and terrorists possess neither anti-submarine warfare nor serious air-defense systems.” Available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/gambit_endgame.pdf (accessed 15.01.2018).

¹ Futter A., Zala B. Advanced US Conventional Weapons And Nuclear Disarmament. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2013, vol. 20, no 1, pp. 107-122.

² International Security Advisory Board. *Report on the Nature of Multilateral Strategic Stability* (27 April 2016). Available at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257667.pdf> (accessed 15.01.2018).

intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons”¹ as a main external military risk. It also explicitly affirms the Russian Federation’s right “to use nuclear weapons (...) in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy” and “to resist attempts by some states or group of states to achieve military superiority through the deployment of strategic missile defense systems, the placement of weapons in outer space or the deployment of strategic non-nuclear high-precision weapon systems”.

Acton notes that in terms of hardware, two focal points of Russia’s modernization are enhancing the survivability of its nuclear forces and improving its air and missile defense systems.² Those points were translated into specific programs highlighted by President Putin in a September 2014 speech, delivered at a drafting session for the 2016-2025 State Armament Program.³ After the meeting, Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, went further and drew a direct link between advanced conventional weapons systems and these programs, stating that “our response to the conventional prompt global strike strategy is upgrading our strategic nuclear forces...and also developing air and space defense resources.”⁴ However, still according to Acton, Russia is working on advanced conventional weapons too, especially hypersonic ones.⁵ It has acknowledged the development of hypersonic cruise missiles, although details of the program remain murky.⁶ There is also reasonably strong — but not completely

¹ *Military Doctrine of The Russian Federation* (2014). Available at: <https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029> (accessed 15.01.2018).

² Acton J.M. Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2015, vol.22, no. 1, pp. 141-154.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Russia Announces Plans to Upgrade Nuclear, Air Defense Forces. *Agence France-Press*, September 10, 2014.

⁵ Acton J.M. Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2015, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 141-154.

⁶ Acton J.M. *Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike*. Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. 197 p.

conclusive evidence — that Russia is also engaged in the development of a conventional boost-glide system.¹

Likewise, China appears increasingly concerned about a threat to its nuclear forces from US conventional long-range strike systems, according to J.H. Pollack.² Pollack notes that a substantial section of a classified military textbook from 2004, “Science of Second Artillery Operations”, discusses defensive operations, anticipating that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conventional and nuclear missile forces are liable to come under attack from precision-guided weapons based on land or sea, air-strikes, airborne forces, air assault forces, or special operations forces.³

More recently, the focus of these concerns has shifted in the direction of strategic strike, with long-range advanced conventional weapons in the lead role. The latest (2013) edition of *Science of Strategy*, a textbook on military strategy produced by the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences makes room to describe the potential for employing these weapons against Chinese nuclear missiles, noting that this event could expose Beijing to coercive nuclear threats, reinforced by ballistic missile defense capabilities.⁴

Similarly to Russia, the impact of advanced conventional weapons on China’s military doctrine is reflected in its procurement policies. Pollack notes that China is busily diversifying its arsenal of nuclear missiles and developing nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines.⁵ It is also trying to catch up with the US in the field of advanced conventional weapons with research into hypersonic missiles, including a boost-glide weapons, and direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons.⁶

¹ Acton J.M. Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons. *Science & Global Security*, October 2015, vol. 23, pp. 191-219.

² Pollack J.H. Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2015, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 155-164.

³ Ibid

⁴ Xiaosong Sh., ed. *Zhanlue Xue (The Science of Military Strategy)*. 3rd ed. Beijing, Academy of Military Science of the People’s Liberation Army, Military Science Publishing House, 2013. 171 p.

⁵ Pollack J.H. Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2015, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 155-164.

⁶ Ibid

The Imperative of Deterrence Incompatible with Disarmament?

As shown by the examples above, we seem to be in a situation where US investment in conventional weaponry has entrenched other nuclear-weapon-states' determination to retain and modernize their own nuclear arsenals. A. Arbatov also commented on this trend: "There are very few countries in the world that are afraid of American nuclear weapons. But there are many countries which are afraid of American conventional weapons. In particular, nuclear weapon states like China and Russia are primarily concerned about growing American conventional, precision-guided, long-range capability."¹ In other words, nuclear weapons are not solely used to deter a potential nuclear attack, rather the nuclear deterrence doctrine is being applied to the conventional field too. This is not new. NATO had adopted the same approach to deter against a ground invasion of Europe by Soviet troops. To a certain extent, Pakistan seems to have adopted the same approach to deter against an Indian ground attack. What is new, however, is that now nuclear weapons are specifically meant to deter the use of certain conventional weapons systems. In other words, those conventional weapons systems are on par with nuclear weapons. This blurring of lines between conventional and nuclear increases the risks of nuclear use. Indeed, as argued by Morgenthau, the moment when you start applying conventional modes of thought and action to the nuclear sphere and try to fit nuclear weapons into conventional thinking, you implicitly change the nature of nuclear weapons.² Their purpose changes from a weapon of last resort to a weapon that becomes usable in certain conventional situations.³

¹ Comment reported by J. Cabasso and A. Liechterman in: Cabasso J., Lichterman A. A Circle That Can't Be Squared: Broad-spectrum arms racing and nuclear disarmament. In: Plesch D., Spies M., Miletic K., eds. *Rethinking General and Complete Disarmament in the 21st Century*. New York, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016. 94 p. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-28/> (accessed 17.01.2017).

² Morgenthau H. *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*. London, Pall Mall Press, 1969. 208 p.

³ Plesch D. The South and disarmament at the UN. *Third World Quarterly*, 2016, vol. 37, no. 7, pp. 1203–1218. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1154435. Available at:

This conundrum has serious implications for the disarmament agenda because certain nuclear weapon states are now directly linking conventional arms control to nuclear disarmament. As highlighted by Cabasso and Liechtermann, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been reported to say that “to move toward a nuclear-free world, it is necessary to resolve the question of non-nuclear-equipped strategic offensive weapons and strategic weapons in general, which are being worked on by the United States, among others.”¹ Following this logic, conventional arms control becomes then a precondition for nuclear disarmament to happen. And deterrence is the only reliable means to keep the lid on an otherwise uncontrolled conventional arms race which, in turn, feeds into the rationale for retention and modernization of nuclear weapons. All this in the name of national security. A perfect example of vicious circle as demonstrated by the concept of “security dilemma”.

Yet, as observed by R. Rydell, the pursuit of security without disarmament is itself a fantasy, given the insecurities and instabilities produced by arms race, asymmetric arsenals, and never-ending qualitative improvements of weaponry.² While rejecting any “hard linkage” between nuclear and conventional as a pretext for delaying progress in disarmament, we should be open to acknowledging a “soft linkage” between these two multilaterally sanctioned goals.³ We should recall that, during the late 80s and

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2016.1154435?scroll=top&needAccess=true> (accessed 17.01.2018).

¹ Cabasso J., Liechtermann A. A Circle That Can't Be Squared: Broad-spectrum arms racing and nuclear disarmament. In: Plesch D., Spies M., Miletic K., eds. *Rethinking General and Complete Disarmament in the 21st Century*. New York, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016. 94 p. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-28/> (accessed 17.01.2017).

² Rydell R. Creating Disarmament Synergies. In: Plesch D., Spies M., Miletic K., eds. *Rethinking General and Complete Disarmament in the 21st Century*. New York, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016. 94 p. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-28/> (accessed 17.01.2017).

³ Meyer P. Hard and Soft Linkages between Nuclear and Conventional Disarmament. In: Plesch D., Spies M., Miletic K., eds. *Rethinking General and*

early 90s, many negotiations were conducted in parallel (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II, Chemical Weapons Convention) and these were successful partly because they generated synergy. At that time, States had adopted a comprehensive approach to disarmament, very much in line with the principles of “General and Complete Disarmament”, where simultaneous negotiations were held in parallel on a wide range of issues.

Reconciling Conventional Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament

Perhaps it is no surprise and may even sound commonsensical to say that simultaneous efforts in the fields of conventional arms control and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing. But lately, conventional arms control has rarely been mentioned in the context of nuclear disarmament, except for those who use it as a rationale for indefinite possession. The fundamental difference here is that conventional arms control or nuclear disarmament are not seen as preconditions for the other **to** occur, but rather measures that energize and sustain disarmament **as** it occurs.¹ This challenges directly the dominant discourse based on a fallacious notion of conditionality and thereby changes completely the nature of the debate.

This is why it is essential to find a way to reconcile conventional arms control and nuclear disarmament. In this regard, a comprehensive approach to disarmament like “General and Complete Disarmament” has the advantage of providing a framework that makes thinking about conventional arms control and nuclear disarmament not incompatible but complementary.

Complete Disarmament in the 21st Century. New York, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016. 94 p. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-28/> (accessed 17.01.2017).

¹Rydell R. Creating Disarmament Synergies. In: Plesch D., Spies M., Miletic K., eds. *Rethinking General and Complete Disarmament in the 21st Century*. New York, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016. 94 p. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-28/> (accessed 17.01.2017).

At first sight, it may seem bizarre, if not completely off topic, to focus on “General and Complete Disarmament” while talking about nuclear deterrence but, whether we like it or not, proponents of nuclear deterrence establish “hard linkages” between conventional and nuclear weapons. If this relationship is not addressed, it will remain a major road block on the path to nuclear disarmament. So one way to go about it, would be to explore this “General and Complete Disarmament” agenda in pragmatic and operational detail — not just vague aspirations. Conceptualizing what shape this comprehensive approach would take is certainly not an easy exercise: whether a single comprehensive disarmament treaty; a comprehensive “framework convention” that sets forth principles for future multilateral negotiations based, perhaps, on an update of the McCloy-Zorin agreement; or even a sort of Helsinki process-bis where baskets of issues that have an impact on strategic stability are identified and discussed in parallel and where each basket would deal with a specific system of weapons.¹

It seems appropriate to conclude by quoting the former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane, who said that: “Perhaps the time has come (...) to revisit the McCloy and Zorin agreement. Some useful questions to ask would include how are they (these measures) still relevant, can they be adapted to present conditions, do they offer a means to reconcile WMD disarmament with conventional arms control (...) This might also offer the best scenario for the future of the NPT, the future of the non-proliferation regime, and the future of international peace and security”².

¹ Plesch D., Miletic K. General and Complete Disarmament: The Way Forward. In: Plesch D., Spies M., Miletic K., eds. *Rethinking General and Complete Disarmament in the 21st Century*. New York, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016. 94 p. Available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-28/> (accessed 17.01.2017).

² Kane A. Outlook for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and Beyond: The Roles of the Russian Federation and the United States. *The 2014 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference: Nuclear Energy, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation. Session VI: How to Make the 2015 NPT Review Conference a Success?* Moscow, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 22 November 2014, 5 p.

**Новые технологии и ядерная безопасность:
риски и ответные меры**

Наталья Самойловская

**Emerging technologies and nuclear security:
risks and responses**

Natalya Samoylovskaya

Abstract. In this paper are analyzed two technological trends that may have influence on traditional nuclear security. The first is cyber security. The second is new challenges to nuclear facilities from small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Regulation of these areas is a complex emerging process mostly based on the national level but there is a requirement for greater attention from international society to modernize our approach to nuclear security.

Key words. Nuclear security, technologies, cyber security, UAV.

At the end of the 19th century the discovery of X-rays became a sensation for medical society. Doctors all over the world quickly started using the technology for diagnosis in their medical practice. But it took them some time to realize all the dangers. Accordingly, the first victims of radiation were patients. However, this tragic experience of the devastating effects of radiation on human beings did not prevent the creation of the most dangerous weapons in the history of mankind. At the same time, a better understanding of radioactivity opened the way to a new era of space exploration for humanity.

Whether atoms are used for peaceful or military purposes always balances on the brink. The first serious radiation accidents occurred at the national nuclear weapons complexes of the “nuclear club” countries, first of all in the USSR, the USA and United Kingdom¹. No less danger-

¹ Митюнин А.Ю. Взбесившийся атом. Трагическая хроника атомной эпохи по отечественным и зарубежным публикациям. *Гражданская защита*, 2006, № 12, сс. 31-34. [Mityunin A. Neistoviy atom. Tragicheskie hroniki atomnoy eri [Furious Atom. Tragic Chronicle of Atomic Age]. *Grazhdanskaya zashita* [Civilian Defense]. 2006, № 12, pp. 31-34].

ous were accidents at nuclear power plants and crashes of space objects equipped with nuclear facilities.

The nuclear accidents of the 20th century revealed a complex set of problems concerning the responsibility of scientists and governments towards civilian population. These issues are still urgent including the problem of transparency of the “nuclear club” countries’ policies and civilian control on the one hand and the problem of their legal responsibility towards the international community on the other hand.

The 21st century started with new technologies and at the same time new nuclear threats. Sufficient progress in the UAV industry and widespread application of this technology includes its potential misuse, thus entailing possible incidents in the nuclear industry. Equally important is the issue of cyber vulnerabilities of nuclear facilities. Such security shifts demand new approaches to maintaining as well as updating existing multilateral agreements.

Nuclear security in the digital era

The new digital era has affected all aspects of human life: the Internet has provided benefits that have significantly changed modern society but at the same time made it more interdependent and vulnerable. Thus world-leading states are paying more and more attention to cyber security issues and the nuclear field is no exception here.

In the opinion of A. Lukatskiy, one of the leading experts on informational security at Cisco, the informatization process of historically isolated computer systems at nuclear facilities has increased the risk of cyber threats. This has led to the adoption of new normative policies and processes on cyber security at nuclear facilities since around 2005¹. As A. Lukatskiy pointed out, these recently developed approaches have not eliminate all risks and require further research studies to assess the effectiveness of protective measures designed by the International Atomic

¹ А.В. Лукацкий. Кибербезопасность ядерных объектов. *Индекс безопасности*, 2015, №4 (115), Том 21, сс. 113-126. [Lukatskiy A. Kiberbezopasnost yadernih obektov [Cyber security of nuclear facilities]. *Index bezopasnosti* [Security Index], 2015, #№4 (115), Vol. 21, pp. 113-126. Available at: <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14513827960.pdf> (accessed 18.01.2018).

Energy Agency (IAEA) and national nuclear legislations. In the view of A. Lukatskiy these research efforts could result in the creation of new tools to identify deficiencies in protective measures and give possible recommendations for their elimination.

One of such research study was an investigation undertaken by the International Security Department at Chatham House, with the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The working group of analysts interviewed about 30 industry practitioners, requesting specific recommendations. The study found that “the nuclear industry, regulatory bodies, security establishments, governments and international organizations needed to engage with cyber security experts and academics, on a sustainable basis, to formulate robust policy responses through coordinated plans of action to deal with the technical, managerial and cultural shortfalls identified in report”¹.

Nuclear security in the era of drones

Another technological trend is the widespread use of low-cost UAVs for both military and civilian purposes. Rapid and uncontrolled spread of this technology led to different incidents indicating new challenges for nuclear security. In the opinion of M. Bunn, an expert at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “drones could provide detailed images of the facility layout... real-time monitoring of guard responses... could also be used for more active, potentially violent assistance to an attack”². In the article “Analyzing the threat of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to nuclear facilities” a group of experts takes up the analysis of new nuclear security challenges from UAVs through traditional approaches to nuclear security in the IAEA. In their opinion, the existing Design Basis Threat

¹ Baylon C., Brunt R., Livingstone D. *Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities: Understanding the Risks*. London, Chatham House, 2015. 41 p. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20151005CyberSecurityNuclearBaylonBruntLivingstoneUpdate.pdf (accessed 18.01.2018)

² Bunn M. Drones: Good News and Bad News for Nuclear Security. *Nuclear Security Matters*, April 27, 2015. Available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/drones-good-news-and-bad-news-nuclear-security> (accessed 18.01.2018).

(DBT) should be revised after a deep analysis of the “evolving threat capabilities of new technologies, like UAVs”¹.

Most experts emphasize the need for legal regulatory instruments in the use of drones. As C. Baylon, an expert at Chatham House, pointed out, “if the technology is harnessed properly, drones might not only be able to solve the problems they have created but also provide additional security benefits”². Put differently, drones as well as other emerging technologies may be used both as a threat or opportunity for nuclear facilities security. In this process, governments and scientists can play an important role in finding timely decisions to prevent new challenges and develop new opportunities.

Responses

While new technological trends impact on traditional physical nuclear security, they are not currently critical. These trends need to be met with a common international dialogue of experts on how to adapt existing norms on physical nuclear security, to prevent emerging cyber security threats and small UAVs to challenge physical nuclear security.

On the national level, regulation of the cyber security of nuclear facilities needs to implement international best practice, with IAEA feedback. Intensification of dialogue on international regulation and norms of cyberspace vis-a-vis traditional approaches to nuclear facilities security will play a great role in potential threat prevention.

The main problem regarding small UAVs is the absence of special attention on nuclear facilities security at the national level. It requires a dialogue of national expert communities on the IAEA platform on adaptation of the IAEA “detect-delay-respond” approach, with new technical

¹ Solodov A., Williams A., Al Hanaei S., Goddard B. Analyzing the Threat of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to Nuclear Facilities. *Security Journal*, April 18, 2017. Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41284-017-0102-5#Sec6> (accessed 18.01.2018).

² Baylon C. Leveraging Drones to Improve Nuclear Facility Security and Safety. *Chatham House Expert Comment*, January 22, 2015. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/leveraging-drones-improve-nuclear-facility-security-and-safety> (accessed 18.01.2018).

recommendations on UAVs detection, identification and neutralization for national governments.

Advanced technologies — old nuclear issues

In the article “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence” K.A. Lieber and D.G. Press pointed out that changes in technology, rooted in the computer revolution, “were eroding the foundation of nuclear deterrence”¹. The authors emphasized the increasing risk of using nuclear weapons in military conflicts and analyzed the possible US policy options to prevent it. The main conclusion was the idea that any further reduction of nuclear arsenals might become a destabilizing factor.

This idea was strongly criticized by leading Russian experts on nuclear security issues V.Dvorkin and A.Arbatov during the joint Russian-American international seminar “Disruptive Technologies, Strategic Vulnerability, and the Future of Deterrence”². V.Dvorkin stressed the fact that mutual reduction of nuclear weapons decreased the possibility of a disarming strike even regardless of the new technological realities, and “strategic stability could be most reliably achieved on the basis of contractual relationship when mutual monitoring of the strategic forces was used”³.

A.Arbatov also pointed out the risk of cessation of negotiations on the further reduction and limitation of strategic and other weapons in view

¹ Lieber K.A., Press D.G. The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence. *International security*, April 25, 2017, vol. 41, issue 4, pp. 9-49. DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00273 Available at: http://www.mit-pressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273 (accessed 18.01.2018).

² Арбатов А.Г., Дворкин В.З. Концепция обезоруживающего удара в новую эпоху. *Материалы международного семинара «Прорывные технологии, будущее сдерживания и вызовы стратегической стабильности»*. Москва, ПИР-Центр, 14.06.2017. [Arbatov A.G., Dvorkin V.Z. Kontseptsiya obezoru-zhivayushego udara v novuyu epohu [Prompt Global Strike Concept in New Era]. Materiali mezhdunarodnogo seminar “Prorivnie tehnologii, budushee sderzhivaniya i vizovi strategicheskoy stabilnosti” [Materials of the international seminar “Disruptive technologies, strategic vulnerability, and the future of deterrence»]. Moscow, PIR Center, 14.06.2017. Available at: <http://pircenter.org/media/content/files/14/15003867470.pdf> (accessed 19.01.2017).

³ Ibid.

of the crisis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In his opinion, “it will be the unwillingness to sign new agreements, which are needed in the negotiations on missile defense system, high-precision conventional weapons, hypersonic system that will end nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in course of the upcoming multilateral unlimited arms race and their proliferation, not excluding to terrorists”¹.

Most Russian leading experts from IMEMO RAS, Institute for the US and Canadian Studies RAS agree that the concept of “strategic stability” is being transformed under new realities, including the impact of technological aspect. They contend there is need for new approaches but at the same time still a requirement for continued dialogue on the reduction of nuclear weapons and preserving the existing agreements on nuclear arms control².

The current crisis in Russian-American relations has a much stronger influence on the future of dialogue on the reduction of nuclear weapons than the recent technological trends. The cessation of nuclear arms reductions and the build-up of military nuclear technologies, which enhances the ability to resist contemporary efforts of non-proliferation, can threaten Article VI of the NPT. Such an approach may become the most dangerous challenge to the NPT as the foundation of the non-proliferation regime.

Recent discussions at the VI All-Russian Congress of political scientists about overcoming crises in the area of arms control and nuclear

¹ Ibid.

² Read more: Арбатов А.Г., Дворкин В.З., Пикаев А.А., Ознобищев С.К. *Стратегическая стабильность после холодной войны*. Москва, ИМЭМО РАН, 2010. 60 с. [Arbatov A.G., Dvorkin V.Z., Pikaev A.A., Oznobishev S.K. *Strategicheskaya stabilnost' posle holodnoy voyni* [Strategic Stability After the Cold War]. Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 2010. 60 p.] Available at: <https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2010/10060.pdf> (accessed 19.01.2017); *Ядерное оружие и стратегическая стабильность: поиски российско-американского консенсуса в XXI веке*. Москва, Российский совет по международным делам, издательство «Спецкнига», 2012. 64 с. [*Yadernoe oruzhie I strategicheskaya stabilnost: poiski rossiysko-amerikanskogo konsensusa v XXI veke* [Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability: In the Search for Russian-American Consensus in the XXI Century]. Moscow, Russian International Affairs Council, “Spetskniga” [Special Book], 2012, 64 p.] Available at: <http://russiancouncil.ru/upload/NuclearWeapon.pdf> (accessed 19.01.2017).

non-proliferation are instructive here.¹ Stimulating debates via different international platforms about emerging technology issues, for example on nuclear cyber security and on legal UAVs regulation for nuclear facility security, may have positive effects on crucial nuclear security issues. Against the backdrop of the Russian-American negotiating crises on nuclear disarmament, discussing new trends may be helpful to encourage dialogue on nuclear security issues as a whole and for the restoration of confidence measures.

¹ Ознобищев С.К., Никитин А.Н., под. ред. *Есть ли будущее у контроля над вооружениями?* Москва, Российская ассоциация политической науки (РАПН), Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2013. 279 с. [Oznobishchev S.K., Nikitin A.I., eds. *Est' li budushee u kontrola nad vooruzheniyami?* [Arms control: does it have a future?]. Moscow, RAPN [Russian Political Science Association], ROSSPEN [Russian Political Encyclopedia], 2013. 279 p.]

**От модернизации к уничтожению:
новый взгляд на будущее ядерного оружия**

Петр Корзун

**From Modernization to Elimination:
Adopting New Perspective on the Future of Nuclear Weapons**

Petr Korzun

Abstract. The article deals with the issue of nuclear weapons modernization and the risks connected to it within global security context. Modernization of nuclear arsenals risks to perpetuate the threat of nuclear war for many years ahead, and compromises global disarmament regime, which is already under pressure due to uncertainties over the future of major arms control and non-proliferation treaties and restricted nuclear cooperation between Russia and the USA. The text suggests that although the modernization is already under way, the political decision to curtail it and pave the way for nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons still can be envisaged. The indispensable condition for such a decision is the basic consent over the need for pulling back from nuclear action-reaction cycle that puts both countries and the whole world at greater risk. The article offers a number of conclusions which highlight in particular the critical role of civil society in urging politicians and military strategists to reconsider nuclear weapons modernization plans.

Key words. Modernization of nuclear weapons, disarmament, US-Russia strategic relations, nuclear-weapon states (NWS), civil society.

Although the number of nuclear weapons is down today from its Cold War peak, the risk of nuclear conflict (nowadays sometimes recklessly presumed to be able to happen as “local” one) and nuclear race is again on the rise. The progress on further nuclear cuts is on hold, and both Russia and the US continue to pursue costly schemes to replace and upgrade their strategic nuclear forces.

In such a context the other nuclear-weapon states (NWS) also feel the need to modernize their arsenals. Both India and Pakistan are working on modernizing their nuclear delivery vehicles and expanding their nuclear

weapon stockpiles. China appears to be gradually increasing and upgrading its nuclear capabilities, reiterating, however, its commitment to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and defensive nuclear strategy. North Korea has been investing considerable resources to its military nuclear programme. France and UK are also considering the refurbishment of their nuclear capabilities.

Among the dangers related to the current wave of nuclear forces modernization is that it might change the way how military commanders look at the possibility of using those weapons. More precision and “limited” impact could create an idea of “more usable” nuclear weapons, thus making “limited nuclear war” possible.

In this respect, the announced modernization plans, instead of increasing security, are more likely to banalize the nuclear option for military and political decision-makers and perpetuate excessive force levels as well as connected to it risk of global disaster for future generations.

One of the major risks inherent in contemporary international relations is to see the collapse of the existing treaties aimed at preventing nuclear conflict. Dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation matters between the major nuclear-weapon states, Russia and the United States, is in profound crisis. Its current state generates concerns over the future of such (interdependent) pillars of disarmament and non-proliferation regime as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Treaty between the USA and Russia on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, the system of control over nuclear weapons that has been elaborated by professional community, including diplomats, military strategists, and scientists throughout the decades, falters. Nuclear cooperation between Russia and the United States, that used to be considered as a shared responsibility after the end of the Cold War, is now shrinking. The formats of cooperation which have suffered from a dramatic setback in US-Russia relations after the Ukrainian crisis include the bilateral agreement on the disposition of excess weapons plutonium, agreement on converting research reactors from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium, the 2013 agreement to cooperate on nuclear- and energy-related scientific

research and development. Those negative developments hurt both Russia and the US, increase dangers of nuclear proliferation and erode global disarmament regime.

Meanwhile, the basic condition for further nuclear disarmament will be the ability of the USA and Russia to listen to each other's concerns and to address them for the sake of more secure international relations.

In the framework of strategic dialogue with the USA, Russia has been pointing out that the reduction and limitation of nuclear arsenals should strengthen strategic stability and increase security for all states. According to Moscow, further reduction of strategic offensive arms is possible only in the context when all the factors which influence global strategic stability are taken into account. Among those factors the most disturbing for the Russian side are: unilateral and unlimited buildup of the global US missile defense system; development of the long-range non-nuclear precision weapon and the realization of the US Prompt Global Strike concept; lack of progress in ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; unwillingness on behalf of the US to renounce the modernization of space; existence of quantitative and qualitative disproportions in conventional weapons. However, the lack of regular communication between Moscow and Washington on security issues makes it difficult to discuss in substance the aforesaid concerns of the Russian side.

What is needed in order to line the track from modernization to elimination of nuclear weapons is initial US-Russia agreement that such course would correspond with fundamental interests of both countries (due to security reasons rooted in the contemporary international strategic environment, including new nature of security threats and advanced modifications of conventional weapons, but also because of costs associated with maintenance and modernization of nuclear arsenals). Such an agreement could take a form of political declaration of the leaders on the principles of cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament.

It may seem difficult to imagine this kind of agreement in light of long-lasting tensions in the US-Russia relations and the limited security dialogue between both states. However, mission is not impossible. Both countries are dealing with complex and long-term crises in the Middle East, both are facing global terrorist threat. Nuclear weapons cannot help

in solving those issues, but, on the contrary, could jeopardize any common effort aimed at finding coordinated solution to them, and damage the whole international security environment. Among the dangers related to possession of nuclear weapons particularly sensitive in the world of today seem to be their use or acquisition by terrorist organizations, physical or cyber attacks on nuclear facilities by the non-state fanatical armed groups. The emergence of modernized “limited impact” nuclear weapons (or, on the contrary, of higher destructive capability) would only aggravate those dangers. Reaching the agreement over the need for curtailing nuclear weapons modernization programmes and promoting complete nuclear disarmament would show the ability of Russian and American politicians to identify common interest and invest efforts in pulling back from nuclear action-reaction cycle that puts both countries and the whole world at greater risk.

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States revealed new perspectives for strategic relations between Russia and the USA. However, throughout the first year in office new political administration in the USA has not manifested any significant interest in addressing together with Russia arms control and arms limitation issues in a comprehensive way, in spite of all the manifest urgency of such a step. Despite the disappointed expectations of the Russian government with the possibility to address soberly vital security issues with the new American president, it is still important for Moscow to come up with new initiatives on resuming dialogue on strategic security matters. Among the most urgent topics for discussion are preserving the INF Treaty; extension of the New START treaty beyond 2021; dangerous impact on strategic stability of innovations in technological capabilities, as well as of development and use of increasingly high-tech weapon systems. Officially formulated initiatives and suggestions on further disarmament talks with the USA would make it more complicated for the American side to avoid dialogue with Russia, and would urge US officials to sit at the negotiating table¹.

¹ Арбатов А. Ядерное сдерживание — гарантия навсегда. Стратегическую стабильность не сохранить без ограничения вооружений. *Независимая газета*, 5.07.2017. [Arbatov A. Yadernoe sderjivanie — garantiya navsegda. Strategicheskuyu stabilnost ne sohranit bez ogranicheniya voorujeniy [Nuclear

While Russia and the USA hold the keys from any successful disarmament initiative, the role of other nuclear-weapon states in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in world politics should not be underestimated. If one of them renounces the modernization of nuclear arsenals and advances disarmament agenda, that would be a strong signal for the whole international community and a groundbreaking step toward collective disarmament action.

Talking about the prospects for disarmament, it is worth recalling that from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) perspective, the current massive nuclear weapon modernization programmes go against the spirit of its Article VI which required nations possessing nuclear weapons to disarm. Continuing modernization of nuclear capabilities would be a gloomy portent for the next review conference in 2020, which will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the entry-into-force of the NPT. However, for the time being, the collective political will on behalf of the NWS in favor of non-modernization, disarmament, and dismantling of nuclear weapons leading to its elimination, is absent. That was once again blatantly highlighted during the UN Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, with the countries possessing nuclear weapons all staying away from the talks. Nevertheless, the outcome of the Conference was the adoption on July 7, 2017 by an overwhelming UN member states vote of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This was a landmark decision which opened a new chapter in the nuclear disarmament, accentuated the impact of international public opinion and civil society groups, and contributed to marginalization of opponents of the nuclear weapons elimination.

Against this background, wider involvement of the civil society within the NWS in the discussions about the future of the nuclear arsenals may help in forging a much needed political will to take decisions on the non-modernization and disarmament. Broader debate on the civil society level should, in particular, remind the NWS governments of the need to address

deterrence — guarantee forever. Strategic stability cannot be maintained without arms limitation]. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5.07.2017.] Available at: www.ng.ru/world/2017-07-05/1_7022_garanty.html (accessed 30.07.2017).

each other security concerns and move on in fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the NPT.

Taking into account the global impact of nuclear weapons and the universal vulnerability in front of the threat of their use, the topic of the nuclear weapons future, including prospects for their modernization, needs to become a subject for public debate in the same way as climate change problematics and scenarios of addressing it constitute today an indispensable part of discussions, involving civil society organizations, all over the world. Future of nuclear weapons, its persistence or elimination, is in a similar way a question of common interest which impacts next generations and deserves nation-wide thoughtful discussion. The significance of the nuclear weapons issue has been recently enhanced and brought into limelight by the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize 2017 to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN).

Extensive debate on nuclear weapons and increased responsibility of political decision-makers and citizens of the nuclear-weapon states are especially pressing in light of the current plans among nuclear-weapon holders to modernize their arsenals, committing present and future generations to live in a nuclear armed world.

This paper offers the following conclusions for consideration:

- The salience of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically in the strategic international relations within last several years. It has been a consequence of aggravating crisis between Russia, the US and NATO over Ukraine, Syria and, more generally, over the international security architecture. Against the backdrop of worsening security situation in different parts of the world and the major lack of trust between Moscow and Washington, the nuclear weapon states have launched the modernization of their nuclear arsenals.
- Nuclear weapons, however, cannot really help in getting over the security challenges that the world is facing today, but, on the contrary, could jeopardize any common effort aimed at finding coordinated solution to them and aggravate the whole international security environment.
- The modernization of nuclear weapons increases the risk of a new nuclear arms race between Russia and the USA. This unsettling

scenario is looming against the background of continuing tensions between both states and the deployment of significant military forces of NATO countries and Russia in close proximity to each other. Taking this into account, the US and NATO officials should resume regular communications with their military and intelligence counterparts in Russia in order to avoid brinkmanship and miscalculations that can degenerate into an armed conflict of unimaginable dimensions.

- Modernization of nuclear arsenals compromises global disarmament regime, which is already under pressure due to the restricted nuclear cooperation between Russia and the USA, and uncertainties over the future of major arms control and non-proliferation treaties.
- The emergence of modernized nuclear weapons (including those of “limited impact” or, on the contrary, of higher destructive capability) would only aggravate existing dangers related to the possession of nuclear weapons (risk of acquisition by terrorist organizations, physical or cyber attacks on nuclear facilities by the non-state armed groups).
- Reaching the agreement over the need for curtailing nuclear weapons modernization programmes and promoting nuclear disarmament would show the ability of Russian and American politicians to identify common interest and invest efforts in reducing security threats. Such an agreement could take a form of political declaration of the US and Russian leaders on the principles of cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament.
- In order to be successful, the dialogue between Russia and the USA on the further reduction of nuclear arsenals should address mutual security concerns.
- Despite the disappointed expectations of the Russian government with the failure to address vital security issues with President Trump, it is important for Moscow to come up with new initiatives on resuming dialogue on strategic security matters with the USA. Among the most urgent topics are maintaining of the INF Treaty; extension of the New START treaty beyond 2021; dangerous impact on strategic stability of innovations in technological capabilities, as well as of development and use of increasingly high-tech weapon systems.

- The current massive nuclear weapons modernization programmes go against the spirit of the Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and create unsettling environment for the next review conference in 2020, which will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the NPT entry-into-force.
- A turn from the modernization of nuclear weapons toward their dismantling and elimination would be a practical choice for the nuclear-weapon states in terms of saving substantial financial resources which could be allocated to support the development of peaceful sectors within national economies.
- There is a lack of substantial democratic debate in the nuclear-weapon states about the future of nuclear weapons. This leads to a limited comprehension of challenges related to nuclear weapons within civil society, and restricted democratic impact on decision-making process related to the modernization of nuclear capabilities.
- Taking into account extensive international support for the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, as well as the universal implication of nuclear weapons and the global vulnerability in front of the threat of their use, the topic of nuclear weapons future, including prospects for their modernization, should take rightful place in public debates and electoral agendas of political leaders.
- Wider participation of the civil society in the debates over the nuclear weapons would remind the NWS governments of the need to address and allay each other security concerns and move on in fulfilling disarmament obligations under the NPT. Civil society organizations together with disarmament-related NGOs could support forging a much needed collective political will to motivate decisions on the non-modernization of existing arsenals and disarmament leading towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

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Новая ядерная опасность требует новой парадигмы разоружения: время начинать

Виктор Камышанов

New Nuclear Danger Demands New Disarmament Paradigm: Time to Start

Victor Kamyshanov

Task which resolve the Pugwash movement of scientists all through history of its existence, is the elimination of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and primarily nuclear weapons through its general and complete prohibition and elimination.

How can we describe the state of this problem today?

The prospect of global nuclear disarmament has become more distant.

The reason is the rise of a significant number of conflicts between the modern States, as well as internal conflicts. As a consequence, confrontation was intensified between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers at different levels. Special concern is the deterioration of Russia-US relations beneath the Cold war level.

It's hardly remembered today the history of progress in nuclear disarmament that was linked to the short-time period of declining confrontation, political and ideological reconciliation.

The positive trend of *détente* and the disappearance of the USSR had generated illusions on the right for a global dominance in the international community. The United States started the offensive on all fronts in the quest to achieve absolute global leadership.

The use of force against a few sovereign states by the United States and NATO has led to a sharp reduction in the threshold security for the modern world. This caused serious concerns among many players in the international arena, while the practice of applying power by the United States played into the hands of those political forces that articulated the issue of the protection of national interests through the formation of an adequate nuclear counterbalance. This has stimulated increased interest in the possession of nuclear weapons as a factor of protection of national sovereignty and security. Confirmation of this

was stagnation in the implementation of the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The combination of these factors is the main but not the only obstacle in addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In this context, the deployment of nuclear tactical weapons in Europe should be referred as potential danger to regional and global security like those stockpiled in Turkey that today has rigid relations with the European states and the US. Special risk is posed by moving them to countries that became new members of NATO like Romania. In fact, these states do not control covert activities of US and NATO.

Whether the possession of nuclear weapons by states — historically being members of the official nuclear club — is a threat of global thermo-nuclear war? It was in the past. Now the situation has changed.

Mechanisms of control in this issue suggest the presence of only minimal threats. Experts confirm that the system of nuclear arms control which was created during the last years of the cold war is now, contrary to popular opinion, not outdated, because of constant improvements¹. Existing international instruments and bilateral control mechanisms in this area have confirmed their effectiveness in the formation of a mutually recognized system of protection against the use of nuclear weapons.

The members of the nuclear club have positioned their stance on nuclear weapons through the adoption of the official defense doctrine. This is a distinctive feature of documents in the field of nuclear weapons, to record their purely defensive function.

Russia has formed its own approach in the basic documents, focused on issues of national security, including the national security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, Military doctrine of the Russian Federation, foreign policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

¹Арбатов А. «Система контроля над ядерным оружием сегодня трещит по швам». *Профиль*, 12.07.2017. [Arbatov A. “Sistema kontrolya nad yadernim oruzhiem segodna treshit po shvam” [“System of control over the use of nuclear weapons is going to pieces today”]. *Profil*, 12.07.2017.] Available at: <http://www.profile.ru/politika/item/118416-sistema-kontrolya-nad-yadernym-oruzhiem-segodnya-treshchit-po-shvam> (accessed 21.01.2018).

The US is building its policy in this area on the basis of such documents as the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, and the National Military Strategy of the United States of America.

Emerging global players like China are formulating their understanding of modern security issues basing on their own national interests that got expression in the National Security Act.

These are internally and internationally binding legal documents that guide nuclear states and ban unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The main problem of modern disarmament process is growing mistrust in international relations and consequently different understanding of the challenges and threats of the modern world.

The emergence in the US, after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, of the conflict among the highest political authorities and elites, the precedents of selfish political adventurism among a certain part of the US military command create all together the feeling of uncontrolled development of certain processes in international security.

For six months in power Trump almost not clarified its approach to the most important of its key tasks which is to reduce the risk posed by the nuclear weapons and the possibility of its application in the attack on the United States and its allies.

In the absence of a specific vision of the strategy in this area Trump instructed the Pentagon to conduct the development of new nuclear strategy, for the fourth time after the end of the cold war and for the first time after the presidency of Barack Obama. The US administration has already given the acceleration to the process of implementation of the plan formulated under President Obama for the replacement and modernization of all three elements of the nuclear triad. This means an increase of these forces on the third with the allocation of more than 1.2 trillion dollars over the next three decades.

These capacities combined with the factor of possible unauthorized WMD use constitute a serious security challenge in the modern world. History gives us examples of so-called "dirty" weapons of mass destruction. This issue recently has become more acute. It is evident in the use of force outside of US, not always sanctioned by the UN Security Council.

Most clearly this is manifested in the course of conducting operations using conventional weapons in the Middle East under the so-called "fight against terrorism".

One of the strengths of Pugwash has always been a recognition of the obvious threats, its ability to rise above political partisanship, which today is most clearly demonstrated in Western media. The position of scholars has a significant impact on the formation of a broad anti-war movement. The public nongovernmental non-official element in the past was important to form an objective view of the challenges and threats, and to develop a balanced official position of the States and their participation in international agreements. The broad-based nature of this movement created conditions for an objective assessment of security challenges and threats in the past. The relevance of this approach today, is as never obvious.

Modern international society faces the problem of destruction of moral and ethical principles in international relations, which initially appealed to the founders of the Pugwash movement.

Practice shows that the Declaration of the European Security Charter which was formulated in Istanbul in 1999 has not stood the test of time. For nearly two decades past differences have not ended, and manifested in a new form.

International environment today is characterized by growing contradictions in the relations between states, economic fluctuations, prevalence of political-military interests and the weakened influence of public opinion. This bundle of consolidated global awareness of the danger of war, which was characterized as a prerequisite for creating the conditions for detente in the second half of the twentieth century, occurs today within each of the forces participating in a discussion of global threats to peace and security, and seeks to contribute to achieving results in the field of nuclear disarmament and to impose their understanding of national and global security in the modern world.

The crisis of this process demonstrates the work of the UN. The UN Conference dedicated to negotiations of a binding legal mechanism for the prohibition of nuclear weapons was attended by 124 States. All NATO members did not participate in voting on this issue, the Netherlands has announced a consolidated position of voting against the proposed document.

Official and unofficial members of the nuclear club did not participate in voting. The document was supported only by 122 States. And it's safe to say that the prospect of progress in this area has remained very vague.

However, recognized international security paradigm continues to exploit old stereotypes of international challenges and threats, formed in a perished bipolar world. The modern international security system is weakened with an offset of military dangers and military threats into the information space. Thus, today, there is a high demand for the changed paradigm of security through disarmament. It should not consist only of its nuclear component. In the last decades, the number of wars and conflicts in the modern world has reached a critical mass. And that's the main challenge of forming a new paradigm of security through disarmament.

Therefore, today the words of the Manifesto of Russell — Einstein has not lost its significance: “We have to learn to think in a new way. We have to learn to ask ourselves, not what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever group we prefer, for there no longer are such steps; the question we have to ask ourselves is: what steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of which the issue must be disastrous to all parties?”

The problem of security threats has gone beyond nuclear threats and should include all components of a military threat from weapons of mass destruction to political mechanisms of the unwinding of the global international tension, such as the sanctions policy against Russia and other States.

The problem is not to reach a decision on the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Their danger is an axiom. In case of critical voltage, the solution of this problem takes a minimum of time. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the use of chemical weapons is an example, which in our time have been confirmed in the process of liquidation of chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria. The possibility of renunciation of nuclear weapons was demonstrated in the denuclearization of Africa. The Cuban missile crisis had launched the mechanism of control over nuclear weapons.

And if the crises of the second half of the twentieth century grew out of the syndrome of the struggle for nuclear superiority and ideological domination, the tension in the field of international security at the end of the

second decade of the XXI century is growing under the influence of different vectors of influence on the modern political consciousness of society and political elites in the world today, the dominant pseudo liberal human rights ideology. Its forceful imposition led to the destruction of accepted norms of communication. To ensure the rights and freedoms of man and society, responsibility of the state as an institution and power as its tool for a right to peace and right to life are basic human rights demands in the modern world, without which the rest of the of human rights simply loses all meaning.

It is in changing this unproductive ideological doctrine that lies the way out of the current crisis and creation of conditions for the return to the idea of peaceful coexistence and socio-economic progress.

**Роль профессионального медицинского сообщества
в историческом решении Генеральной ассамблеи ООН
о договоре по запрещению ядерного оружия и в
присуждении Нобелевской премии мира 2017 г.
Международной кампании по запрещению ядерного
оружия (ICAN)**

Сергей Колесников

**Medical Professionals' Role in the United Nations General
Assembly Historical Decision for Nuclear Ban Treaty
and ICAN Nobel Peace Prize 2017**

Sergey Kolesnikov

The 7-th of July 2017 was a remarkable day in the history of antinuclear movement and especially those NGOs, which have been awarded Nobel Peace Prize — International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and Pugwash movement.

This day the UN General Assembly by overwhelming majority adopted the Nuclear Ban Treaty — next step on the road toward prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, biological, toxin and nuclear weapons).

Physicians first recognized great danger of nuclear weapon and alerted the world about its devastating effects after Hiroshima bombing. In September 1945 International Committee of the Red Cross called for nuclear weapons to be banned.

Physicians and medical scientists have been on front line of investigation to prove immediate and long-term effects of nuclear weapon production and testing. They tried to unite all antinuclear forces, and Russel-Einstein Manifesto was significant event in this process.

First step was Limited Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow August 5, 1963 by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Treaty required Parties to prohibit, prevent, and abstain from carrying nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water, or in any other environment if such explosions cause radioactive debris

to be present outside the territorial limits of the State that conducts an explosion.

During the Cold War period in the early 1980s, the medical community mobilized to educate the general public about the enormous threat to public health posed by the arms race. IPPNW was founded by physicians from the USA and the Soviet Union to prevent nuclear war between the two superpowers. Drs. Bernard Lown, Jim Muller, Eric Chivian and Herb Abrams from the USA and Drs. Evgueni Chazov, Mikhail Kuzin and Leonid Ilyin from the Soviet Union organized a team who had studied the effects of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

These investigations lead to the World Health Organization recognition in 1984, that nuclear weapons constitute the greatest immediate threat to health and welfare. The study evaluated the “catastrophic results [that] would follow from any use of nuclear weapons”, and concluded that “no health service in any area of the world would be capable of dealing adequately with the hundreds of thousands of people seriously injured by blast, heat or radiation”.

Doctors have an obligation to prevent what they cannot treat, and a global federation of physician experts came together to explain the medical and scientific facts about nuclear war to policy makers and to the public, advocating for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world’s arsenals. IPPNW comprehensively documented the health and environmental effects of the production, testing, and use of nuclear weapons, as well as of tremendous price nuclear weapons states are paying for the nuclear weaponry. IPPNW mobilized citizens in the nuclear states to protest and change their governments’ policies.

Doctors met with Presidents R.Reagan and M.Gorbachev to urge them to end the arms race. M.Gorbachev then launched the series of initiatives and first of them was unprecedented declaration about unilateral cancelling of all nuclear testing. In recognition of the special role in and responsibility for preventing nuclear war the IPPNW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985.

Due to efforts and pressure of the NGOs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996, but still not ratified by some nuclear countries, including the USA.

After the Cold War most of the world has acted as though the dangers of nuclear war were outdated and paid far less attention to this issue. But in the situation when more than 15 000 nuclear warheads (2000 are on hair-trigger alert) still exist, the very real danger of accidental nuclear war remains. Five times since 1979, either Moscow or Washington prepared to launch nuclear weapons in the mistaken belief that it was under attack by the other side.

In the last two years the situation has become perhaps even more close to the nuclear conflict, then it was before. Unprecedented sanctions imposed to several countries, very aggressive military rhetoric from the leaders of the North Korea and the USA, fast growing military presence around Russia, existing and new local conflicts constitute today the main danger of a possible global war.

One of the new (revised from 1981) conceptions of nuclear war danger is nuclear winter and nuclear famine. The essence of it is that if there is a detonation of “only” 300 warheads, close to 100 million people would die from the blast and heat effects in the first half hour, and entire economic infrastructure would be destroyed. US scientists and physicians proved, that fires created by the use of nuclear weapons over big cities cause emissions of enormous quantities of soot into the atmosphere (about 150 million tons), disrupting climate worldwide. Those quantities are enough to reduce temperatures around the world by an average of 8°C and in the interior regions of North America and Eurasia to levels not seen since the Ice Age. Food production would collapse and it is possible that our species would become extinct. Even a regional nuclear war, as might take place between India and Pakistan, would have catastrophic consequences worldwide. Only 100 Hiroshima-sized weapons would cause a fall in temperature to an average 1.25°C around the world.

Physicians organized extraordinary conferences to discuss the medical consequences, or as they called it the humanitarian impact, of nuclear war. A total of 116 countries have signed the Humanitarian Pledge to seek a new treaty in order to fill the gap in the international law and prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons, pushing for their abolition.

On November 20, 2013 the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement renewed its call for the elimination of nuclear weapons at

Sydney, Australia. ICRC restudied the international capacity to organize a humanitarian response to the use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirmed its conclusion that “there is presently no effective capacity at the international level to deliver appropriate humanitarian assistance to survivors if nuclear weapons were ever to be used”.

IPPNW physicians played a vital role in all three conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which were the first ever intergovernmental conferences focused on the actual impacts of nuclear weapons and the essential evidence that was needed to drive policy related to those weapons. More than 80% of the world’s governments, key UN agencies and international organizations, most experts and civil society organizations accepted the evidence as it was presented. In Vienna such a Conference produced the Humanitarian Pledge. More than 115 states have signed into the Pledge so far, committing those governments to cooperate to fill the legal gap regarding nuclear weapons. The states without nuclear weapons established an unequivocal moral and political norm and legal embodiment that nuclear weapons must be eliminated before they are used again.

In 1998 and again in 2008, the World Medical Association condemned nuclear weapons and called on the governments of the world to work for their elimination. The World Medical Association also adopted such a statement at the meeting in Moscow in October 2015.

The abolition of nuclear weapons is the core mission of the IPPNW. Citing the first principle of the medical profession — that doctors have an obligation to prevent what they cannot treat — the IPPNW launched in 2007 the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Together with hundreds of civil society partner organizations, it was campaigning for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, leading to their elimination.

Astana Declaration of the IPPNW’s 21st World Congress, adopted on August 30, 2014, stated that “the renewed awakening to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that is now driving apolitical initiative for their abolition is the most hopeful development in more than 20 years since the end of the Cold War.... With sufficient courage and determination, the ban treaty, championed by ICAN and IPPNW, can be completed in

a very short time, and can hasten the arrival of a nuclear-weapons-free world".

Since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the medical and international relief communities have understood that there can be no meaningful response to the terrible devastation caused by nuclear weapons. All existing resources would be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the devastation. Based on this understanding, doctors have a responsibility to prevent what cannot be cured. Banning and eliminating nuclear weapons is the best and only way to prevent their use.

And for me it was not great surprise that worldwide lobbying of nuclear ban treaty by physicians finished for IPPNW by, in fact, the second Nobel Peace Prize in October 2017. IPPNW founded ICAN as a sister organization, which united more than 400 antinuclear organizations around the world in successful attempt to stigmatize nuclear weapons.

Принципы построения устойчивого мира

Юрий Куршин

Principles for Building Sustainable Peace

Yuri Kirshin

Аннотация. Ядерные государства занимают лидирующее положение в мировом сообществе. Они организаторы глобальных процессов, творцы мирового порядка. Ядерные государства являются не только новой общностью, но и угрозой гибели человечества, так как доктрины всех ядерных государств предусматривают возможность применения ядерного оружия. В этом контексте новым вызовом является стремление государств создать кибероружие, что только усиливает глобальные угрозы выживания человечества. В ответ на вызовы и угрозы XXI и XXII веков в статье предлагается концепция ликвидации войн как образа жизни человечества на пути к формированию стабильного мира. По мнению автора, в создавшейся международной обстановке необходимо реализовать принципы, провозглашаемые в идеологии космополитизма. Статья раскрывает ценности космополитизма, которые позволяют обеспечить выживание человечества на пути ликвидации войн как традиционного образа жизни человечества.

Ключевые слова. Ядерные государства, мировой порядок, войны, мир.

Abstract. Nuclear-weapon states take a leading position in the world community. They are the organizers of global processes, the creators of the world order. Nuclear-weapon states represent the threat of destruction to humanity and to each other. Doctrines of all the nuclear-weapon states are based upon the possibility of use of nuclear weapons. Currently, some states try to create cyber weapons that can lead to a new reality, threatening the survival of mankind. The response to the challenges and threats of the XXIst and XXIIInd centuries is the concept of eliminating wars as a way of life of mankind on the way towards perpetual peace. In the current international situation the implementation of the concept requires realization of the principles explained at the ideology of cosmopolitanism. The article

reveals the values of cosmopolitanism, which allow to ensure the survival of mankind, to eliminate war as a millennial way of life of mankind and to achieve Perpetual peace.

Key words. Nuclear states, world order, war, Perpetual peace.

1. Меры по ликвидации войн и установлению Вечного мира

Ликвидация войн, установление вечного мира требуют как принципиально новых, так и традиционных военных и гуманитарных мероприятий для предотвращения войн.

Военные мероприятия

Важным движением в этом направлении является создание Единой системы военной безопасности человечества. Одним из компонентов такой системы является всемирная стратегия взаимного сдерживания: стратегия взаимного ядерного сдерживания между РФ и США, система ядерного сдерживания всех ядерных государств, запрет на создание кибероружия, система взаимного сдерживания между всеми конфликтующими неядерными государствами, система сдерживания международного терроризма, взаимное сдерживание религиозных войн.

Стабилизация отношений между Россией и США на основе специального антиядерного соглашения между двумя странами, направленного на немедленное прекращение гонки ядерных вооружений, на отказ от борьбы за военно-техническое превосходство, может стать основой новой структуры в двусторонних отношениях. Важным элементом стабилизации отношений является сотрудничество между Россией и США в освоении космоса, демографической сфере, в области культуры, в отношении к окружающей среде, в оказании помощи другим государствам при природных и техногенных катастрофах.

Другим важным направлением является развитие российско-китайских отношений. Китайские и российские мыслители, философы, ученые мечтали о Вечном мире и предлагали конкретные меры по его достижению. Продолжая эту традицию в современном мире, в качестве первого шага по пути к мирному сосуществованию

государств возможно заключение между Россией и КНР «Договора о Вечном мире».

Для достижения мирного сосуществования как общечеловеческого явления народов, государств, мировых религий, религиозных конфессий необходим также отказ от классового тактического подхода социализма, стремление к ненасилию, миролюбию, недопущение создания ОМУ, расширение конвергенции. Только на этой основе возможна всемирная демилитаризация человечества как средство ликвидации войн на пути к формированию Вечного мира. К этому может привести только ликвидация материальных и духовных причин всех видов войн и упреждающие действия в отношении появления новых причин войн.

XXI век — начало постоянной, целеустремленной, организованной борьбы по ликвидации войн для создания Вечного мира. Для повышения эффективности борьбы по ликвидации войн важны международные институты. Назрела необходимость в постепенном превращении ООН во всемирный орган законодательной, исполнительной и судебской власти, в центр принятия решений во многих сферах жизнедеятельности человечества. Большую роль ООН должна играть в создании Всемирной Дорожной карты развития мирового сообщества на основе дорожных карт всех государств, учитывающих религиозные конфессии, социально-природный характер государств, состояние природных циклов. Такие дорожные карты определяют способы, методы, средства для достижения Вечного мира, приоритеты реформ по всемирной демилитаризации. Такие задачи будут определяться принципом «мыслить поколениями».

Борьба с международным терроризмом в государствах, в религиозных конфессиях — это защита Отечества: политических, социальных, идеологических систем, культуры, религий, традиций, истории. Международный терроризм не должен стать образом жизни человечества. В этом контексте «гуманитарная интервенция» — общечеловеческое явление, имеющее отечественный характер. Если в справедливых отечественных войнах это защита Отечества народов, государств, религиозных конфессий, то в «гуманитарных

интервенциях» — это защита всего человечества, планетарного Отечества. «Гуманитарная интервенция» как защита допустима при следующих условиях: не удалось использовать принципы политической обусловленности («вознаграждение»); обнаружены признаки, что государство может создать ОМУ, возникла угроза международному миру и военной безопасности человечеству.

Гуманитарные интервенции отражают постепенную эволюцию в морально-политической оценке войн. Участие в войне оправдано и справедливо, если оно способствует выживанию человечества, ликвидации войн, демилитаризации, сберегает биологический фонд и приближает Вечный мир. Народы должны нести моральную ответственность за развязывание захватнических войн, за активное участие в них. В этой связи Отечественные, оборонительные войны могут выступать как способ ликвидации войн на пути формирования Вечного мира. Отечественные войны — общечеловеческое явление для защиты народонаселения, социальных, политических, экономических систем, всех форм общественного сознания истории. Основной целью отечественных войн является военная победа для демилитаризации, превращения агрессора в миролюбивое государство.

Гуманизация войн является необходимым элементом для формирования миролюбивой внешней и военной политики и принятия оборонительных военных доктрин. Гуманизмом должны быть ограничены все аспекты войн: политическое содержание, вооруженная борьба, итоги и последствия войн, невоенные формы борьбы. Это должно привести к ограничению наиболее разрушительных способов ведения войн, их масштабов в пространстве и во времени, а после окончания войн — к справедливым военным договорам, примирению воюющих сторон.

В этой связи нормы международного гуманитарного права нуждаются в более интенсивном развитии, ориентированном на выживание человечества и на сохранение биологического фонда. Принятие Международного договора о торговле оружием, соответствующего сохранению демографического фонда будет способствовать выживанию человечества. В этом контексте актуальным

является усиление правовой ответственности за преступления перед человечеством, особенно совершаемых по политическому заказу политиков, военных стратегов в области разработки, создания и использования новых видов ОМУ.

Гуманитарные мероприятия

«Культура мира» — это культура для человечества с системой ценностей на основе миролюбия, гуманности, милосердия и ненасилия. Только такая культура способна объединить людей быстрее, чем политика. Переход от культуры войны и насилия к культуре мира и ненасилия возможен посредством диалога культур. Поддержка антивоенного движения в государствах, международных движений сторонников мира со стороны ООН будет способствовать гуманизации международных отношений. Важную роль в этом направлении играет народная дипломатия, развитие туризма, опережающее развитие народов, государств, религиозных конфессий в политической, экономической, социальной, культурологической, демографической, моральной, научной, законодательной сферах в интересах ликвидации войн, формирования Вечного мира на основе главного принципа интеграции — ненасилия.

Сотрудничество современных локальных цивилизаций: китайской, индийской, японской, западноевропейской (евроатлантической), исламской, восточноевропейской, латиноамериканской и африканской — важнейшее интеграционное средство на пути к Вечному миру. Именно миролюбивые государства — маяки будущего, способные заменить военные доктрины на совместные доктрины мира и войны. Уже в современных международных реалиях такие практические шаги как создание «Тройки» (США, Россия, Китай) будут способны стабилизировать международную обстановку в Латинской Америке, Азии, Африке, Европе. Немаловажной является идея «Концерта Великих Держав XXI века», включающая 10–17 государств всех континентов, объединившихся для предотвращения войн между великими державами, поддержания политического равновесия, создания условий для совместной деятельности по решению глобальных проблем.

На сегодняшний день главным способом ликвидации войн являются миротворческие усилия. Объектами внимания миротворцев должны быть и пограничные территории, которыми в разное время владели два пограничных государства: между Россией и Украиной — это Крым; между Индией и Пакистаном — Кашмир; между Сербией и Албанией — Косово; между Францией и Германией — Эльзас-Лотарингия. Современным ненасильственным способом борьбы за ликвидацию войн также являются референдумы, которые позволяют определить готовность каждого государства жить без войн.

Современные религии обеспечивают сохранение огромных человеческих масс в едином цивилизационном пространстве. Религии осуждают войны, проповедуют идеи мира, добра, любви, выступают против религиозного экстремизма. Для формирования Вечного мира возникает необходимость во Всемирной религиозной организации (ВРО) по типу ООН, которая бы способствовала усилению роли религий в ликвидации войн. Пацифизм превращается в общечеловеческое явление, которое содействует изоляции агрессивных сил, обузданию авантюризма в военной политике. Модель мирной жизни делает человека в полной мере абсолютной ценностью с возможностями полной реализации творческого потенциала.

2. Проекты. Уроки. Принципы

В интересах ликвидации войн на пути к Вечному миру важно изменение роли народа во всемирной истории в системе «народ-власти», нейтрализация разрушительной составляющей научно-технического прогресса, рациональное и справедливое использование ресурсов Земли и Космоса, управление всемирными демографическими процессами, учитывающее влияние общественных и природных циклов на ликвидацию войн.

Всемирно-исторический путь к Вечному миру предполагает регулирование деятельности человечества на пути к диалогу, сотрудничеству, равноправному партнерству всех членов мирового сообщества. Этот путь требует огромной исторической мотивации и строгой нормативной базы. Такой всемирно-исторический путь может поднять на принципиально новый уровень взаимодействие

человечества и природы. Таким образом, ликвидация войн — социально-природное явление и одновременно исторический процесс.

Всемирно-исторический путь к Вечному миру реален только при условии, которое состоит в том, что человечество извлечет уроки из XX века: от чего надо отказаться, что сохранить, что сделать в будущем. Но нужно также понимать, что в XXI веке еще будут продолжаться войны, являющиеся образом жизни человечества. Если сохранится взгляд на войны как продолжение политики насильственными методами, добиться Вечного мира будет невозможно. Война — явление историческое, оно возникло на определенном этапе развития человечества и характеризует образ жизни человечества с его несовершенностями. Война также и социально-природное явление — организованная борьба для достижения политических, социальных, экономических, культурологических, демографических, этнических, религиозных и природных целей.

Поэтому очень важно понимать основные принципы ликвидации войн как образа жизни человечества на пути к Вечному миру: укрепляя военную безопасность государств, необходимо думать о демилитаризации. Этому будет способствовать не только система особых мирных договоров между государствами, вносящими вклад в создание Вечного мира, но и поощрение желания конфликтующих государств вместо военных доктрин принимать совместные доктрины мира и войн.

Основными приоритетными направлениями в целях ликвидации войн являются:

- Военная безопасность человечества от земных и космических угроз, которая имеет приоритет над военной безопасностью отдельных государств. Не существует такого национального интереса, который превосходил бы общий интерес человечества — обеспечение своего выживания. Только мировое сообщество обладает достаточным для этого материальными и духовными ресурсами и ценностями.
- Угрозу для мирового сообщества представляет международный терроризм, поэтому система военной безопасности предусматривающая борьбу с международным терроризмом, также об-

ладает приоритетом по отношению к военной безопасности отдельных государств. Борьбу с международным терроризмом ведут силовые и гуманитарные структуры соответственными средствами и способами. Гуманитарная борьба должна превалировать над силовой. Она обладает значительно большими асимметричными возможностями в целях и используемых средствах, чем борьба силовая.

- Очень важно, чтобы все религиозные конфессии признавали принципы и приоритеты мирового сообщества. Интересы военной безопасности человечества выше интересов, взглядов, доктрин любой конфессии по вопросам войны и мира. Нераспространение ОМУ, предотвращение ядерных войн и кибервойн, борьба с международным терроризмом, обеспечение выживания человечества важнее доктринальных положений тех или иных религиозных конфессий.
- Исходя из того, что главной проблемой для человечества является выживание, то основной приоритет — это противодействие распространению оружия массового уничтожения, предотвращение ядерных войн и кибервойн.

3. Роль космополитизма в ликвидации войн и в формировании Вечного мира

Чтобы ликвидировать войны на пути установления Вечного мира, необходима особая идеология и основанная на ней особая практика. Сравнительный анализ прошлых и современных идеологий свидетельствуют, что космополитизм может стать необходимым условием и средством ликвидации войн для формирования Вечного мира.

Космополитизм возник в античный период благодаря усилиям выдающихся мыслителей, философов, народов, государств, локальных цивилизаций, человечества в целом. Главным противоречием человечества космополиты считают борьбу космополитизма и антикосмополитизма, космополитизма и несовершенностей человечества. Борьба в войнах между космополитизмом и антикосмополитизмом проявляется в целях, способах борьбы, в итогах и последствиях.

Цель космополитизма в главном — обеспечить выживание человечества, ликвидировать войны, добиться единства человечества при его культурном, этническом и религиозном разнообразии. Философский смысл будущего человечества заключается в том, что Земля — общий дом, единое общее Отечество, Вечный мир; переход от системы «Общество — Земля» к системе «Общество — Земля — Космос».

Ценности космополитизма, ключевые слова, принципы космополитизма: благие деяния, общественная польза, душевность, благотворительность, всеобщее гостеприимство, озабоченность судьбой мира. Добродетели космополитизма: миролюбие, человеколюбие, милосердие, сопереживание, братство, солидарность, справедливость. При «встрече» добродетелей космополитизма с конкретными явлениями, процессами (отношения людей в государствах, между государствами; природные и техногенные катастрофы, примирение, «гуманитарные интервенции») происходит наращивание ценностей, их содержание расширяется, углубляется.

Космополитизм реализуется через космополитизацию, распространение, внедрение ценностей, идеологии космополитизма и космополитической практики в мировом сообществе, а также их усвоение человеком, социальными группами, народами, государствами, человечеством в целом. Субъекты космополитизации: модернизированные демократии, ООН, антивоенные движения, анти-террористические структуры, общественные организации, деятели культуры, представители мировых религий, религиозных конфессий. Космополитизация предполагает создание в государствах космополитических структур, включая создание Космополитической Ассоциации.

В настоящее время космополитизм переживает кризис. Авторитарные и тоталитарные государства, идеологи фашизма, марксизма в ленинской и сталинской трактовке, диктаторских режимов, идеологи находящихся в кризисе мировых демократий извратили сущность космополитизма. Космополитизм нуждается в реабилитации во всем мировом сообществе.

Новые космополиты верят, что будущее общество будет преобразовано, оно явится лучшим способом бытия человечества. Стартовая позиция нового космополитизма — XXI век. Новые космополиты внесут вклад в ликвидацию войн, в формирование Вечного мира. Рождающаяся космополитическая демократия внесет вклад в ликвидацию кризиса мировых демократий, в модернизацию ценностей демократий. Космополитическая демократия охватит человека, отношения людей в государствах, отношения между государствами, всемирный демографический процесс. Разные модели демократий будут обогащать друг друга. От системы враждующих государств мир перейдет к единому космополитическому обществу.

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ЧАСТЬ II. В ПОИСКАХ РЕШЕНИЯ РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫХ ПРОБЛЕМ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Роль региональных межгосударственных организаций в сферах геополитики и обеспечения безопасности

Александр Никитин

Geopolitical and Security Role of Regional Inter-State Organizations

Alexander Nikitin

Global context must inevitably involve not only correlation of forces and interests of major world powers, but as well coordination of interests and actions of major international organizations. Regional inter-state organizations recognized (under credentials of the UN Charter Chapter VIII) as regional collective security providers are of special importance for the effectiveness and “harmony” within the “Global Concert” to be shaped.

Regional Inter-State Organizations (RIOs) at Eurasian Geopolitical Context

Europe boasts the highest density of multilateral international interaction mechanisms in the world. The key regional structures are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Added to the number of European multilateral interaction mechanisms should be the bodies that have sprung up on the territory of the former Soviet Union. We are talking first of all about the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The strict focus of these structures first and foremost on the post-

Soviet international political space determines their specific character and importance in the context of ensuring European security.

In the system of multilateral cooperation in Europe a certain role is played by the United Nations (UN) and numerous structures aimed at the development of sub-regional cooperation.

Name	Number of Participating States	Notes
OSCE	57	Includes the United States and Canada, Caucasus states (3) and Central Asian states (5)
Council of Europe	47	Includes Caucasus states (3)
European Union	28	Composition changed by Brexit
NATO	29	Includes the United States and Canada
CIS	10	Includes Caucasus states (2) and Central Asian states (4)
CSTO	6	Includes Caucasus states (1) and Central Asian states (3)
United Nations	193 (including 45 from Europe)	Out of the five permanent Security Council members four are from the Euro-Atlantic area
Sub-regional structures (10+)	5+	Among the most significant are: the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

The following trends in the development of geopolitics in Europe are worth mentioning.

First, the expansion of the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO. These structures are gradually taking on an almost pan-European dimension, if not by membership, then by area of operation and proclaimed responsibility.

Second, the growing interaction between EU/NATO states and non-EU/NATO states, with CIS countries occupying the top of the list of the latter. The EU is the biggest trading partner for most of them. It offers CIS and Transcaucasian countries prospective association and closer

cooperation, including establishing a free-trade zone in exchange for harmonizing economic regulation, technical standards and the basic principles of the political system. The EU maintains direct political dialogue with Central Asian countries with the aim of expanding economic, energy, and financial cooperation, cementing the rule of law and respect of human rights, and interacting to meet new security challenges and threats.

NATO develops differentiated partnerships with most CIS countries on the basis of the principle of keeping the door open for their eventual membership.

Third, the “division of labor” among European regional organizations. In the 1990s, the idea of transforming the OSCE into an umbrella organization and establishing an “executive committee” vested with powers identical to those of the UN Security Council was mooted. It was suggested that the OSCE take on conflict settlement functions or delegate them to other organizations (NATO, EU, CIS). But such an approach failed to garner the necessary support.

A new practice of interaction took shape during the settlement of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 1999). Under UN political guidance, the NATO alliance performed the tasks of providing security, while the OSCE took charge of forming democratic institutions (including justice and police bodies), holding elections, establishing the rule of law and the supremacy of human rights. The European Union, backed by specialist international organizations, was responsible for economic reconstruction.

Fourth, a functional shift in the activities of Euro-Atlantic structures. The OSCE holds a comprehensive (though not exclusive) mandate to discuss security issues, economic and humanitarian cooperation, crisis management and conflict settlement. NATO was originally devised as a collective defense organization, the EU as a body of economic integration, and the Council of Europe as a guardian of democracy and human rights standards. However, over recent years a certain shift in the functional areas of activity of the above-mentioned structures has been apparent.

As it scales down its military activity and potential in Europe, NATO is starting to become involved in the settlement of crises outside Europe. The European Union is stepping up its security functions, taking part in

the management of crises in Europe and beyond, helping respond to the new challenges and threats, etc. As the OSCE and NATO tone down their activity in South-East Europe, the EU is stepping in to take their place.

This results in higher potential interchangeability of the activities performed by the European multilateral structures. The situation, accentuated by the high density of such structures in the region, gives rise to a certain competition between them. At the same time, when a crisis erupts it becomes possible to assign different roles to the OSCE, the EU, NATO and the UN in order to cater to the different stakeholders' tastes.

In general, it appears appropriate to set and resolve the tasks of upgrading the European security architecture while taking account of the following:

- It is legitimate to raise the issue of how effective the existing multilateral organizations are in Europe, and of their broader interaction in the interests of strengthening European security.
- Russia is interested that the CSTO features on the list of the main protagonists of the “European concert” of multilateral structures. To achieve this, it is necessary to at least make efforts towards increasing the viability of this organization.
- It is important to bear in mind that the overwhelming majority of European countries do not see any need in performing a profound change or an extensive makeover of the existing mechanism of multilateral cooperation, considering it, if not utterly efficient, at least adequate. With further expansion of the EU and NATO and their closer cooperation with CIS countries on the cards, the potential number of supporters of the “coalition for change” may shrink.
- Promoting the idea of a brand-new organization that would take charge of guaranteeing European security from scratch appears equally problematic. The international political landscape of the continent is overloaded with various multilateral structures. Without serious reform, adding a new — and important — one to their number could only increase the clutter. Especially as the newcomer would require its “own field” assigned to it and a delimitation of the competences with other bodies already in place on the European continent.

- The difficulties that the existing regional organizations experience in responding to crises in Europe stem not so much from an institutional deficit as from a lack of enthusiasm from the participating countries to seek compromise.
- Another problem lies with the key member-countries not being sufficiently prepared to expand the field of independent action by the regional organizations or to allow them more autonomy.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?

Formed in 1991, immediately at the days of collapse of the Soviet Union, by now the CIS already accomplished its main function: to provide relatively peaceful “divorce” of the 15 former Republics and division of the infrastructure of the former USSR into 15 new independent states.

There are a number of reasons underpinning the continuing importance of the CIS for Russia. However, fully-fledged and effective participation of this structure in the resolution of problems related to ensuring European security as well as its involvement in the process of upgrading the pan-European architecture appears problematic.

There are at least two main reasons for this. Firstly, a limited viability of the CIS, which results in its vague positioning in the European international political space.

Secondly, the unmistakably dominant role of Russia in the Commonwealth prompts some of its members to exercise caution in entrusting the structure with any meaningful authority and powers, and external counterparts to refuse to consider it as a "powerful" figure in the international arena because in their view it would be tantamount to agreeing to Russian domination in the organization.

Still, in a number of aspects CIS-related activities correlate with the problems of European security. For instance, the Council of the Heads of State may focus its attention on it, and the issues of security and military cooperation can be tackled in a more detailed way by the Council of Defense Ministers, which to all appearances is so far concerning itself with relatively peripheral issues. In the field of "soft security" (cooperation on such issues as drug trafficking and the fight against trans-border crime) the

CIS continues to play a role, even though it is facing competition from the CSTO and GUAM.

The biggest joint project by the CIS countries in the military field is cooperation in setting up the Unified Air Defense System. Still, Ukraine favors bilateral cooperation, while its prospective NATO membership adds to the uncertainty of its position in the project. Accordingly, the logic of moving the system under the auspices of the CSTO as a more compact and homogeneous body becomes more convincing.

Early expectations of a rather important role to be played by the CIS in the settlement of conflicts on the territory of its member states have proved futile. The only peacekeeping mission ever to take place under the auspices of the CIS (and also approved by the UN Security Council) has been dispatched to Abkhazia.

The role of the CIS in the process of upgrading the architecture of European security has to be defined with caution and realism.

- An artificial reanimation of this structure is problematic, which limits its capabilities in impacting the tasks of European security.
- It is worth outlining the presence of the CIS (even in the most general terms) in the documents, decisions and mechanisms aimed at strengthening security over the former Soviet space (excluding the Baltic States). In particular, it may turn out to be politically worthwhile to counterbalance the involvement in the region of other multilateral structures (most importantly, the EU and NATO).
- On some specific aspects ("soft security", the Unified Air Defense System) the CIS may be considered as a reserve structure in case if CSTO for any reasons will go out of the game.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a New Type of Geopolitical Actor in Eurasia

Important sub-regional inter-state actor is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), consisting of six states of the Eurasia (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan), while Uzbekistan after entering into organization twice finally withdrew from it in 2012.

The CSTO may be defined as a *developing multifunction security structure of a new type*. Throughout the current decade it has been fine-

tuned to combine two major functions: countering traditional external military threats (creation of a military union, unification and merger of the military infrastructures of the seven participating states) on the one hand, and countering new threats and challenges on the other.

The specific character of the CSTO as far as its membership is concerned is in the existence of three de facto autonomous segments, united by Russia's uncontested core role in the organization. Belarus, Armenia and the Central Asian countries face different external threats creating serious objective difficulties in fostering horizontal ties between them and limiting the possibility of developing military and political cooperation within the CSTO framework in general. Russia emerges as the main integrating force on the territory of the CSTO as the only country capable of providing real assistance in ensuring the security of its partners in each of the three above-mentioned territorial segments.

For them, cooperation with Russia is an important but not the only foreign policy priority; they are also looking for ways to counter external and internal threats (as well as to strengthen their own positions in relation to Russia) in other fields. Other problems inside the CSTO are the disagreements among the Central Asian countries (struggle for influence, an increasing water deficit, etc.).

In 2009, the members agreed to set up Collective Forces for Operative Reaction (CFOR) — in contrast to earlier such attempts, not on a regional but on a common basis. All member states have agreed to contribute military contingents (Russia — a division and a brigade, Kazakhstan — a brigade, the rest — one battalion each). The total strength of the CFOR is planned at about 16,000. The CSTO is also planning to set up a joint air defense system and a joint threat identification system for chemical and biological warfare. Military and technical cooperation has been actively promoted. A system of joint training of military personnel has taken shape.

As far as countering "new threats" is concerned the CSTO approved set of documents regulating the issues of joint peacekeeping; significant efforts are being undertaken to promote counterterrorist activities (information exchange, joint exercises, etc.). One of the key elements of the CSTO's work is the fight against drug trafficking.

The CSTO, in the context of Russian efforts to upgrade the European security architecture, may become one of its elements due to a number of current and prospective factors: it is the only multilateral structure in the post-Soviet area capable of conducting military operations; in this capacity it can be used independently or as a partner (counterpart) of the EU, NATO or the OSCE; its role may turn out to be outstanding in efforts to stop drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe; supporting US and NATO efforts in Afghanistan could become a step of paramount importance for increased international political exposure of the CSTO; more generally — a focus by the organization on certain "new threats" (drug trafficking, terrorism) could be interpreted as a move away from the traditionalistic approaches to providing security.

Russia is interested in promoting the CSTO as an element of the new system of European security. At the same time it is important to identify the circumstances that work against it and make efforts to at least alleviate them. Among them are, for instance, the notions that are widespread in the West that the CSTO is first and foremost a "Russian tool" and that by strengthening security and fighting terrorism the organization understands a perpetuation of the existing "undemocratic regimes". To that effect efforts should be made to achieve greater CSTO transparency, broader informational support, and interaction with non-governmental organizations.

The possibility of implementation and the effectiveness of the following measures to heighten the significance of the CSTO in the eyes of its participating countries and external counterparties should be considered: regularly briefing the leadership of the CSTO states on the development or the outcome of certain bilateral negotiations (on nuclear disarmament, for instance); conducting consultations on the issues of global politics; and advance notification of important diplomatic or military steps or initiatives.

It is imperative to think about strengthening the real character of military functions, which will promote interest in the CSTO as a partner from NATO and the EU. In that sense the success of the CFOR project and convincingly presented information to that effect could be very significant. Another line of efforts could be making this particular organization responsible for effective support of the logistics of NATO's air operations

in Afghanistan or organizing military cargo transit through Central Asian states to Afghanistan by land.

CSTO and NATO: Just Neighbors or Geopolitical Rivals ?

With regard to the functional nature of CSTO as geopolitical entity, we should note that two major Western integrative institutions are of a similar nature — the NATO and the European Union. Both have to varying degrees combined political integration and military integration (or, if speaking on broader terms, security integration), which in principle makes possible their linking-up and also, sometime in the future, coordination of functions with CSTO.

Interaction with NATO is one of the most problematic areas of the international political dimension of CSTO's activities.

For the perspective of international law, CSTO can be categorized as the same type of organization as NATO: a regional multi-state security organization with authorities corresponding to those indicated in Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. Both organizations are recognized as such by the UN.

In contrast to NATO, CSTO already has a legal framework for developing cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. CSTO's Council on Collective Security adopted a decision on the key areas of dialogue and cooperation with NATO.

But a reciprocal move on NATO's part did not follow. The following year one particular issue was highlighted in the general cooperation agenda — combating narcotics trafficking. But this proposal for cooperation also went unanswered.

The North Atlantic Alliance is still in no hurry to establish institutionalized relations, preferring rather to work separately with CSTO members within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

CSTO is not mentioned in NATO's new Strategy Concept. But it does indicate that Euro-Atlantic security “is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe.” At the same time, the specific list of international organizations

for partnership is limited to the United Nations and European Union, with reference to enhanced cooperation within the context of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. However, this document does pay particular attention to opportunities for enhancing cooperation with Russia.

At the same time, the Strategic Concept speaks of the importance of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace program, which include all member states of CSTO. However, it seems important that partnerships are to be enhanced through “flexible formats” across and beyond existing frameworks for cooperation. So it seems that there is a conceptual basis for establishing relations between NATO and CSTO.

However, in contrast to Russia-NATO relations, along the CSTO-NATO track we see neither perceptible debates nor purposeful exchanges of opinions, not to mention constructive and specific proposals, perhaps with the exception of the Afghan issue.

With this in mind, we should note that both organizations with their respective fundamental documents have the opportunity to develop flexible forms of interaction. Considering the existing hindrances to relationship building, perhaps it would be prudent to develop cooperation through specific programs and focus areas as a starting point on the path toward possible institutionally formalized cooperation.

The need to launch discussions arises out of the various possible scenarios for the development of the international situation. Of concern are the most pressing difficult issues which must be addressed according to priority, including those which skeptics say are preventing the two organizations from establishing cooperative relations.

Among these arguments that provide grounds for experts’ most pessimistic or skeptical assessments of cooperation prospects, we should pay close attention to the following.

1) NATO’s readiness for cooperation will signal the organization’s possible support of integration processes in the CIS, with Russia playing the leading role, and recognition of Russia’s right to have its own special interests in this area.

Even within the framework of such an assessment, constructive scenarios of cooperation between the two organizations are limited to

resolution of the situation in and around Afghanistan. And even here, there are suspicions that the US and its allies in NATO want to drag Russia and CSTO into the war in that country and thus split up both the burden and responsibility. But, as speculation goes, even if such a scenario plays out, it would have to be under the auspices of the United Nations, which would require a UN Security Council resolution. And under such circumstances the signing of a cooperation agreement directly between CSTO and NATO is unlikely.

2) NATO has proven uncompromising in its preference to develop direct relations with the member states of CSTO rather than with the organization itself, and this has been confirmed by the alliance's approach in recent decades.

3) Cold War stereotypes continue to hold sway. At NATO it is a commonly held belief that CSTO was created by Russia with the aim of offsetting the alliance. Furthermore, Brussels, according to skeptics, continues on a course aimed at maintaining its 'military and political monopoly.' The alliance does not intend to support the idea of coalitional political and military multi-polarity, particularly in Eurasia.

4) The 'China factor' and the cooperation of Russia and several other CSTO members participating in SCO are additional considerations. In this regard, particular emphasis is given to the possible negative of Beijing to the development of relations between CSTO and NATO. In any case, Chinese concerns will be an issue and relations between Moscow and Beijing may cool. Furthermore, in assessing the various options for cooperation between CSTO and NATO, the views of other SCO member states and observers not participating in CSTO must be taken into consideration.

5) CSTO is not without its own problems. The organization has certain internal contradictions, including its geographical scope, as well as the insufficiently clear and active positioning of the organization in such a way as to provide a big-picture understanding of its plans and objectives for NATO.

6) NATO's adherence to a course aimed at developing bilateral relations with individual CSTO member states reinforces suspicions that certain states are engaged in a double game. The countries, meeting with NATO behind Russia's back, are supposedly placing an emphasis on their

readiness to cooperate with the alliance through the Partnership for Peace program. Furthermore, there is some opposition within the organization to building relations with NATO. An agreement between CSTO and NATO is viewed by the leadership of some countries as implying the transfer of certain functions to Russia, which plays a leading role in the organization, thus amounting to an infringement on their sovereignty in the realm of foreign affairs.

7) The plans of the US and NATO to expand their presence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Central Asia, are not a good fit with the objective of building relations with CSTO on the whole. These plans can be realized through bilateral relations with individual member countries of CSTO, which in turn as an organization is quite negative about separate relations. And such relations are a source of irritation that serves to reinforce within CSTO arguments against further development of relations with NATO.

8) CSTO continues to be perceived in the West as an organization which supports ‘authoritarian regimes’ and some of its member states are qualified as such.

9) The ‘Belarus factor’ is worth a separate mention. The critical attitude of the West toward the current leadership of Belarus presents an obstacle to cooperation with CSTO.

By all appearances, the recognition of the organization as an equal partner of NATO faces not only external but also internal obstacles. The latter arise not only from within the organization but also from the positions of a number of member countries, including Russia. At the same time, given the lack of progress in bilateral relations between the two security organizations, it is understandable that the silence in Brussels with regard to cooperation initiatives has resulted in the disappointment of the leadership of CSTO and Russia.

Experts’ efforts, including multidisciplinary efforts, should be activated. Such efforts could be based on three ‘platforms’ — 1) within Russia, 2) among experts of all CSTO member countries and 3) joint CSTO-NATO expert consultations.

Naturally, it would be problematic to launch a CSTO-NATO mechanism that greatly differs from the themes Russia-NATO engagement, which has already made some substantial progress, and it will require concerted

and extensive efforts to achieve visible results. At the same time, it should be noted that a number of the problems that need to be resolved for the sake of developing relations between Russia and NATO are similar to the issues hindering CSTO-NATO cooperation. Proposals aimed at resolving these problems were put forward in INSOR's report published last year — *Prospects for the Development of Russia-NATO Relations*.

Efforts made toward making this possible would be highly useful and not only with regard to the objective of launching a mechanism for interaction between CSTO and NATO. Also implied here is the study and discussion of a wide range of security issues which could be resolved through the cooperation of these two organizations. CSTO-NATO discussions could very well broaden and elevate the scope of interaction to something much greater than, for example, cooperation on the Afghan situation. It could encompass Euro-Atlantic security from Vancouver to Vladivostok, a European security treaty, etc.

It is quite clear that bilateral cooperation is not a goal in and of itself. It follows that more than just dialogue and talk is needed; the dialogue must be topical and serious, focused on areas of mutual interest and value.

This dialogue could touch upon assessments of the advantages of each organization in addressing various common threats. One of the advantages of CSTO in comparison with NATO is its mechanism for cooperation between various law-enforcement and special forces in the fight against terrorism. And in this area such cooperation is very expedient.

In terms of a step-by-step plan for the near future, we could consider the following.

While working on CSTO's doctrinal documents, it would be useful to explore the possibilities for aligning them with the new Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic alliance. We should not forget the experience of the NATO Expert Group which during the drafting of the new concept consulted with Russian colleagues. Likewise, CSTO-NATO dialogue could in part focus on the principles expressed in the doctrinal documents of CSTO and which wording NATO might consider problematic or, to the contrary, positive.

Much of value for experts' efforts toward establishing CSTO-NATO dialogue can be found in the work of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

Making use of these previous efforts would help optimize work and put the focus on the problems specifically concerning the relations of these two security organizations and the subsequent resolution of these problems.

For example, this concerns the issue of peacekeeping. Nearly a decade ago the NRC Peacekeeping Working Group agreed upon a document stipulating the ‘Political Aspects for a Generic Concept for Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations.’

An important practical task is the provision of at least some level of operation compatibility of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force and the Peacekeeping Force of CSTO with the NATO Response Force. An agenda needs to be drawn up to outline the steps necessary to achieve such operational compatibility between the two alliances.

It is possible to invite to trainings of CSTO’s combined arms task forces not only observers from NATO and NATO member states but also incorporate training scenarios involving joint operations with NATO forces. It would be appropriate for starters to invite a small group (perhaps a platoon of paratroopers) from the NATO Response Force to work on operational coordination.

If we look at the current cooperation development between Russia and the US and Russia and NATO for Afghanistan, we see that it touches four areas. Firstly, intensive consultations on the future of Afghanistan. Secondly, the northern transit corridor. Thirdly, narcotics trafficking countermeasures. And, fourthly, cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council is largely focused on two aspects: training of narcotics specialists in Russia and issues related to a trust fund for repairing and maintaining the Afghan helicopter fleet. It is clear that narcotics trafficking is a central issue of these consultations.

It seems that cooperation along the Russia-NATO and Russia-US tracks is not going to be sufficient to find comprehensive solutions. Sooner or later the need will arise to establish full-fledged relations with CSTO. This organization has serious experience as well as the potential to make an important contribution in this difficult area. It is no coincidence that NATO observers are paying close attention to Operation Canal, a CSTO anti-narcotics effort.

At the same time, judging by the declarations of US and NATO officials, they are not against consultations with CSTO on Afghanistan, including on the narcotics trafficking issue. Furthermore, Washington and Brussels (just as Russia) are in search of regional partners for solving the Afghanistan problem as well as practical areas for cooperation and new methods of interaction. But at the same time, the customary caveat is always made about the need of the US and NATO to “understand the practical meaning” of cooperation with CSTO and “clarify what can be achieved” through such cooperation.

In this regard, even accepting the skeptical viewpoint that such remarks mask the clear lack of a desire on the part of Brussels and Washington to establish cooperative relations with CSTO, it would be prudent to once again raise the issue of the possible opportunities for CSTO in regulating the situation in and around Afghanistan with specific rationale and proposals. And at the same time we should not make the appearances that we are engaging in this gratuitously; we should undertake this based on our own interests and concerns. Work in this area with an emphasis on the narcotics trafficking issue (at least for the short term) should be invigorated.

We should not lose sight of the fact that in recent years CSTO has become increasingly engaged in the Afghanistan issue. Its structure has been incorporated into the CIS Antiterrorism Center. Operation Canal is ongoing and has been successful in seizing narcotics contraband. Russia and other CSTO member states have experience dating back to the Soviet era as well as analytical capacity that could be used by NATO. It should be noted that as the public attitude toward the West grows increasingly negative in Afghanistan, there is a clear trend toward more positive perceptions of former Soviet states, including Russia.

The expected withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 brings with it the difficult (and expensive) problem of strengthening the Tajik-Afghan and Uzbek-Afghan borders and continual patrolling by the Collective Rapid Response Force and Collective Operational Response Force north of the Afghan border. In fact, the training scenarios of these two military forces are largely built upon the hypothetical penetration by Taliban militants from the south.

A series of consultations and coordination meetings need to be held between CSTO and NATO and Russia and NATO on the gradual and agreed drawdown of NATO's presence in Afghanistan and the increased engagement of other actors in helping regulate and stabilize the situation.

Forces from CSTO countries should not engage on Afghan soil, but following the potential withdrawal of the Western coalition many tasks will remain unfinished, and they can in part be handled by CSTO and from member-state territories in Central Asia (for example, expanded retraining of Afghan police, repair and maintenance of the helicopter fleet, continued provision of the 'northern transport route' to support the missions of the United Nation, Red Cross and other organizations in Afghanistan, etc.).

The regional mechanisms and structures that have already been created, primarily within CSTO, are aimed at confronting the following challenges and threats: infiltration of extremists and armed groups from the territory of Afghanistan into Central Asian states, narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration. Military-technical cooperation has been established with Afghanistan and assistance is being provided though security forces training.

It should be recognized that given the current situation the withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan will inevitably lead to the expansion of the Taliban, which will create a serious security problem for Central Asian countries as well as Russia. And Russia will find it extraordinarily difficult to deal with this threat without an international coalition component. Given such a situation, it is both necessary and possible to expand cooperation with NATO (both in the Russia-NATO format and the CSTO-NATO-SCO format) to carry out operations in Afghanistan. The present level of cooperation (transport corridor plus repairs on old Soviet helicopters) is a minimalist approach. Furthermore, with the exception of the direct participation of CSTO troops in military operations in Afghanistan (which should be avoided), all other forms of military cooperation with international forces in Afghanistan in the interest of stabilization can and should be undertaken: military logistics support, training (with trips to Russia and other CSTO countries as well as locally) of military and police personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan, cooperation in the delivery and repair

of arms and military equipment, provision of intelligence information, cooperation in air space control, cooperation in border protection, etc.

CSTO should be oriented toward new political tactics in such conflict regions as Afghanistan. CSTO's military preparations to prevent Taliban incursions into member countries in Central Asia will not produce the desired result without economic aid and assistance in the post-conflict reconstruction of the northern provinces of Afghanistan in coordination with other international actors. The organization should prepare for a long-term program in the Afghanistan area in cooperation with the international forces and organizations which today make up the core of the coalition that is gradually being withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Conclusions

- United Nations Organization is more and more supplemented and even substituted in Eurasia by the spectrum of regional and sub-regional inter-state organizations. That is especially visible in international security area.
- Regional and sub-regional organizations do not constitute harmonious “Concert”, instead, they are subdivided into rivaling groups, same way as great powers were during the Cold War. At the same time, character of juxtaposing the interests of the regional actors is less sharp and more cooperatively oriented (at least in tendency) than the clash of great powers was.
- There are no chances that any one regional organization of universal representation (like OSCE for Europe or African Union for African continent) can concentrate all major functions and responsibilities and really become a full scale security provider for the continent. At the same time, combination of several organizations sharing functions and geopolitical sub-regional responsibilities really can play a role of combined security provider of continental scale.
- The sub-division and juxtaposing between Western (EU, NATO, etc.) and non-Western (CIS, OSCE, SCO, etc.) regional organizations has been relatively clearly shaped, and new *modus vivendi* between these two groups is needed, if international community wants to avoid new dividing lines in Eurasia.

- Key dialogue should be set up between the NATO and CSTO, as far as clash of interests between these two political-military alliances may create serious threats to Eurasian security of a new type.
- Joint crises response mechanism should be elaborated with participation of both “great powers” and “great organizations”. Most great organizations (like OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO, etc.) by now are definitely “bigger” than summation of politics of powers that constitute their membership. In other words, regional and sub-regional interstate organizations converted into new types of geopolitical actors with their own policy that actively participate in shaping of Eurasian geopolitics of the XXI century.

Смена политических режимов и международные конфликты: политика США

Наталья Бубнова

Regime Change and International Conflicts: US Politics

Natalia Bubnova

Смена режима (Regime Change) — незаконная концепция

Смена режима (Regime Change), о которой там много говорилось в международной теории и практике, на самом деле является делом совершенно незаконным. В данном материале мы не ведем речь о смене режима в результате внутренних обстоятельств: революций, народного волеизъявления и пр. — что представляет собой отдельную тему. Что же касается внешнего вмешательства для свержения правительства какой-либо страны, то международное право однозначно трактует его как недопустимое. Статья 2 (4) Устава ООН безоговорочно запрещает вооруженную интервенцию в страну без ее согласия. Более того, даже и так называемая «гуманитарная интервенция» для защиты народа или какой-то его группы, подвергшихся насилию со стороны собственного государства, с точки зрения международного права незаконна без санкции ООН.

Так, международный суд ООН, рассматривая в 1986 г. дело об американской поддержке никарагуанских «контрас», принял решение, что международное право не позволяет стороннему государству использовать вооруженную силу для исправления ситуации с серьёзными нарушениями в области прав человека в другом государстве (правда, американская сторона не признала решения суда и так и не выплатила Никарагуа компенсации; а потом в Никарагуа произошёл государственный переворот и к власти пришло проамериканское правительство, которое «простило» долг).

Россия и Китай отвергают концепцию международной ответственности.

США «делают(ли?) это»

Однако в Соединенных Штатах исторически сложилось представление о допустимости американского вмешательства за рубежом. Истоки этого прослеживаются ещё с раннего периода существования США, что в значительной мере связано с миссионерскими взглядами американских отцов-основателей. Но первоначально подобные взгляды носили скорее национально-центричный и более оборонительный нежели наступательный характер. Однако принятая в 1823 г. Доктрина Монро, провозгласившая принцип «Америки для американцев», в реальности сделала заявку на расширение «зоны американской ответственности» на всё западное полушарие. А параллельно происходило постепенное изменение смысла американских притязаний от республиканского к империалистическому и экспансионистскому.

Собственно империалистический период в истории США обычно отсчитывается с конца XIX века, с войны с Испанией 1898 г. В выпускаемых в США университетских учебниках американские действия того периода рассматриваются как помощь Кубе в борьбе за независимость. В действительности же одержанная США тогда победа привела к установлению американского контроля над Кубой, а «заодно» и к захвату Филиппин, Гуама, Пуэрто-Рико.

Внешнее вмешательство во внешней политике США происходило с типичной для этой страны флуктуацией между изоляционизмом и интервенционизмом. Но почти каждый президент имел свою «маленькую победоносную войну». В первые десятилетия XX века это было установление или содействие в установлении «удобных» для США режимов на Кубе (1906-1909), в Панаме (1903, 1918-1920), Гондурасе (1903, 1905, 1907), Никарагуа (1907, 1910, 1912-1933), Мексике (1905, 1913, 1914, 1917), Гаити (1915-1934), Доминиканской республике (1903, 1907, 1911, 1916), на Филиппинах (1906, 1911). Тогда же Соединенные Штаты участвовали и в Иностранной интервенции в России.

Между двумя мировыми войнами США 17 раз вводили войска в страны Латинской Америки. Помимо смены режимов и политического фаворитизма, они преследовали цель навязывать зависимым

от США государствам выгодные для Вашингтона условия торговли и политические решения.

После Второй мировой войны США много лет осуществляли политику по отрыву «по одиночке» восточноевропейских и азиатских стран от социалистического лагеря (так называемый «Проект Солариум»). А в 1959 г. совместной резолюцией Конгресса был принят закон 86-90 «О поработенных нациях»¹, в котором провозглашалась американская поддержка национальных групп, «страдающих под гнетом русского коммунистического империализма». Среди указанных там национальностей, наряду с поляками, венграми, чехами и словаками, румынами, болгарами и албанцами, были названы прибалтийские и кавказские народы, а также жители «Козакии», «Туркестана», «Идель-Урала» (нереализованный проект национального государства татар и башкир). А из государств Азии в документ попали «материковый Китай», Северный Вьетнам, Северная Корея. Однако резолюция носила скорее декларативный характер, и значение американской поддержки сепаратизма в произошедшем впоследствии распаде СССР не следует преувеличивать.

Однако при всей своей поддержке демократии правящие круги США параллельно парадоксальным образом в годы Холодной войны были склонны помогать военным диктатурам. В обострившейся международной ситуации они пришли к выводу, что демократически избранные и часто социально ориентированные правительства недостаточно сильны, чтобы противостоять коммунистам. И в годы Холодной войны приводили к власти авторитарные режимы путем организации или поддержки государственных переворотов в различных странах мира, среди которых: Иран (1953), Конго (Заир) (1960-1965), Гаити (1987-94), Доминиканская республика (1961), Гайана (1964), Гватемала (1966), Боливия (1971), Чили (1973), Уругвай (1973) и др.

Соединенные Штаты много лет осуществляли и широкомасштабную военную агрессию против неудобных им режимов в Корее

¹ *Public Law 86-90* (17 July 1959). Available at: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Page_212_from_STATUTE-073-1-2_Public_Law_86-90.pdf (accessed 21.01.2017).

и Вьетнаме, Лаосе и Камбодже. Помимо этого, они неоднократно (по различным данным от нескольких десятков до многих сотен раз) пытались организовать убийство кубинского лидера Фиделя Кастро, поддерживали оружием и деньгами антиправительственные банды «контрас» в Никарагуа и «команды смерти» в Гондурасе, проводили спецоперации в Сальвадоре и обеспечивали ведение «грязной войны» в Аргентине.

«Практический опыт» и исторические прецеденты дают аргументы тем вашингтонским стратегам, которые верят, что «смена режимов» и «нациестроительство» возможны. В Германии, Японии, Италии этот опыт после Второй мировой войны был успешным, но там это осуществлялось в рамках международных усилий, а сами эти государства были проигравшими в войне и формирование их новых структур происходило при продолжавшемся присутствии на их территории оккупационных войск. А на Ближнем Востоке, в Африке, Азии подобные попытки в подавляющем большинстве случаев заканчивались неудачей.

При этом в Соединенных Штатах доминирует представление, что они, пользуясь словами Барака Обамы — «на правильной стороне истории», делают хорошее. Преподавая курс по «Национальной безопасности» в Университете Маркетт, автор данного материала дважды составляла и распространяла среди студентов анкету, включавшую среди прочих вопрос: «Когда, в каком конфликте США были не на праведной стороне?» Среди указанных в ответах случаев американской поддержки «неправой стороны» в заполненных анкетах указывался лишь иногда «Вьетнам» и то, по-видимому, только потому, что Соединенные Штаты в той войне проиграли.

America does not know best — Америка может, но не знает?

В последнее время в различного рода публикациях и выступлениях часто можно встретить утверждения, что Соединенные Штаты утрачивают свою силу. Однако силы у них по-прежнему довольно, они продолжают располагать самым мощным вооруженным потенциалом в мире, а по военным затратам превосходят пять следующих за ними государств, вместе взятых. Между прочим, мои аме-

риканские студенты дружно верили в то, что «техника решает всё», а я давала им другую *perspective*: дело не в силе, вернее не только в силе.

Не довольно у «наших партнеров» *empathy* (хорошее слово, которое, кстати, использовал Барак Обама). Готовности действовать «для других и за других». Трудно бывает отличить, когда они действительно стремятся к решению проблемы, выступают за благое дело, а когда преследуют свои узкокорыстные интересы и, грубо говоря, ловят рыбу в мутной воде.

При принятой в США политкорректности, там, тем не менее, часто говорят и пишут о других государствах в пренебрежительных выражениях. Обычным делом в начале статьи или выступления являются вводки типа: «Кто когда-нибудь слышал про эту крошечную страну?!» Или: «В этой стране на краю света, про которую никто не знает...» (В некоторых российских СМИ тоже, к большому сожалению, «переняли» эту манеру¹). В США говорят про «американские жизни» — противопоставляя им «жизни иные». Эта фигура речи обусловлена спецификой английского языка. Но одновременно она отражает и характерное восприятие себя как «более равных».

В дефиците не только эмпатия, но и простое знание. И не только экспертное, о деградации которого в последние годы вышло немало публикаций, но и обычное знание истории, географии, культуры. В Соединенных Штатах широко распространено представление, что народы отличаются друг от друга в основном только тем, что едят и как танцуют. Американцы также имеют иллюзии по поводу отношения к ним в мире. Они не знают, что в годы Холодной войны наблюдались примерно равные проценты поддержки США и СССР: то есть Советский Союз, воспринимавшийся ими с однозначным

¹ Например, так говорилось про Бирму в передаче «Время покажет» 5 сентября 2017 г. «США: игра без правил», передача «Время покажет», Первый канал, 5 сентября 2017 г. [“S.Sh.A.: igra bez pravil” [“USA: game with no rules”], “Vremya Pokajet” [“Time will show” TV show], Perviy Kanal [First Channel], 5 September 2017 (In Russ.)] Available at: <https://www.1tv.ru/shows/vremya-pokazhet/vypuski/ssha-igra-bez-pravil-vremya-pokazhet-vypusk-ot-05-09-2017> (accessed 21.01.2017).

знаком минус, в мире имел столько же поддержки, сколько и сами Соединенные Штаты. Они видят себя в роли мирового жандарма — считая это положительным словом и не зная, что с точки зрения граждан других государств это далеко не так. Они убеждены, что все смотрят на Америку снизу вверх с ожиданием помощи (“are looking up to America for help”). И при этом у них мало и становится всё меньше «местной экспертизы»: представления о реальных нуждах, специфике и этно-культурных различиях стран и регионов и, напротив, высокомерное американоцентричное боевитое шапкозакидательство.

Недавно, когда президент Трамп сказал, что не исключает военного вторжения в Венесуэлу, например, в Латинской Америке, пытались вспомнить — когда, в каком конкретном случае Соединенные Штаты действовали, исходя из интересов самих этих стран или во благо конкретной страны? Но на память вместо этого приходило, как тот же Трамп, еще будучи кандидатом в президенты, писал в своем излюбленном Твиттере: «У Обамы проблемы. Ему нужна малая война где-нибудь в Латинской Америке, чтобы отвлечь внимание»¹. Если даже это и был его саркастический троллинг Барака Обамы, то само по себе обстоятельство, что кандидат в президенты считает возможным такой стёб за счёт соседних государств, представляется весьма показательным.

Кейсы «с перехлёстом» — Югославия, Грузия, Украина

Гражданская война в Югославии и односторонняя позиция США

Характерным примером «отсутствия присутствия» не в смысле военной силы, а в смысле незнания ситуации в регионе вплоть до самого момента «смены режима» является пример бывшей Югославии. Для меня всегда было вопросом, почему в разворачивавшемся там гражданском конфликте Соединенные Штаты одно-

¹ *Твиттер Президента США Дональда Трампа*. [Twitter of the President of the USA Donald Trump]. Available at: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor (accessed 21.01.2017).

значно стали на одну сторону? Можно предложить читателям на выбор четыре версии ответа (помимо связанной с собственностью на нефть) — но, возможно, они предложат и свои собственные:

- Что боснийцы были более прозападными, а сербы воспринимались как коммунисты и традиционно связанные с Россией-СССР (или — если в позитивной для Запада трактовке — что американцы хотели демократии для Боснии). Можно также вспомнить военные столкновения американцев с сербами в Долматии в 1919 г.

- Что религиозный фактор мог сыграть свою роль — поскольку сербы православные, а у православных многовековая история конфликтов с католиками. Но, с другой стороны, начиная «Войну в Заливе», в Вашингтоне могли стремиться «компенсировать мусульманам причиненные неудобства», продемонстрировать собственную «сбалансированность» за чужой счёт.

- Что Саманта Пауэр — будучи в середине 90-х единственным на регион репортером американских новостных служб (впоследствии ставшая американским представителем в ООН) — изначально и случайно, как говорится, волей судеб, оказалась за линией фронта у боснийцев, и с их точки зрения, а не с сербской, освещала те события: а её комментарии затем транслировались и ретранслировались различными американскими и европейскими телеканалами.

- Что в американском политическом истеблишменте просто *не знали*, что 63% земли в Боснии на момент начала гражданской войны находилось в частной собственности сербов. А также что сербы — после евреев (и, наверное, белорусов и русских) — самая пострадавшая во II Мировую войну этническая группа в пропорции от своей совокупной численности.

В книге Дерека Шолле «Игра в долгую» американское вмешательство в Югославию приводится как пример удачного опыта смены режима и образец на будущее. С точки зрения подавляющего большинства российских политологов — всё то же самое, только наоборот. Здесь особенно выпукло выступает зеркальность в восприятии и оценке событий. Для них: «горькая память Сребреницы» — для россиян: «горькая память Белграда». Дерек Шолле пишет: «Как отмечал [известный американский журналист и писатель]

Джордж Пэккер в 2002 г., Босния многих либералов превратила в ястребов»¹. А про Россию, напротив, можно сказать, что бомбардировки Белграда многих либералов превратили здесь в ястребов!

Грузия — расчеты и просчеты

Многие российские политики и политологи убеждены, что США стояли за «оранжевыми революциями». Подозрения вызывает уже их «брендинг»: в использовании «цветных» определений явно прослеживаются приёмы западного маркетинга: в самих словах «оранжевая», «революция роз», «революция тюльпанов» — торчат уши политтехнологий западного образца. Михаил Саакашвили пришел к власти в результате «Революции роз» и проведенного под ее давлением повторного голосования на президентских выборах. Хотя многие считают это инспирированной Вашингтоном «сменой режима», однако очевидно, что без массового недовольства и народного волеизъявления этого бы не произошло. Тем не менее, пришедшее к власти правительство было безусловно проамериканским, а события войны 2008 г. весьма показательны для анализа того, насколько обоснованы и эффективны американские представления о поддерживаемых ими режимах и своей роли в мире.

В связи с августовской войной по-прежнему остаются многие вопросы, ответы на которые будут даны, по-видимому, только когда будут открыты архивы. Была ли ночная бомбардировка Цхинвали, в результате которой погибли сотни мирных граждан, и убийство российских миротворцев предприняты Саакашвили по собственной инициативе, без предварительного согласования с США или же Вашингтон «дал добро» на применение силы, или хотя бы позволил считать, что не будет возражать? Польский премьер-министр Дональд Туск предположил, что в правительстве Саакашвили могли истолковать какие-то сказанные в Вашингтоне слова о поддержке как соответствующий сигнал.

Как бы то ни было, очевидно, что именно «Саакашвили начал». Российские войска стояли в Рокском тоннеле до самого последнего

¹ Chollet D. *The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America's Role in the World*. New York, Public Affairs, 2016. 247 p.

момента, пока не начались бомбардировки Цхинвали. (Оставляем за скобками продолжавшиеся на протяжении нескольких месяцев до этого взаимные провокации). Однако в западных СМИ картинка тогда давалась односторонне «не та», а в новостных комментариях однозначно говорилось о «российской агрессии»: европейские СМИ потом «одумались», а американские так и остались «в заблуждении» (в дальнейшем, после Крыма, и европейские вернулись на «исходные позиции»).

Еще одним неотвеченным вопросом осталось, почему бежали грузины — как писали западные СМИ — «лучшая армия на постсоветском пространстве», с чуть ли не самым большим процентом от ВВП в мире, ассигнуемым на её нужды, обученная и вооруженная США? (Не будем вспоминать известные строки поэта про «робких грузин», а лучше вспомним «про день Бородина», генерала Багратиона и грузин — героев Великой Отечественной.) Потому ли грузины отступили, что американскими инструкторами были обучены рациональным действиям (т.е. раз превосходящие силы «противника» — значит нужно отступать)? Или потому, что они нас ... любят? И для них невозможно было сражаться с «русскими»? Ведь даже после многолетнего отчуждения, войны и антироссийской пропаганды 31% грузин в 2015 г. говорили, что поддержали бы вступление своей страны в Евразийский Союз¹, а по данным 2013 г. 80% при анкетировании отвечали, что были бы не против брака своей дочери или сына с россиянином/россиянкой.

Слишком многое связывает два народа. Американцы никогда не поймут, что для русских Грузия — не «объект» доминирования, а (по метким словам, сказанным в те дни) — «образ души», мечта, рай божий на земле. Как непонятно им и то, что украинцы для русских вовсе не предмет имперских вожделений, а по сути родные люди (53% русских имеют кровных украинских родственников). Очень показательно, что в день ввода войск в Грузию журналисты на

¹ *Public Attitudes in Georgia. Results of August 2015 survey carried out for the National Democratic Institute by the Caucasus Research Resource Center-Georgia* (2015). Available at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_August_2015_Survey_public%20Political_ENG_vf.pdf (accessed 22.01.2018).

радиостанции «Эхо Москвы» говорили о происходящем с глубокой грустью. И ставили в прямом эфире «Сулико».

Здесь не удаётся избежать противоречия: выступая против гуманитарных интервенций, тем не менее, в случае с Цхинвали, мы склонны разделять мнение, «как можно не помочь», когда осуществляется бомбардировка мирного города?! Характерно, что все кроме одного сотрудники Московского центра Карнеги — в отличие от их коллег в вашингтонском Фонде Карнеги — все дни выступили в поддержку ввода российских войск в Грузию. Наверное, в русской ментальности есть это — отталкиваться от «права правого» (хотя, конечно, ориентация должна быть на безоговорочное соблюдение международного права). Ну а с юридической точки зрения, для апелляции к международному праву при обосновании российского вмешательства, конечно, главным доводом было то, что были убиты российские миротворцы.

Украина: США «не видят» государственного переворота и гражданской войны

Соединенные Штаты если и не инициировали государственный переворот в Киеве, то были в значительной степени причастны к событиям на Украине. Подтверждением тому — и констатация помощника государственного секретаря США Виктории Нуланд в опубликованной в *New York Times* статье, что США «вложили более пяти миллиардов долларов, ...чтобы продвинуть Украину к тому будущему, которого она заслуживает»,¹ и ее же получивший огласку телефонный разговор с американским послом на Украине Джефффри Паэттом, когда они что называется «на пару» обсуждали, как распределить места в украинском кабинете, и, наконец, свидетельство самого Обамы, как-то через год после прихода Порошенко к власти разразившегося неожиданным признанием: «...Мы помогли достичь договоренности о переходе власти на Украине»². Хотя

¹ Nuland V. Remarks. *U.S.-Ukraine Foundation Conference*. Washington, U.S. Department of State, December 13, 2013.

² Zakaria F. *Interview with President Barack Obama*. CNN, February 1, 2015. Available at: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1502/01/fzgps.01.html> (accessed 22.01.2018).

все помнят, что переговоры тогда велись без участия США, и с американской стороны на протяжении последующего года всячески отрицалась причастность к тем событиям. Показательно при этом, что в американских и европейских публикациях, за редким исключением, подписанное и нарушенное соглашение 21 февраля 2013 г. о компромиссе между Януковичем и оппозицией и новых президентских выборах вообще почти никогда не упоминается.

Последовавшая вслед за государственным переворотом гражданская война тоже «вне поля зрения» американского радара, который фиксирует лишь «российскую агрессию», но не жертвы обстрелов городов украинскими правительственными войсками на востоке страны. Однако, если американское руководство действительно озабочено человеческими потерями, например, в Венесуэле, и считает это аргументом для вмешательства в южноамериканскую страну (в этом плане Дональд Трамп возвращается на более традиционные позиции, в отличие от Обамы, который не поддерживал доктрину «Обязанности защищать»), то почему оно тогда не слышит аргументов Москвы по поводу Восточной Украины?

Хотят ли американцы хаоса?

Но при всей разности подходов к «смене режимов» и «гуманитарной интервенции», никто из американских руководителей ни разу не заявлял о поддержке концепции «управляемого хаоса». Эта концепция, изложенная в начале 90-х годов в статье обучавшегося тогда в Национальном военном колледже Стивена Манна, опубликованная в журнале сухопутных войск США¹, имела большой резонанс в США (а еще больший в России!), но никогда не получала официального одобрения американского руководства.

Рональд Рейган, Билл Клинтон, Джордж Буш-старший, да и младший, делая ставку на смену режимов, при этом декларировали, что их целью является обеспечение безопасности США и стабильность, а потом после 11 сентября — борьба с терроризмом, но не хаос. При этом они считали, что поддерживают внутренние

¹Mann St. R. Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought. *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, Autumn 1992, vol. XXII, pp. 54–68.

силы соответствующих стран, стремящиеся к демократии. И что именно демократические режимы являются наиболее устойчивыми и наименее агрессивными. Именно в русле этих подходов было осуществлено в 2001 г. вторжение в Афганистан, а в 2003 г. в Ирак. По мнению профессора Регетского университета Пола Боничелли, работавшего тогда в американском Агентстве по международному развитию, критики политики Джорджа Буша-младшего ошибочно «путают смену режимов с поддержкой демократии, что делает последнюю похожей на вооруженное навязывание демократии»¹. Он убежден, что «“навязывание демократии через смену режима” является теоретически несостоятельным и практически невозможным, что это не было политикой Буша, и что это не то же самое, что поддержка демократических сил по миру». И далее ещё раз повторяет: начиная с войны в Афганистане и в Ираке, «президент Буш не учреждал новой политики “утверждения демократии через смену режима”». Никакой такой политики никогда не существовало; администрация не заявляла, что будет навязывать демократию силой»².

Что Джордж Буш-младший действительно говорил, так это, что американские войска — «самая великая сила свободы за всю историю мира». И «самая великая сила человеческого освобождения, которую когда-либо знал мир»³. Обама тоже заявлял, что войска США в Афганистане — «величайшая военная сила, которую когда-либо знал мир»⁴. И что американские ВМС — «глобальная сила в отстаивании добра» — данные слова стали затем лозунгом призывной кампании американских ВМС. В этом плане и Буш, и Обама

¹ Bonicelli P. A Brief History of the Democracy Through Regime Change Policy That Never Was (Part I). *Foreign Policy*, 26 May 2015. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/a-brief-history-of-the-democracy-through-regime-change-policy-that-never-was-part-1/> (accessed 22.01.2018).

² Ibidem.

³ Bush G.W. *Remarks at the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention*. Kansas City, 22 August 2007. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/washington/w23policytext.html> (accessed 22.01.2018).

⁴ *Obama praises troops in unannounced visit to Afghanistan*. CNN, 4 December 2010. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/03/afghanistan.obama/index.html> (accessed 22.01.2018).

перекликаются друг с другом. Однако, в отличие от своих предшественников, ни Обама, ни затем Трамп, никогда не выступали за «смену режимов».

Обама высказывался и против «смены режимов», и против «обязанности защищать». Хотя и говорил, что есть ситуации, когда применение вооруженной силы оправдано. Интересно, что 2009 г., год вступления Обамы в должность, значится в Википедии как чуть ли не единственный, когда США не начали ни одной военной операции¹. Осуществленную в 2011 г. Ливийскую операцию Обама называл своей самой большой ошибкой, хотя и настойчиво продолжал считать правильным смещение ливийского лидера Муаммара Каддафи. Но и в Ливии — хотя США и начали операцию с превышением прерогатив данного Советом Безопасности мандата о «бесполетной зоне», они «ограничились» бомбардировками. А затем не решились на наземную операцию в Сирии.

США в Сирии: не за «смену режима», но за уход Асада

С 2009 г. администрация Обамы утверждала, что не стремится к «смене режима» в Сирии. Ею предпринимались шаги по дипломатическому урегулированию ситуации. Но после начала гражданской войны в Сирии Вашингтон призвал Асада уйти (или, чуть более точно, «отойти в сторонку» — *step aside*) и ввел нефтяное эмбарго — чтобы сирийское «правительство поставить на колени». Начиная с 2013 г. группам сирийской оппозиции предоставлялось американское обучение, вооружения и финансирование.

Дональд Трамп тоже неоднократно заявлял, что против «смены режимов». После прихода в Белый дома республиканской администрации государственный секретарь Рекс Тиллерсон заявил, что решение о «долгосрочном статусе президента Асада будет принято сирийским народом» (30 марта 2017 г.). Постоянный представитель США при ООН Никки Хейли в тот же день отметила, что приоритетом США более не является «заставить Асада уйти». Однако уже через несколько дней, 4 апреля 2017 г., после того как

¹ *Timeline of United States military operations, Wikipedia*. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations#1890.E2.80.931899 (accessed 22.01.2018).

прозвучали обвинения сирийского правительства в химической атаке, Тиллерсон заявил, что Асад не должен играть никакой роли в Сирии. То есть изменение позиции США произошло всего лишь за несколько дней. А затем авиацией США была предпринята бомбардировка аэродрома, где предположительно хранилось химическое оружие. Впрочем, вскоре после этого президент Трамп объявил о прекращении действий ЦРУ в Сирии.

Во многих книгах, мемуарах, в авторитетных ежегодниках по вооружениям Стокгольмского института политических исследований (SIPRI) многократно говорилось про то, что события «арабской весны» были для Соединенных Штатов неожиданными. В каждом из ближневосточных государств они происходили по своему собственному сценарию. В одних странах — при руководящей роли военных, в других — как в Йемене — за счет намеренно мирных массовых протестов молодёжи. А в Иордании, например, по мнению исследовавшей революцию в этой стране Марии Салех, — при ведущей роли женщин, имевших доступ к западному телевидению и располагавших при этом большим количеством свободного времени. Показательно и то, что в некоторых из этих стран, как, например, в Египте, в ходе событий «арабской весны» был смещен дружественный для США режим — что уж никак не могло быть выгодно Соединенным Штатам.

Однако раз за разом в заявлениях российских политологов, в выступлениях на ведущих федеральных каналах телевидения¹

¹ «Право голоса», ТВЦ, *История*, май 2017 г. [“Pravo golosa” [“The right to vote”], TVC, Istoriya [History], may 2017 (In Russ.)]; «Однако», ТВ-1, 20 сентября 2017 г. [“Odnako”, TV-1, 20 September 2017 (In Russ.)]; *выступление Никиты Исаева в «60 минут», Россия-1, 22 ноября 2017 г.* [Intervention of Nikita Isaev in “60 minut” [“60 Minutes”], Rossiya-1, 22 November 2017 (In Russ.)]; *выступления Саркиса Цатуряна и Романа Романова в передаче «Время покажет», «США: игра без правил», Первый канал, 5 сентября 2017 г.* [Intervention of Sarkis Tsaturyan and Roman Romanov in “S.Sh.A.: igra bez pravil” [“USA: game with no rules”], “Vremya Pokajet” [“Time will show” TV show], Perviy Kanal [First Channel], 5 September 2017 (In Russ.)] Available at: <https://www.1tv.ru/shows/vremya-pokazhet/vypuski/ssha-igra-bez-pravil-vremya-pokazhet-vypusk-ot-05-09-2017> (accessed 21.01.2017).

говорится о том, что Вашингтон якобы практикует «управляемый хаос». В одной из передач Михаила Леонтьева на Первом канале телевидения в подтверждение тезиса о проведении американским руководством концепции «управляемого хаоса» ссылались на некоего Томаса Барнетта, *бывшего главного аналитика краудфандинговой консалтинговой компании Wikistart*, который также преподавал в *Военно-морском колледже ВМФ США в Ньюпорте (Род-Айленд)* и являлся старшим научным сотрудником факультета стратегических решений американского Центра военно-морских исследований. Барнетт действительно в начале нулевых выдвигал концепцию «неинтегрируемых территорий», на которых — в случае распространения там «непорядка» считал необходимым вводить американское управление. Но на самом деле сам Барнетт полагал, что выступает не за «управляемый хаос», а за «экспорт стабильности»¹. И в любом случае приводить его предложения пятнадцатилетней давности в подтверждение неких представлений об официальной американской стратегии — это как сослаться на некоторые высказывания Владимира Жириновского в обоснование тезиса об «агрессивной российской политике». Ведь мнение есть мнение, но никак не доказательство. Приводить чье-либо частное или даже экспертное мнение в качестве свидетельства существования государственной стратегии исключительно неверно. Здесь впору говорить о том, что это история, которая ничему не учит.

Если уж вспоминать историю, то тут в контексте теории «управляемого хаоса» можно привести теоретиков и практиков русской революции. Так, один из лидеров большевиков Сергей Киров в 1919 г. в своем докладе «Текущий момент и международное положение» заявлял: «На Северном Кавказе... мы действовали умело.

¹ Барнетт Т. Новая карта Пентагона, или Почему американцы воевали и будут воевать в XXI веке. *Белорусский проект*, 19 апреля 2003. [Barnett Th. P.M. Novaya karta Pentagona, ili Pochemu amerikanci voevali i budut voevat v XXI veke [The Pentagon's New Map. It Explains Why We're Going To War, And Why We'll Keep Going To War]. *Belorussky proekt* [Belorussian project], 19 April 2003. Available at: <http://www.belproject.com/2003/04/pentagon-new-map/> (accessed 23.01.2017).

Мы создали там анархию, возбуждая одну группу населения против другой — и старались в это время организовать рабочих. И это нам удалось. Мы должны создать международную анархию, которая должна предшествовать установлению коммунистического строя в мировом масштабе. И это нам удастся»¹. Но это высказывание относится к революционному периоду российской истории и не может служить доводом для постулатов об «извечной агрессивности» русских.

Американское «Пособие по тактике России в войне»: с большой головы на здоровую?

Как сообщалось в издании National Interest, Группа по асимметричной войне сухопутных войск США выпустила «Пособие по военной тактике России при ведении гибридной войны». Основной смысл этой публикации в трактовке National Interest заключается в том, что Россия в последние годы будто бы сделала ставку на смену режимов в различных странах при поддержке местного населения. В российских изданиях сразу же начали печататься опровержения — с резкой критикой пособия.

На самом деле, в пособии в общем-то скорее делается вывод об умеренности России, о том, что она прилагает усилия, чтобы избежать войны, и вообще стремится воздерживаться от больших войн. Но одновременно на самом деле применительно к России сказано, что «новой целью является не победа в конфликте, но смена режима»². «Не все случаи смены режимов требуют разрешения путем военной операции. Но когда военных задействуют, это происходит с помощью и через посредство местного населения. Участие

¹ Волков С.В. *Черная книга имен, которым не место на карте России*. [Volkov S.V. *Chernaya kniga imen, kotorim ne mesto na karte Rossii* [Black book of names that do not have place on the map of Russia]]. Available at: http://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1031018/3/Volkov_Chernaya_kniga_imen%2C_kotorym_ne_mesto_na_karte_Rossii.html (accessed 23.01.2017).

² *The U.S. Army's Handbook for Defeating Russia in a War* (2017). Available at: <http://lingualeo.com/ru/jungle/this-is-the-us-armys-handbook-for-defeating-russia-in-a-war-547074#/page/4> (accessed 23.01.2017).

местных сил придает весомость военной акции на международной арене»¹. То есть получается по ставшей традиционной схеме: Мы обвиняем, нас обвиняют.

* * *

Что можно сказать по этому поводу? Что смена режимов незаконна. Но здесь мы опять возвращаемся к началу. Однако представляется важным еще раз подчеркнуть, что надо противостоять нарушениям международного права и со своей стороны стремиться делать «не так, как они», а как должно: в соответствии с международным правом и всемерным учётом нужд в первую очередь данного конкретного народа, страдающего в результате очередного конфликта. Что политика не должна быть только лишь рациональной и прагматичной, но и руководствоваться соображениями морали, блага и справедливости. На протяжении многих десятилетий в США исходили из допустимости вмешиваться в дела других стран, заниматься «сменой режимов», базируясь на собственных представлениях о должном, и отнюдь не всегда считаясь с международным правом. То, что последние два президента — при всём различии их подходов — не декларируют поддержки данной концепции, является шагом вперёд. Однако это оказывается верным в том случае, если подкреплено реальными действиями. Администрация Обамы, обжегшись на Ливии, в дальнейшем демонстрировала определенную умеренность во внешней политике. Дональд Трамп также заявлял об отказе от «смены режимов» и декларировал большую отстраненность от международной политики. Но при этом он параллельно делал боевитые заявления о готовности прибегать к более решительным силовым мерам. Впрочем, в том, что касается республиканской администрации, пока преждевременно делать определенные заключения относительно ее политики, учитывая как зачастую спонтанные, импульсивные и противоречивые действия и заявления самого Трампа, так и то, что он оказывается блокированным в своих поступках вследствие активного противодействия со стороны других институтов власти и политического истеблишмента.

¹ Ibidem.

Всё сказанное выше по поводу политики Соединенных Штатов нужно непременно учитывать, как следует обязательно принимать во внимание и национальную специфику этой страны, но не надо подозревать американское руководство в том, что оно стоит за всем, происходящим в мире, и что заокеанские политики априори заинтересованы в разжигании кризисов и провоцировании хаоса¹, что их цель — разрушать, чтобы управлять. Не только российские пропагандисты, но, к сожалению, и многие отечественные политологи и идеологи перешли от советской иллюзии «мирового рабоче-крестьянского движения» к иллюзии якобы насаждаемого США «управляемого хаоса». Сменился только высвечиваемый вектор — в советские времена он выстраивался исходя будто бы от нас («угнетенных народов» и «всего прогрессивного человечества») и считался «прогрессивным», теперь будто бы «от них» и стал регрессивным. Однако подобные представления мешают видеть действительную картину мира и выстраивать эффективную внешнюю политику, что особенно опасно в условиях обострившейся международной обстановки.

А для американцев характерно клишированное и тоже нуждающееся в коррекции представление, будто бы у России — «постимперский синдром», что она хочет восстановить влияние на бывшем советском пространстве или даже захватить соседние страны или, по крайней мере, доминировать там. Зачастую такие оценки связаны с англо-саксонскими стереотипами, с экстраполяцией собственных моделей поведения на Россию, но, конечно, события в Грузии, Крыму и на востоке Украины дали мощный толчок подобным опасениям. Необходимо предпринимать последовательные усилия, чтобы менять сложившуюся негативную парадигму, ломать ложные представления и выходить из тупика, в который зашли двусторонние отношения.

¹ Бубнова Н.И. Военный фактор в политике Барака Обамы. *Разоружение и безопасность*. Отв. ред. Арбатов А.Г., Бубнова Н.И. Москва, ИМЭМО РАН, 2014, 245 с. С. 82. [Bubnova N.I. Voenny factor v politike Baraka Obami [Military Factor in the Politics of Barack Obama]. *Razorujenie i bezopasnost* [Disarmament and Security]. Arbatov A.G., Bubnova N.I., eds. Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 2014, 245 p. P. 82.]

Россия и Европа: новые дилеммы в области безопасности

Виктор Мизин

Russia and Europe: New Security Dilemmas

Victor Mizin

The turbulent developments after the outbreak of the crisis in and over Ukraine, the accession of Crimea and the lingering Syrian crisis, have completely changed the outlook of the world and of European politics. The entire structure and configuration of the European polity established by Yalta, Helsinki and the Basic EU-Russia Act agreements are nowadays put into question. The well-known tenets of the post-post-Cold War era and hopes for a New World Order seem to be reversed, and certain observers even started speculating about the advent of a new Cold War, a ‘hybrid Cold War’ or Cold War 2.0. We now live in a new world which is still to be defined in the terms of a novel political science (that needs innovative methods similar to the situation when quantum mechanics was introduced to physics in the 1920s) and needs to be thoroughly analysed. Contrary to many euphoric expectations, Russia has not entered ‘the democratic Western family of nations’ and largely remains ‘a continent apart’ and — in the eyes of many Western critics — a clone of the late Soviet Union, only without the Communist ideology.

Never since the beginning of the 1960s were the relations between Russia and its Western partners — with information wars raging and the sanctions war continuing — so strained. Russian political science pundits have concluded that the West once again has chosen the strategy of containment regarding Russia, which is still (again) described as a foe and major security threat — almost on par with the notorious ISIS. All this has exacerbated old Moscow grievances as was first succinctly formulated by President Putin in his famous Munich speech of 2007 and his statement at the UNGA sessions to the point that the West uses a double-standards’ approach and does not regard Russia as an equal, respected and reliable partner.

On the other hand, many voices in the West demand the delineation of a new policy to offset Moscow’s ‘new intransigence’ because, as they

see it, Putin's Russia rejects the existing international system's norms and thwarts post-WWII rules that have guided the European order, meaning that Russia's policy is lacking any legitimacy. They allege that the 'Russian annexation of Crimea and open support of separatist forces in the troubled eastern regions of Ukraine' have shown that the Kremlin has decided to act independently – disregarding the Western critics. In and by Russia this is seen as the sustainment of Russia's vital geopolitical interests and some kind of 'revenge for the alleged humiliation and inattention' it suffered from the Western side in the 1990s.

Moscow — despite its apparent though arguable economic feebleness — has reached global prominence, enjoys almost undisputed influence and its 'foreign policy capitalisation' or the presence at international 'radars' has overreached, in certain aspects, even the Soviet global clout at its highest point. This once again makes Russia almost ready to compete with the USA. Not considering the EU a serious interlocutor, it pretends to become the leader of those parts of the world where the elites and masses are tired of the 'eternal American diktat'.

The pitch of controversial adversarial rhetoric on both sides seems to put into oblivion not only the outlines of a 'common security space' and the entire heritage of Russia-West relations in modern times but buries all hopes for the further promotion of arms control or a constructive build-up of deeper confidence and a relationship of trust between Russia and the West. The vision of a Common community space 'from Lisbon to Vladivostok' or a world free from nuclear weapons, or further —and deeper — cuts in nuclear arsenals appears irrelevant in the current situation. Are those processes, therefore, an impasse — at least for the time being? I am rather optimistic in this regard.

Moscow's observers tend to state that Russia's aspiration to become a 'strategic ally' of the West (though many in NATO habitually prefer not to regard Moscow as such!) was arguably ignored in the 1990s. Their Western colleagues retort that Russia has never made any moves towards actual democratic changes and sound market reforms which would have helped to integrate it into a community of free European nations. Moscow eluded actual 'de-Sovietisation', which would have included a thorough lustration process for the high-placed USSR Communist party officials

and KGB officers, the Berufsverbots for the apparatchiks of the Ancien regime — as implemented in most of the other ex-Warsaw Pact states (which has, though not without difficulties or Angst of the ex-apparatchiks, ultimately turned the Communist-ruled former GDR into an integral part of the unified Germany). The current bland of socially-oriented modern capitalism has never worked in post-Soviet Russia.

Ideologically, the new Russian ‘elites’ never shared the fundamental traditional Western values. This all led to confrontation on issues ranging from basics of democratic rule and principles of governance, separation of powers, human rights and freedoms to the approach toward the resolution of almost all major international crises. The diametrically opposite attitudes of the Western and Russian elites have been, for example, lately demonstrated by Moscow’s stance on the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ affair or certain Western officials’ reaction to the Russian activity in Ukraine or Syria.

No doubt, all these malign developments have particularly affected the relations with Russia’s traditional European partners, specifically with the European Union.

Since the demise of the Communist state Russia is painstakingly trying to define its national identity rocking between the acknowledgment that it is historically an integral part of Europe, a European nation, though a specific one, and certain pipe dreams about the creation of a ‘Eurasian’ entity or even claims to be a separate ‘Continent-Russia’, something like an island in the geopolitical Eurasian heartland. Many contemporary politicians and commentators in Moscow tend to ignore the fact that due to the influx of European technological prowess in the eighth century Russia has become a powerful empire with considerable military might and diplomatic clout only as a result of swift Westernisation under Peter the Great without whom it would have evolved into a semi-colony like the ancient China. It is thus that it has become a major player in the European affairs.

Ever since the 14th century, European written sources contained statements mentioning the dream for a united Europe. This continent was marked not only as the cradle of modern global civilization, science and the world’s technological workshop but also as the arena of bloody wars and revolts. The 19th century launched the slogan of the ‘United States

of Europe' after the US Civil war. The quest for this only heightened after two World Wars with their terrible scourge. But only after the defeat of Nazism the New Europe's founding fathers like Winston Churchill, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Altiero Spinelli, Walter Hallstein, Konrad Adenauer and many others supported by the aspirations of the general public launched the idea of a United Europe and European institutions. The goal was seemingly obvious – the restoration of the ruined economy, prevention of major future wars and curbing of the long-time German militarism and aggressiveness. The tacit underlying hope was to compete with the growing US preponderance and control over the Western part of the continent stimulated first by the 'Marshall Plan' and the creation of NATO where America was the dominating actor.

Moscow's attitude towards European integration

Thus the process of European integration was launched starting in 1948. It has proved that not only sovereign states can find satisfactory peaceful solutions to long-term disputes which had previously led to devastating conflicts, but also how they can explore opportunities through mutually beneficial cooperation rather than traditional competition.

Moscow regarded this with great and ever-growing suspicion as the consolidation of opposing economic and military potentials and a kind of springboard for its archrival the USA. Then and now Moscow made fun of the EU as a stooge and protectorate of the USA, an entity whose foreign policy and even economy are controlled from the other shore of the Atlantic. Then and now the Russian strategy was to unravel European integration, to confront it with its own integration projects and tear off Europe from the US command and cooperation. Therefore, Russia was closely monitoring the processes and constant crises in EU – with the idea of using any dissenting voices, factors and internal contradictions in the alliance present due to the natural differences and inequalities between its members. In this vein, Moscow had a stake in those European forces that argued for a constructive, respectful dialogue with Moscow.

Reasonable minds in Moscow understand that the eventual collapse of the EU (of which it is so fashionable now to speculate among the Russian 'pundits') would be something like 'the greatest geopolitical disaster of

the 21st century' and could prompt greater unpredictability in the entire region. This is obvious in a situation where Europe remains a major economic partner for Russia with 42, 5 % of its foreign trade as well as the main political interlocutor and the major source of modern technologies and know-how. Despite playing with the 'Third Energy package' the EU is unable to neutralise Gazprom's monopoly that only would become stronger with 'Nord Stream' I and II and the 'Turkish Stream' projects.

However, today, after the relations have soured so much, it is clear that Moscow and Brussels are to formulate and promote a new pattern of interaction having in mind how closely they are connected historically, economically and politically. Officially Moscow is pleading for reviving an equitable partnership and an even-handed cooperation between the EU and the Russia-dominated alliances and groupings. This could be a hard task in the ambiance of a new self-assertive and stronger Russia and with the EU becoming more politicised and tumultuous, as both sides are turning into rather rigid, inflexible negotiating partners.

Russia's attitude towards the EU's foreign and security policy

So, what is the EU's place in the changing global environment? The new 'Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', presented by High Representative Federica Mogherini and welcomed by all 28 EU leaders on 28 June 2017, intends to chart a course to the future. It stresses the need for a stronger Europe, especially now, in the aftermath of the UK referendum on EU membership. (Opinion polls have shown that 70% of EU citizens have been in favour of a common security and defence policy since 2002 and a recent survey confirmed that the European public wants the EU to play a more active role in world affairs).

Russia habitually questions the effectiveness and realism of the EU's CFSP. Moscow is not ready to backpedal or compromise in matters of principle, especially regarding Europe as a vastly fledgling community in the face of the much-hyped Russian 'resurgence'. However, the goal of enhancing ties and dialogue with Brussels, even in times of crisis and rising divergences is evident to many Russian experts and politicians.

That does not mean, of course, that Moscow will stop to exploit the growing weakness of European institutions: the organisational chaos

which became clear after the eurozone crisis, the threats the unruly influx of migrants posed to EU unity, the worries about Grexit or Brexit or other new national referendums on a walkout, the rising asymmetrical economic development with varying speeds of integration, the general economic, political and social tensions, such as the widening of social inequality, the growing gap between the ‘capitalist’ elite and the majority of the population.

Many in the Russian political class observe that the entire EU integration infrastructure (at some point a matter of envy or even a model for Moscow) developed over decades of coordinating various interests, pulled by the ‘Franco-German locomotive’ and achieved by intricate negotiation processes over numerous complex issues, now passes through difficult times characterised by a growing populism, legitimacy collapse testing the limits of solidarity between Member States. All this could lead either to a kind of catharsis (like the Chinese see any crisis as a source for new opportunities) or to an imminent overall debacle. The economic crisis that started in 2008 has not yet ended.

The Russian authorities count on an unrelenting EU dependence on Russian gas, the growing pressure of the European business that allegedly loses billions of euros in the sanctions campaign and a growing resentment in European capitals against what is more and more seen as a ‘Brussels Diktat’. Moreover, Moscow gurus opine that the EU — notwithstanding recently issued programmatic ‘global influence’ documents — lacks long-term vision, strategy or a guiding philosophy and is unable to cope with incoming challenges, not actually ready to assume novel responsibilities. Russian experts like to stress that almost no strictly political action plans since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty have proven very successful. They point to the ‘crisis of normative leadership’ when in the face of a rising Islamist terrorism threat and the migration conundrum several EU Member States pursue a course that openly contradicts the basic European values of tolerance and freedom of expression. The common line in such analysis is that the EU is now divided at least in three groups: Old Europe, New Europe and ‘decrepit pariahs’. They emphasise that European unity is in crisis, and it remains unclear whether the EU can recover its overall effectiveness and its ability to promote the development of each Member

State. Thus Moscow doubts that the idea that ‘European integration emerges from each crisis stronger than before’ is still valid.

The necessity of Russia-EU cooperation

However, the current turn of tide in European integration is not a sign of death. Germany will continue to pursue its long-time policy of EU consolidation trying to bring the integration process to its final stage. Also, many states are actually economically dependent on or benefit from Brussels. Even after a devastating Brexit, the EU will hold about 15% of the global GDP remaining a major economic player, third after the USA and China.

The EU will therefore remain a major partner for Russia, even despite the latter’s growing alliance with China which is also a sign of its resentment with Europe’s rebukes. Russia’s much-touted ‘Pivot to Asia’ is more of a propaganda move; China could for example never provide the technology or managerial skills for Russia’s modernisation plans – these are only attainable from the EU. (Still Russia is working hard to show it is reorienting eastwards; its trade with China in 2016 for the first time prevailing over the one with Germany. Russia has slid to fourth place after the US, China and Switzerland as the EU’s trading partner).

A promising area of collaboration is, however paradoxical, the fight against the Islamist terrorist threat and cooperation on regional security issues. True, the Russian military never considered the EU a military heavyweight regarding it as just a logistic appendix to NATO – what many EU members’ leaders never contradicted. So the claims of the threat of any imminent ‘European army’ to Russian security that are put forward in the wake of certain testing statements in Europe are just for PR and ‘info war’ usage. Actually, the EU enthusiasm over military cooperation has now practically disappeared; is restricted to limited policing or peacekeeping missions. At the same time, Russia could provide a model of excellence for coping with internal security, migration and terrorism problems, even despite concerns about its human rights’ abuses that as Moscow retorts are necessary, just as in the USA, in order to provide for greater domestic security and public stability.

Ukraine, no doubt, remains the major salient dilemma. The sanctions adopted since 2014, have been the first since the Cold war and applying

economic pressure on Moscow and continuously extended every half year, they have further exacerbated the bilateral tensions, actually rupturing many avenues of dialogue. They have instilled the feeling in Russian society, currently very keen on regaining almost great power status in world politics and military affairs, that the EU and Europe are not friendly partners and by no means a model for replication. Real progress has to be made on this issue before relations can return to normal. In my eyes it is clear that the Minsk II agreement frequently saluted by the leading EU members and its members in the Normandy format talks is almost defunct.

Furthermore, Moscow will observe jealously any EU attempts to extend its influence and presence in the post-Soviet are. This means that we could indeed expect growing tensions and competition regarding EU moves to strengthen cooperation not only with Kyiv but also with Moldova, Belarus, any Black Sea and Balkan states and even with the Central Asian countries. Consequently, Moscow would only be happy to see Eastern Partnership wither, as much as it understands that Brussels also will strive to prove that for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the European Union remains a more attractive option than Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Therefore, many in Moscow's political circles are against the termination of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. Although somehow outdated, it provides guarantees of minimum legal protection to Russian economic interests. At the same time, in the current circumstances Moscow is not ready for any new initiatives to resume talks on a new strategic agreement that could practically lead nowhere, although potentially being a further stabilising factor (though Great Britain's departure demands possible revision of the document). On its part, Russia is ready for talks with individual states on important bilateral issues as migration, energy (including nuclear), science, cooperation in space, cyber security, the formation of a Greater Eurasian Partnership, etc.

Russia and the EU could also develop a 'road map' for the Eurasian Economic Union-EU dialogue, that besides many other things would help Moscow's dialogue with China and other Asian partners and could lead to a broader scheme 'from Shanghai to Kaliningrad', which is so far, of course, vastly infeasible.

In a broader context, Russia actually is a natural partner for the EU in discussing such topics as the migration crisis now haunting the EU, the situation in the Balkans, where Bosnia-Herzegovina still remains a powder keg, in the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa, specifically in Libya and Syria, in Iran and Iraq. HR Mogherini already suggested consultations on North Korean nuclear-missile issue, though I do not see how Moscow despite its recent accommodation proposals and UNSC permanent member status could be really helpful. Generally, there are, in my opinion, almost no controversies between the EU and Russia on the issues of arms control.

Neither Russia, nor the European Union are interested in a new version of Syria-like instability, an escalation of the current level of confrontation in Europe, especially in the Baltic area, with the new forces' deployments after 2014 developing into a full-scale arms race or, worse, a large-scale regional war involving a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO. Here the role of the EU as the European pillar of NATO cannot be overestimated.

The parties seem to agree on the importance to strengthen the crisis-management capabilities of the OSCE, its monitoring mechanisms in conflict areas, as well as on instruments for crisis prevention and resolution. They are now, not without friction, tested in the eastern Ukraine separatist-held areas.

It is of paramount importance to resume the military dialogue between Russia and NATO (with the active participation of its core EU members) and the US. The focus should be on developing new measures to prevent direct military collisions on the ground and in the air, sea and cyberspace, on creating constant channels of communication between defence ministries and military headquarters, and on developing new rules of conduct that would prevent dangerous military activity. Nothing meanwhile prevents the ever-eager regional arms control community to mull over and propose certain new ideas which might be useful when the time for them finally ripens.

As the Ukrainian issue is now the key irritant in the EU-NATO-Russia relations; what is rather more promising is a start of discussions of new outlines for a perspective European security architecture. It is important

to avoid such conflicts in Europe in the future while maintaining the inviolability of borders and sovereignty of states, their territorial integrity, and at least, to preserve the spirit of Helsinki. At the same time, it is vitally important for the West to prevent ‘Bosniasation’ of the unarguably pro-Russian Ukrainian east; currently seized by leftist-separatists and or the creation of another eternal ‘frozen conflict’ in Europe (what might happen if peacekeepers are deployed there as separatists demand now).

Measures aimed at the restoration of a climate of mutual trust and cooperation

What is needed and can, apparently, be realised are various step-by-step, cautious measures aimed at the restoration of a climate of mutual trust and cooperation in the security sphere in Wider Europe.

These measures should be focused on a range of confidence-building measures and transparency-promoting mechanisms, primarily in the specific parts of the European theatre, with a special accent on the most endangered Baltic and Black Sea ‘flanks’. This could arguably recover the current crisis and bring us into a new and safer dimension of ‘hard’ Euro-Atlantic security. While the American administration is now portrayed in Moscow as the worst, it seems that the initiative to breach the current stalemate must come from Russia’s European neighbours (presumably, Germany as formerly the preferred Russian interlocutor) and would be in the interest of the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.

These measures could include:

- Creation of a joint group of unofficial experts which can suggest some new mechanisms and new tenets for strategic stability for the Euro-Atlantic theatre, as it is clear that the Yalta-Potsdam order and the Helsinki regime of the 1970s have now been largely ‘overtaken by events’ (double track or ‘old wise (wo)men’ option). They could first work on the comparison of the Russian and Western approaches describing not just the present state of relations, but also the outlines of a suggested future, this mechanism could develop new principles and ideas on what practical measures could be introduced for greater transparency and pragmatic, efficient confidence-building measures, to start making the strategic doctrines of the two sides

more compatible and less mutually threatening, in short, how to disassemble the material remnants of the Cold War. Discussions to develop new outlines of global strategic stability — including, on the thorny issues of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) could also be envisioned.

- At first, the experts can explore the principle and outlines of the envisioned future Euro-Atlantic security architecture as well as major challenges on this path and a programme of step-by-step accomplishments to ease the present-day tensions in relations, the role of institutions in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (NATO, NATO-Russia Council, OSCE, EU, CSTO, Eurasian Union, etc.) and also the way toward improving the security of areas and states in the Euro-Atlantic region that are not members of any grouping or blocks.
- One could also suggest the establishment of a new set of communication links between the Russian and the NATO military that could enhance mutual predictability and foster the promotion of better comprehension and greater trust, based on timely notifications of future moves. The experts could develop the outlines of the system of notifications on military aviation flights and manoeuvres of naval vessels, i.e. in the Baltic and Black Seas (to avoid anxiety during the other side's manoeuvres or patrolling flights in the vicinity of other's borders). Both NATO and Russia could practice a broader system of inviting representatives to their respective manoeuvres and envision more joint peacekeeping and terrorist-fighting operations. It would be especially useful in conventional arms control in Europe, where efforts to revive the dialogue have failed.
- Both sides could, for example, examine what kind of positive security guarantees from Moscow, NATO member states, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, could await — in such term as local/regional transparency and confidence-building measures, greater openness about large scale military exercises in bordering areas and greater openness regime. The same counts for warning against planned snap exercises.

- Non-stationing of military assets and contingents, not having military manoeuvres close to the border with RF-NATO can also be discussed. Moscow could, in turn, demand more guarantees against the rapid deployment of NATO forces or at least some limits and more predictability regarding their deployment in eastern Europe.
- Moscow could, for example, assure the non-stationing or limitation of the number of ‘Iskander-M’ missiles in the Kaliningrad area and give guarantees for non-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there. It would be interesting to return to examining the possibility of a non-nuclear zone in central (eastern) Europe — ‘Rapacki plan’ under the present conditions.

In sum, what is needed is a package of crisis-de-escalation and prevention instruments such as sub-regional transparency and confidence-building measures, more openness on large-scale military exercises in border areas, strengthening of the inspections regime in a cost-effective way. Moscow could demand more guarantees against rapid deployment NATO forces which it regards as a threat (something like a no-troops-increase zone along the NATO-Russia borderland). This could eventually lead to a European security environment which would be acceptable and attractive both for Moscow and the West, while effectively precluding or quickly alleviating the outbreak of any major conflicts (such as the present one in Ukraine or the earlier ‘frozen’ ones).

This set of proposals may be too extensive and unrealistic for the moment. However, launching such a discussion process could lead us to the stabilisation of the current situation. Russia is deeply interested in good, solid relations with the West while the EU and NATO do not reject Moscow as a partner, i.e. suggesting a dialogue and cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU or Moscow’s collaboration in meeting new challenges — from Afghanistan, to WMD non-proliferation, to fighting the ‘Islamic State’ and Islamist terrorism or dealing with the new economic crisis.

In these difficult times, Russia and EU and NATO members must show that they are still active and responsible multilateral players. What is needed today is a programme to crush the deep-frozen ice packs in bilateral relations and introduce a new set of confidence-building measures. That

would bring about a new quality in the relations between Moscow and the West and strengthen mutual reliance and collaboration.

Today it is important to concentrate on the issues of implementation of existing arms control instruments such as the new START, INF or the OSCE's Vienna Document – preventing the outbreak of a novel arms race. It is critical that the current crisis does not undermine the traditional constructive collaboration between the United States and Russia on non-proliferation issues. P-5 seems now the only remaining place (despite the evident cooling of relations among the nuclear weapon states) where the Western members can push Moscow to be more receptive to new ideas on how to save the face of nuclear weapons' stakeholders, including the idea of a future multilateral dialogue on further reductions of strategic weapons – in view of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

EU Member States and Russia must then engage in discussions over the control of conventional and nuclear arms, as well as the potential arms race in Europe, including tactical nuclear weapons and deployment of US-NATO missile defence.

It is especially viable in the conventional arms control in Europe which is now after Moscow's suspension of CFE in 2007. There are seemingly no clues how to revive it. The EU, NATO and Russia could work on the outlines of some sort of adapted follow-up to the CFE Treaty. Managing insecurity by regional Baltic Sea states through the kind of risk reduction and confidence-building measures and constructively resuming the dialogue at the NATO-Russia Council could be very propitious for the general climate of sanctions in the European region. This could potentially bring about the process of moving to lower numbers of 'tactical' nuclear arms in Europe in the future taking into account the dual-use role of their launchers.

Despite Moscow's current reticence, the EU and NATO could prod Russia into starting work on detailing and adapting the Vienna document which is the main guarantor of European stability and predictability in military matters.

The INF Treaty is also at stake – though Russian, EU and US experts put forward interesting ideas how to mend it and alleviate mutual suspicions through adopting a set on new MOUs describing and defining the areas of concern.

Generally, all this should lead to new efforts to develop a picture of an eventual European security ambiance which could be acceptable and attractive both for Moscow and the West. Outlines of a possible document (statement, declaration) can be worked out. That is why what I have in mind is a kind of ‘long-term project’ which will be noticed in expert and political community and, hopefully, influence the public discourse. This is, in my view, an urgent imperative of these tumultuous historic times when novel actions and the New Thinking is needed.

Russia remains – despite the recent fallbacks – an indispensable part of European civilisation. It could only applaud the 5 principles of RF-EU relations aired by the EU in 2016. We could then discuss the return to four common spaces declared in Saint-Petersburg in 2003.

Both the EU and Russia must propose the outlines of civilised relations, including the observance of agreed upon rules and norms of communication. The collapse of the EU as a key partner is not in Moscow’s vital interests — though the deep divergences will continue to persist, especially on visa or the Ukraine-Crimea issues. What Russia needs is not a frail and fragmented, but rather an efficient and cohesive EU for successful cooperation on the large number of international issues, not least as a counterbalance to the USA or China, as well as it needs the EU as a major economic and technological partner. The EU, predictably, will remain critical of Moscow concerning human rights and domestic governance issues which can only aggravate close to the 2018 presidential elections in Russia. Still, both sides could think about negotiating a brief framework agreement as a kind of ‘code of conduct’ document.

Russia was and will remain a key European state and thus an inevitable partner and interlocutor for the European Union despite all persistent problems in their relations – and this requires a certain level of good faith and optimism.

Морской порт сектора Газа: новые идеи для урегулирования конфликта

Эзра Фридман

A Gaza Seaport: New Ideas for Conflict Management¹

Ezra Friedman

In January of 2006 Hamas won a sweeping majority in the Palestinian parliament elections, with an almost outright victory within the electoral districts of the Gaza Strip.² This in turn led to confrontation with the secular leaning Fatah whom Hamas would go on to violently eject from the Gaza Strip in 2007, leading to the current split of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) controlled by Fatah based in Ramallah and the Gaza Strip controlled solely by Hamas.³ It is important to note that Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States and the European Union. Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip has been followed by a joint Israeli-Egyptian blockade, one that has all but stopped the flow of goods and people across land, sea and air borders.⁴ Hamas and Israel have also engaged in several rounds

¹ The paper was earlier published in: Friedman E. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 21, 2018. Available at: <https://thebulletin.org/2018/03/a-gaza-seaport-new-ideas-for-conflict-management/> (accessed 12.09.2018).

² Wilson Sc. Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast. *The Washington Post*. January 27, 2006. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html> (accessed 09.08. 2017). Simon J. Hamas celebrates election victory. *The Guardian*. January 26, 2006. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1> (accessed 09.08. 2017).

³ *TIMELINE-Key events since 2006 Hamas election victory* (2007). Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-chronology-idUSL1752364420070617> (accessed 09.08.2017).

⁴ *Gaza Blockade* (2017). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available at: <https://www.ochaopt.org/theme/gaza-blockade> (accessed 09.08.2017). Kingsley P. Egypt's decision to side with Israel has cost Gaza dear. *The Guardian*. July 30, 2014. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/30/egypt-siding-israel-cost-gaza-dear> (accessed

of conflict which have not only intensified the blockade, but have led to massive destruction worth billions of dollars including that of critical infrastructure.¹ The ongoing feud between the PA and Hamas has led to cuts in PA payments to Israel for electricity to the Gaza Strip and has also seen Hamas raise tariffs and taxes on Gazans in order to raise revenue.²

The economic situation of the Gaza Strip is seen as particularly dire and on the verge of collapse. The 2014 round of conflict with Israel caused 1.7 billion dollars in losses to the enclave's economy, which is contributing to the ongoing situation.³ The unemployment rate is over 40% amongst

09.08.2017). Understanding the Gaza blockade. *The Week* (by *The Week* staff), June 18, 2010. Available at: <http://theweek.com/articles/493446/understanding-gaza-blockade> (accessed 09.08.2017).

¹ White B. Why is Israel tightening the Gaza blockade? *Middle East Monitor*, October 21, 2016. Available at: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20161021-why-is-israel-tightening-the-gaza-blockade/> (accessed 09.08.2017). Rivlin P. Iqtisadi: Economics and the Gaza War. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, November 12, 2015. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/iqtisadi-economics-and-gaza-war> (accessed 09.08.2017).

² Rivlin P. The Crisis in Gaza. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). Estrin D. 10 Years After Gaza Takeover, Hamas Under Pressure To Surrender Power. *Parallels*, National Public Radio, Inc., July 17, 2017. Available at: <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/07/17/537031035/10-years-after-gaza-takeover-hamas-under-pressure-to-surrender-power> (accessed 09.08.2017). Thrall N., Blecher R. The Next War in Gaza Is Brewing. Here's How to Stop It. *The New York Times*, July 30, 2017. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/opinion/gaza-violence-conflict-prevention.html> (accessed 09.08.2017). Ben-Meir Al. The Gaza Strip: A Disaster in the Making. *The Algemeiner*, July 27, 2017. Available at: <https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/07/27/the-gaza-strip-a-disaster-in-the-making/> (accessed 09.08.2017).

³ *The World Bank In West Bank and Gaza* (April 1, 2017). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/overview#3> (accessed 09.08.2017). Rivlin P. The Crisis in Gaza. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017).

the general population with youth unemployment at almost 60%.¹ This in turn contributes to the low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person, which hovers around 1,000 dollars a year.² The restrictions on the entry of construction material and other items that are considered ‘dual-use’ (items and resources that could be used in a militarily offensive capacity), have been put in place by Israel as a result of tunnel building and rocket production. These tunnels are used for both smuggling of goods and for attacking Israel while the rockets are fired at Israel’s populations centers. This has also put a strain on the economy, as tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars has been allocated to tunnel development and arms acquisition as opposed to civilian and critical infrastructure reconstruction.³ Hamas’s levying of taxes on the residents of the Strip, for everything from imports and exports as well as tobacco and even real-estate has led to an estimated revenue in the hundreds of million dollars a month and has placed an extra burden on the people of Gaza as the revenue is being used to pay the salaries of Hamas officials in the Strip and support their military effort.⁴ The limits placed on the freedom of movement of Gazans

¹ *Gaza Economy on the Verge of Collapse, Youth Unemployment Highest in the Region at 60 Percent* (May 21, 2015). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/05/21/gaza-economy-on-the-verge-of-collapse> (accessed 09.08.2017).

² Hamas marks ten years of misruling Gaza. *The Economist*, July 13, 2017. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725005-conditions-blockaded-enclave-are-deteriorating-hamas-marks-ten-years?zid=308&h=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d> (accessed 09.08.2017). *The World Bank In West Bank and Gaza* (April 1, 2017). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/overview#3> (accessed 09.08.2017).

³ Rivlin P. The Crisis in Gaza. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). Su A. ‘Gaza Is Hell’. Desolation and Destiny in a Land in Limbo. *The Atlantic*. May 2, 2015. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/gaza-israel-war/392024/> (accessed 09.08.2017).

⁴ Rivlin P. The Crisis in Gaza. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). Su A. ‘Gaza Is Hell’. Desolation

since Israel's withdrawal from the territory in 2005 (coupled with Hamas's rise in 2007) has also led to a sharp reduction in per capita income for the general population who have lost access to jobs within Israel which have higher wages. This has resulted in Gazans having to search for employment in the Gaza economy which has less opportunity, is less productive and has lower earnings.¹ The destruction caused by conflict with Israel, coupled with the blockade as well as Hamas's rule of the Gaza Strip has led to a serious deterioration in GDP growth rate, employment, wages, and in increased poverty rate.² The continued de-development of the economy of the Gaza Strip may lead to its economic collapse in the near future without a change in the status quo.

The humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is dire, with 70%-80% of Gazans reliant on some form of aid in order to survive.³ As of 2015, over 500 000 people are displaced as a result of the 2014 conflict with Israel, with over 20 000 homes yet to be repaired or rebuilt.⁴ Basic public services

and Destiny in a Land in Limbo. *The Atlantic*. May 2, 2015. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/gaza-israel-war/392024/> (accessed 09.08.2017).

¹ Rivlin P. The Crisis in Gaza. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017).

² Rivlin P. The Crisis in Gaza. *Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). *The World Bank In West Bank and Gaza* (April 1, 2017). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/overview#3> (accessed 09.08.2017). *IMF Office in West Bank and Gaza* (April 10, 2017). Available at <http://www.imf.org/en/Countries/ResRep/WBG> (accessed 09.08.2017).

³ *The World Bank In West Bank and Gaza* (April 1, 2017). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza/overview#3> (accessed 09.08.2017). Hamas marks ten years of misruling Gaza. Conditions in the blockaded enclave are deteriorating. *The Economist*, July 13, 2017. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725005-conditions-blockaded-enclave-are-deteriorating-hamas-marks-ten-years?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d> (accessed 09.08.2017).

⁴ Gaza could become uninhabitable in less than five years due to ongoing 'de-development'. *UN News Center*, September 01, 2015. Available at: <http://www.un.org/>

have also seen serious deterioration, with facilities, access and quality of said services all in decline or essentially nonexistent in terms of electricity, water, sewage and more.¹ Gazans are currently provided with a few hours of sporadic electricity a day, caused by a lack of fuel for the damaged power station within the Strip (imports are restricted by the blockade and President Abbas cutting payments to Israel to provide electricity to the Gaza Strip as part of his attempt to reassert PA authority over Hamas).²

apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51770#.WYXNtNOGO8U (accessed 09.08.2017).

¹ *Water Situation Alarming in Gaza* (November 22, 2016). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/11/22/water-situation-alarming-in-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). Rivlin P. *The Crisis in Gaza. Iqtisadi: Middle East Economy*, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, June 12, 2017. Available at: <http://dayan.org/content/crisis-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). Hamas marks ten years of misruling Gaza. Conditions in the blockaded enclave are deteriorating. *The Economist*, July 13, 2017. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725005-conditions-blockaded-enclave-are-deteriorating-hamas-marks-ten-years?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d> (accessed 09.08.2017).

² Gewirtz J. A dispute over electricity could make an already tense Israeli border worse. *CNBC*, May 15, 2017. Available at: <https://www.cnb.com/2017/05/15/israel-and-gaza-an-electricity-dispute-makes-a-tense-situation-worse.html> (accessed 09.08.2017). Hamas marks ten years of misruling Gaza. Conditions in the blockaded enclave are deteriorating. *The Economist*, July 13, 2017. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725005-conditions-blockaded-enclave-are-deteriorating-hamas-marks-ten-years?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d> (accessed 09.08.2017). Rasgon A. Gaza power plant to resume operation day after being shut. *The Jerusalem Post*, July 13, 2017. Available at: <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Gaza-Electric-Company-Strips-sole-power-plant-shut-down-499583> (accessed 09.08.2017). Booth W., Balousha H. As Palestinian leaders fight over Gaza, Israel worries Hamas will go to war. *The Washington Post*, July 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/as-palestinian-leaders-fight-over-gaza-israel-worries-hamas-will-go-to-war/2017/07/12/0f85bb50-6584-11e7-94ab-5b1f0ff459df_story.html?utm_term=.39eb88731a1b (accessed 09.08.2017). Lieberman: Abbas seeks to start new Israeli-Hamas war. *Aljazeera News*, June 22, 2017. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/lieberman-abbas-seeks-spark-israeli-hamas-war-170622175504038.html> (accessed 10.08.2017).

Abbas has also limited shipments of much needed humanitarian goods that the PA supplies, including medicines, baby milk and other essential commodities, all in short supply in the Strip.¹ A lack of facilities to treat sewage and the overuse as well as contamination of the Strip's only aquifer is quickly contributing to the Gaza Strip being uninhabitable by 2020.²

But there is potential for an improvement to both economic and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. The Strip is a ticking time bomb, with its almost two million residents growing increasingly desperate. There are those who would argue that it is in Israel's best interest to do its part in improving the worsening situation as Hamas may initiate conflict with Israel to shift the focus away from crisis within the territory or, in a worst-case scenario, risk hundreds of thousands of Gazans attempting to cross over into Israel to escape the ever-deteriorating situation. A step that Israel can take in helping to relieve the economic and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is the construction of a Gaza seaport, an idea being put forward by government ministers and security officials including Yisrael Katz, Minister of Transportation, Intelligence, and Atomic Energy, and Yoav Galant, Minister of Housing and Construction.³

¹ Hamas marks ten years of misruling Gaza. Conditions in the blockaded enclave are deteriorating. *The Economist*, July 13, 2017. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725005-conditions-blockaded-enclave-are-deteriorating-hamas-marks-ten-years?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d> (accessed 09.08.2017).

² Swinburne Z. The water is running out in Gaza: Humanitarian catastrophe looms as territory's only aquifer fails. *The Independent*. June 29, 2013. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-water-is-running-out-in-gaza-humanitarian-catastrophe-looms-as-territorys-only-aquifer-fails-8679987.html> (accessed 09.08.2017). *Water Situation Alarming in Gaza* (November 22, 2016). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/11/22/water-situation-alarming-in-gaza> (accessed 09.08.2017). Gaza could become uninhabitable in less than five years due to ongoing 'de-development'. *UN News Center*, September 01, 2015. Available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51770#.WYXNtNOGO8U> (accessed 09.08.2017).

³ Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Baker L. A new island in the Mediterranean...

The idea for the seaport originates in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements (DOP), which was signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993.¹ The specifics for this seaport, which include necessary security arrangements and location were to be achieved through negotiation as set out in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in 1994.² Later

just off Gaza. *Reuters*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-gaza-island-idUSKBN19J1XW> (accessed 10.08.2017). Eglash R. Israel is still floating a plan for Gaza island. And now there's a video. *The Washington Post*, June 27, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/27/israel-is-still-floating-a-plan-for-gaza-island-and-now-theres-a-video/?utm_term=.1500168544aa (accessed 10.08.2017). A New Island in the Mediterranean...Just Off Gaza. *Voice of America, Reuters*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/new-island-in-mediterranean-just-off-gaza/3919617.html> (accessed 10.08.2017). Sanchez R. Israeli minister proposes building an artificial island off the coast of Gaza. *The Telegraph*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/28/israeli-minister-proposes-building-artificial-island-coast-gaza/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Eldar Sh. Is Gaza seaport construction on its way? *Al-Monitor*, January 05, 2017. Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/israel-gaza-sea-port-turkey-construction-khan-yunis.html> (accessed 10.08.2017). Ariel O. Katz presents idea to build island off Gaza to US security officials. *Jerusalem Online*, May 13, 2017. Available at: <http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/world-news/the-israeli-connection/katz-presents-his-gaza-island-vision-to-us-officials-28434> (accessed 10.08.2017). Smith M. To Stop Treading Water, Minister Floats Gaza Island Plan. *The Times of Israel*, March 30, 2017. Available at: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/to-stop-treading-water-minister-floats-gaza-island-plan/> (accessed 10.08.2017).

¹ Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Declaration of Principles — Main Points. *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, September 13, 2013. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles%20-%20main%20points.aspx> (accessed 10.08.2017).

² Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, May 4, 1994. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/agreement%20on%20>

agreements, which chose the location of the port within the Gaza Strip, ran into disagreements between Israel and the PA regarding security and oversight, with the port location being bombed during the Second Intifada and remaining unused since.¹

This seaport would provide for Israel's security needs which include a long-term cease fire and the relieving of the crisis in the Gaza Strip. There are two viable options regarding the creation of a port. The first option is building a seaport for Gaza. Such a port could be in either Egyptian or Israeli territory in port cities that have already existing port infrastructure like El-Arish in Egypt or Ashdod in Israel. Such ports could be expanded so that specific quays are built for shipments to and from Gaza alone.²

The second option is the construction of a seaport in Gaza City or off shore. Israel would not agree to a port being built within the Gaza Strip as it would not be able to prevent Hamas from importing weapons it could use against Israel, but a plan already exists and is being pushed by senior Israeli Minister Katz for the construction of an artificial island that is roughly 3 miles offshore.³ Such an island is estimated to cost five

[gaza%20strip%20and%20jericho%20area.aspx](#) (accessed 10.08.2017).

¹Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017).

²Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017).

³Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Baker L. A new island in the Mediterranean... just off Gaza. *Reuters*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-gaza-island-idUSKBN19J1XW> (accessed 10.08.2017). Eglash R. Israel is still floating a plan for Gaza island. And now there's a video. *The Washington Post*, June 27, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/27/israel-is-still-floating-a-plan-for-gaza-island-and-now-theres-a-video/?utm_term=.1500168544aa (accessed 10.08.2017). Sanchez R. Israeli minister proposes building an artificial island off the coast of Gaza. *The Telegraph*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/>

billion dollars and would be connected to the Gaza Strip by bridge. The island itself would be 1,300 acres large and would have a seaport, airport and other facilities that would be able to facilitate the movement of goods and people in a controlled environment. This would not only open Gaza to the world and end its isolation, but would also provide for Israel's security concerns through Israel's control of security inspections on the island.¹

news/2017/06/28/israeli-minister-proposes-building-artificial-island-coast-gaza/ (accessed 10.08.2017). Eldar Sh. Is Gaza seaport construction on its way? *Al-Monitor*, January 05, 2017. Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/israel-gaza-sea-port-turkey-construction-khan-yunis.html> (accessed 10.08.2017). Ariel O. Katz presents idea to build island off Gaza to US security officials. *Jerusalem Online*, May 13, 2017. Available at: <http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/world-news/the-israeli-connection/katz-presents-his-gaza-island-vision-to-us-officials-28434> (accessed 10.08.2017). Smith M. To Stop Treading Water, Minister Floats Gaza Island Plan. *The Times of Israel*, March 30, 2017. Available at: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/to-stop-treading-water-minister-floats-gaza-island-plan/> (accessed 10.08.2017).

¹Sher G., Heuberger J. Prospects for a Gaza Seaport. *INSS Insight*, No. 804, March 13, 2016. Available at: <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/prospects-for-a-gaza-seaport/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Baker L. A new island in the Mediterranean... just off Gaza. *Reuters*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-gaza-island-idUSKBN19J1XW> (accessed 10.08.2017). Eglash R. Israel is still floating a plan for Gaza island. And now there's a video. *The Washington Post*, June 27, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/27/israel-is-still-floating-a-plan-for-gaza-island-and-now-theres-a-video/?utm_term=.1500168544aa (accessed 10.08.2017). Sanchez R. Israeli minister proposes building an artificial island off the coast of Gaza. *The Telegraph*, June 28, 2017. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/28/israeli-minister-proposes-building-artificial-island-coast-gaza/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Eldar Sh. Is Gaza seaport construction on its way? *Al-Monitor*, January 05, 2017. Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/israel-gaza-sea-port-turkey-construction-khan-yunis.html> (accessed 10.08.2017). Ariel O. Katz presents idea to build island off Gaza to US security officials. *Jerusalem Online*, May 13, 2017. Available at: <http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/world-news/the-israeli-connection/katz-presents-his-gaza-island-vision-to-us-officials-28434> (accessed 10.08.2017).

Support for such a seaport could manifest itself in the form of President Trump and his eagerness to broker ‘the ultimate deal’ between the Palestinians and Israel, something that is supported by major regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.¹ Special envoy Jason Greenblatt and Special Adviser to the President as well as son in law to Trump, Jared Kushner, could help facilitate the necessary funding, international support and help broker a deal that is amenable to all relevant parties. This plan has already been proposed to Greenblatt by Katz.² The Trump administration would need to bring together not just Hamas and Israel, but also the PA,

¹ Gray R. Trump Goes After 'the Ultimate Deal'. *The Atlantic*, May 22, 2017. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-israeli-palestinian-peace-process/527649/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Rozsa M. Donald Trump Is Still Optimistic He Can Make an Israel-Palestine Peace Deal. *Salon*, May 23, 2017. Available at: <http://www.salon.com/2017/05/23/trump-believes-he-can-make-an-israel-palestine-peace-deal/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Staff T. Saudi FM: Trump can broker Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, and we'll help. *The Times of Israel*, May 20, 2017. Available at: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-fm-riyadh-confident-in-trumps-abilities-to-broker-israeli-palestinian-peace/> (accessed 10.08.2017). Amer A.A. What will Trump era mean for Gaza? *Al-Monitor*, February 02, 2017. Available at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ja/originals/2017/02/hamas-gaza-trump-views-islam-israel-relations.html> (accessed 10.08.2017). What are Trump's next steps to help forge peace? *The Jerusalem Post*, August 07, 2017. Available at: <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Next-steps-501840> (accessed 10.08.2017). Manson K., Reed J. Jared Kushner Looks for a Deal in the Middle East. *Financial Times*, August 7, 2017. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/23b06a72-791f-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691> (accessed 10.08.2017).

²Karni A. Can Jason Greenblatt deliver peace for Donald Trump? *Politico*, May 21, 2017. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/21/trump-jason-greenblatt-middle-east-peace-deal-238635> (accessed 10.08.2017). Estrin D. A Look At Jason Greenblatt, Trump's Envoy For Israeli-Palestinian Peace. *National Public Radio, Inc. (NPR)*, July 12, 2017. Available at: <http://www.npr.org/2017/07/12/536782026/a-look-at-jason-greenblatt-trumps-envoy-for-israeli-palestinian-peace> (accessed 10.08.2017). Ravid B. Israeli Minister Presented Trump Envoy Greenblatt With Plan to Build Gaza Island Port. *Haaretz*, April 06, 2017. Available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.781771> (accessed 10.08.2017).

Egypt and regional states to sponsor such an agreement, which could only be achieved through indirect negotiation between Israel and Hamas.

The creation of such an island would have to address the needs of the population of Gaza and Hamas, allowing for the increase in the flow of goods and people in and out of the Strip. It would also need to meet both Israel and Egypt's security concerns through sufficient security oversight, access and mechanisms. Such developments would need to be balanced to allow for Hamas to claim some sort of political victory in the eyes of Gazans. This can be done through joint supervision of the port by Israel with relevant international observers to ensure the steady flow of goods and people while preventing weapons from entering Gaza. Lastly, the creation of such an island should facilitate a long-term ceasefire which is in the interest of both Hamas and Israel in terms of humanitarian, economic and political needs.

Раннее оповещение и проблемы управления и контроля за ядерными силами в Южной Азии

Собья Парача

Emerging Early Warning and Command and Control Challenges in South Asia

Sobia Paracha

The paper explores the question whether the current command and control capabilities in South Asia are robust enough to ensure effective or stable deterrence? That requires four basic elements: an assured high-level control of nuclear forces; the prevention of accidental, irrational or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; the assurance of nuclear weapons operations to meet the requirements of strategy; and arrangements for escalation control and nuclear war termination. The paper analyses the balance between the always-never dilemmas here.

In South Asia, due to geographic contagiousness and very small missile flight times, early warning of missile launches really doesn't hold much meaning. In an article by Zia Mian back in 2003 approximate missile flight times were calculated from short to long range missiles and from shortest to longest missile launch points within the Indian and Pakistani geographic territories. The longest time for a missile launched from one country to another without even considering technical hurdles would be from 8 to 13 minutes. This time, with given technical capabilities in India and Pakistan may not even be enough to confirm whether the launch signal received is genuine or not. This assessment is made on the lowest rungs of decision makers and after that it is communicated to the political and military leadership to come up with a response. There is literally no time in South Asia for the leaders to deliberate once a signal of a missile launch is received. This means all the responses to missile launch from one country necessarily have to be predetermined. So all the stories from the Cold War about close to nuclear war scenarios may turn out differently in South Asia and the chances of nuclear use based on miscalculation are much higher. India, however, with its current space-based capabilities is much better placed for damage assessment and precision strikes.

Existing situation is inherently unstable and the only elements that bring stability to the equation are the postures, because they delay the nuclear use in a crisis event and provide more options for signaling. What this paper is trying to do is to compare the postures from ten years ago to today and see how likely nuclear use has become in South Asia with changing postures both in India and Pakistan, regardless of what the stated doctrines say. This goes particularly for India because Pakistan does not have a stated doctrine.

The consolidation of the arsenals in both India and Pakistan started in the aftermath of the nuclear tests. The general nuclear policy in both countries was of recessed nuclear deterrence and assertive command and control based on the principles of credible minimum deterrence. This meant that both countries kept the weapons in demated forms. The warheads were separated from the delivery vehicles and the fissile cores from the rest of the weapon in peacetime situation. Both states rejected nuclear war-fighting options as provocative, escalatory and beyond their deterrence needs.

The command and control were strictly assertive in both countries, which meant that the authority to nuclear use stayed with both countries' respective national command authorities. Main qualification for the assertive command and control is that the authorization for nuclear use comes from the top leadership and not pre-delegated to the battlefield commanders or the ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) commander.

Back in the day, both India and Pakistan had a limited number of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. India relied more on the air leg for nuclear delivery and Pakistan relied on the land forces. There was a conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan from day one. That is why Pakistan always kept the option to use nuclear weapons in a war open. Some people may call it the first use doctrine, however in Pakistan it is officially called a no-no first use doctrine. India on the other hand was always better placed to defend itself with its conventional capabilities and thus did not need a first use option. It thus had a heavily qualified no first use (NFU) doctrine. The timeframe for both countries to prepare the nuclear forces for use would be somewhat similar. It is generally stated that weapons preparedness time should be between 30 minutes to 1-2 hours of a strategic warning.

The posture of recessed deterrence has now begun to change with the new inductions in both countries' nuclear arsenals. Both states are now moving towards nuclear war fighting capabilities. These include: canisterization of Agni V, efforts to develop MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) capable missiles, evolution of a sea-leg of the deterrent as well as short-range or tactical nuclear weapons.

Agni intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are the mainstay of the surface-to-surface leg of India's strategic forces. With the exception of the Agni-I, all Agni missiles are solid-fueled which considerably reduces the launch time. The Agni V, with a claimed range of 5,000 kilometers, is known to be capable of carrying MIRV warheads. A canisterized version of the Agni V was test-fired on January 15, 2015, from a mobile launcher. The process of canisterization means the warhead will be mated with the missile for storage, not stored separately, and mounted on the missile shortly before launch. Agni V is also thought to be a useful opportunity for building an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and launching mini/micro satellites on demand. The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) also plans to develop the Agni-VI IRBM, which will be capable of carrying a 3-ton payload of maneuverable MIRVs.

Both India and Pakistan are working to develop MIRVed missiles. Pakistan even tested one in the beginning of 2017. The MIRVed version of Agni V is still not tested. There may be different rationales for the two countries to develop MIRV. In Pakistan it is developed as a counter measure to India's budding ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which ostensibly has been tested with great precision. Agni V should be considered as a deterrent against China, because of its range, but at the same time it also may cause a first strike instability in south Asia, due to the following two reasons. Firstly, it is canisterized, which means it can be launched on a very short notice and, secondly, it is MIRVed, meaning that it will enhance first strike proficiency for India, coupled with the India's BMD capability and an ever-growing fissile material production.

Both countries are developing a sea leg of their deterrent forces. Their strategic outlook, however, is completely different. India already has an operational ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Arihant, the second one is on the way, and missile ranges will improve with time. It is also developing

its fleet of conventional attack submarines. Some of its surface and maybe sub-surface platforms will be equipped with nuclear capable cruise missile Brahmos. Similarly, Pakistan has recently tested Babur III, which is a nuclear capable cruise missile to be mounted on its conventional attack submarine Agosta 90s. With those capabilities both India and Pakistan have been claiming an enhanced second-strike possibility. While those claims may leave space for different interpretation, the existing capabilities are being operationalized and the deployment of de-mated weapons is not possible on these platforms. Both states will essentially deploy nuclear weapons on these carriers, putting a great pressure on the command and control systems. It would become extremely challenging to avoid miscalculations, accidents and unauthorized use given the crowded waters of the Indian Ocean, inherent difficulty of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and communication under water and on seas. Pakistan just has one virtual lookaside facility (VLF) and India has only recently created an extremely low frequency communication facility (ELF).

Finally, it is important to highlight that the most immediate challenge in terms of command and control is the short-range nuclear weapons. Pakistan developed a short range nuclear capable shoot and scoot ballistic missile to counter the threat emanating from Indian Cold Start doctrine. This weapon if and when deployed would seriously complicate Indian conventional operations in Pakistan. This is officially stated to be the main aim of this weapon's induction, to deter India from making conventional attacks in Pakistan by complicating its decision making. However, if deterrence fails it will be extremely difficult to avoid an accidental launch. In the war when communication lines are extremely stressed, the question is how Pakistan, given its current command, control and communications capabilities, will ensure a centralized control on the weapons. Pakistan's policy makers are in a double dilemma, because insistence on a centralized command and control for these weapons means these weapons would not be used once the communications lines are effectively broken. The problem in such situation is what a battlefield commander will do. On the other hand, if the authorization is pre-delegated at some stage, the weapon may be used in a scenario when the top leadership may have not ordered the use.

India is also developing short range missile, prahaar and pragati. They are not stated to be nuclear capable, but the author of this paper have met Pakistanis who believe these missiles eventually will have a nuclear role even if they are conventionally used. In any case they pose a threat to Pakistan's battlefield command centers and with the deployment of Nasr, losing a command center would be a dangerous scenario.

To conclude, there might be many drivers for why these new capabilities are being produced by both sides, but it is highly destabilizing that while these technologies are being produced there is no effective dialogue between India and Pakistan. The last agreement of confidence-building measures (CBM) between the two countries was signed a decade ago and the track I dialogue on nuclear risk reduction had the last meeting in 2012. Without a common understanding of strategic concepts, rationales, threat perception and even the cultures in the two countries, South Asia is becoming a very dangerous and hopeless place from the arms control perspective. There is little evidence available in the open source literature which shows that command and control is evolving with the pace of technology development and capabilities inductions in India and Pakistan.

Особенности использования дронов вооруженными силами ФРГ (на примере Мали)

Филипп Трунов

The Features of the Drones Usage by the German Armed Forces (the case of Mali)

Philipp Trunov

Аннотация. В статье в контексте процесса роботизации бундесвера рассматриваются вопросы использования разведывательных беспилотных аппаратов. В качестве кейса для изучения избран пример Мали, на территории которого размещены две миссии бундесвера с целью стабилизации обстановки. Изучаются имеющиеся возможности и перспективы использования бундесвером разведывательной беспилотной техники в космической и воздушной сферах, и влияние этого на борьбу с международным терроризмом. Делается вывод о практической значимости процесса роботизации для вооружённых сил ФРГ.

Ключевые слова. Германия, бундесвер, роботы, Мали, международный терроризм.

Abstract. The article considers the questions of the usage by Bundeswehr of reconnaissance unmanned vehicles in the context of the process of robotisation of German armed forces. The paper chooses Mali as the case. At the territory of Mali two Bundeswehr missions for the stabilizing of the situation are located. The article explores the common possibilities and perspectives of the usage by Bundeswehr the vehicles in the space and air spheres, and the influence of it over the struggle with the international terrorism. The article concludes about practical significance of the robotisation process for German armed forces.

Key words. Germany, Bundeswehr, robots, international terrorism, Mali.

В основе процесса преобразований бундесвера, начавшихся ещё в 1990-е гг., лежало стремление создать войска, предназначенные для постоянного использования вне зоны ответственности НАТО

и обычно именуемые в ФРГ силами кризисного реагирования (СКР). С одной стороны, Германия демонстрирует заметные успехи на данном направлении военного строительства. Так, 1990-е гг. фокусным регионом для широкомасштабного применения бундесвера выступали лишь Балканы на фоне точечного использования его подразделений в Африке. С начала XXI века германские войска стали всё более активно принимать на себя ответственность за стабилизацию обстановку в конфликтогенных странах Азии и Африки, в том числе борясь со структурами международного терроризма. Наиболее масштабным направлением использования бундесвера в 2000-е — начале 2010-х гг. выступали Афганистан и Ливан, а с середины 2010-х гг. — Мали.

С другой стороны, применение бундесвера (за исключением Балкан) ограничивалось небоевыми формами: деятельностью по миротворчеству и поддержанию мира, участию в реформе сектора безопасности вступивших на путь постконфликтного развития стран, а также восстановлению разрушенных объектов социально-экономической инфраструктуры. В первую очередь, подобная осторожность была обусловлена высокой степенью риска серьёзных потерь в личном составе и боевой технике при проведении собственно силовых акций — в том числе, против структур международного терроризма. Получение необходимой санкции Бундестага на осуществление подобной деятельности было в принципе весьма маловероятно — однако даже в случае положительного решения возможны последующие варианты не только отзыва мандата, но и жёсткой критики федерального правительства со стороны парламента и общественности вплоть до объявления канцлеру и кабинету вотума недоверия.

При этом в ряде случаев в процессе мониторинга ситуации (в первую очередь, в Афганистане) германские военные лишь «демонстрировали флаг», обходя опасные районы, где могли скрываться боевики. На вновь зачищенных территориях подразделения бундесвера были готовы вести боевые действия с отдельными террористами и мелкими (несколько человек) группами, но отнюдь не скольконибудь значительными их формированиями. Второй «ахиллесовой

пятой» бундесвера, особенно при его использовании в обширных северных провинциях Афганистана (Кундуз, Бадахшан, Мазари-Шариф), была также недостаточная численность его контингентов: суммарно не более 4 тысяч военнослужащих (не считая частей в Кабуле) [1, р. 4-8]. Следствием этого выступала невозможность контролировать (в том числе посредством ведения постоянной тактической разведки) всю зону ответственности даже во взаимодействии с афганскими силами безопасности и небольшими контингентами других стран-участниц Международных сил содействия безопасности в Афганистане. Эта проблема обостряется вследствие значительного расширения ареала использования бундесвера для деятельности по миротворчеству и поддержанию мира, в том числе в странах, на территории которых идёт борьба с международным терроризмом — в частности, в регионе Сахеля.

Одним из путей преодоления данной трудности является насыщение бундесвера автоматизированными системами управления и разведки — в первую очередь, робототехникой. *Задача* данной публикации — рассмотреть особенности и возможности применения робототехники силами бундесвера, ответственными за стабилизацию обстановки в Мали.

Использование армейской беспилотной разведывательной авиации

После фактического свержения режима М. Каддафи и распада единого государства в Ливии (2011) служившие в составе её армии туареги со своим оружием и техникой стали возвращаться в Мали и сопредельные страны с целью создания независимого государственного образования. В отличие от аналогичных попыток в 1970-е — 1980-е гг. [2, р. 405-424], туарегам сопутствовал первоначальный успех: им удалось в апреле 2012 г. провозгласить создание самостоятельного Азавада на севере Мали, не поддержанного, однако международным сообществом. В тесной координации с радикальными туарегами действовали группировки международного терроризма «Ансар-ад-Дин» и «Аль-Каида в Исламском Магрибе», стремившиеся «обрушить» институт государства в Мали.

По просьбе переходных властей страны военная помощь была предоставлена рядом государств-членов Африканского союза, а также Европейского союза — в первую очередь, Францией и Германией. Если первая из них сыграла ключевую роль в проведении боевой операции «Сервал» (Serval), то есть нанесении поражения (но отнюдь не полного разгрома) силам международного терроризма в январе — мае 2013 г., то вторая — в последующей стабилизации обстановки. Бундесвер был задействован параллельно в двух миссиях: военно-тренировочной (под эгидой ЕС, EUTM Mali) и по поддержанию мира (в рамках АС, с мая 2013 г. — ООН, MINUSMA), причем в обоих случаях одной из ключевых задач бундесвера являлось осуществление разведки [3, р. 3-4]. В первую очередь, она требовалась для мониторинга в режиме реального времени ситуации в провинциях на севере Мали — Гао, Кидаль и Томбукту. Они не только являлись субрегионами с преимущественным туарегским населением, но лишь недавно и, главное, не полностью зачищенными от террористов,

В 2014-2015 гг. в Гао — столице одноимённой провинции — в рамках военной базы «Лагерь Кастро» была развернута группировка беспилотных летательных аппаратов (БПЛА) сухопутных войск бундесвера (хеера), состоявшая из 40 машин типа «LUNA» [4] (См. Таблицу 1),

Таблица 1

Тактико-технические характеристики БПЛА хеера типов «LUNA» и «LUNA NG»

Характеристика	«LUNA»[5]	«LUNA NG» [6]
Длина X высота X размах крыльев	236 X 87 X 417 см	530 X 73 X 534 см
Базовая масса	40 кг	110 кг
Максимальная дальность полета (с учётом приёма сигнала из центра управления)	100 км	Свыше 100 км
Предельная высота полёта	5 км	Свыше 5 км
Скорость	70-160 км/ч	90-200 км/ч
Максимальное время пребывания в воздухе	До 6 часов	До 12 часов

Каждое подразделение БПЛА (команда) по штату включает 4 самих аппарата, катапульту для старта, станции по управлению (и приёму информации) и слежением за ситуацией на борту, а также комплекты антенн. Численность обслуживающего персонала одной команды — 23 военнослужащих. Каждый аппарат типа «LUNA» оснащён 5 камерами (с возможностью установки 2-х дополнительных), что позволяет ему передавать цветное изображение происходящего вокруг в радиусе до 3 км в любое время суток.

Использование БПЛА существенно повышает «живучесть» ротных и батальонных тактических групп и, соответственно, позволяет существенно уменьшить плотность мотопехотных и специальных подразделений, ответственных за мониторинг ситуации. Выявление на дальних подступах к базам и населённым пунктам даже небольших (несколько человек) групп боевиков лишает их главного преимущества — тактической внезапности, и, напротив, позволяет бундесверу (и контингентам партнёров Германии по MINUSMA) выбирать время и место для нанесения ударов с целью нейтрализации боевиков. При этом отсутствие у террористов серьёзных средств ПВО вкупе с высоким «потолком» полёта БПЛА типа «LUNA» и её небольшими габаритами сводит к минимуму риск её уничтожения в воздухе.

Наличие в составе группировки хеера до 10 команд БПЛА «LUNA», согласно расчетам автора, позволяет осуществлять постоянный мониторинг ситуации в провинциях Гао (площадью 170 тысяч кв.км) и Кидаль (151 тысяча кв. км), расположенных на границе с Нигером. Это особенно важно для пресечения попыток координации усилий (и подпитки боевиками, боеприпасами, техникой) расположенной на территории последнего террористической группировки «Боко Харам» (так называемой «Западной провинции» «Исламского государства»¹) с боевиками «Ансар-ад-Дина» и «Аль-Каиды в Исламском Магрибе».

Показатель эффективности использования БПЛА — отсутствие успешных попыток наступательных операций в Гао и Кидале со стороны боевиков, что создавало благоприятный фон для налаживания межмалийского диалога между представителями

¹ Запрещённая в России террористическая организация. — *Прим. авт.*

официального Бамако и туарегскими вождями. В этой связи необходимо также обратить внимание на удельный вес команд, обслуживающих БПЛА в Мали (по состоянию на 2017 г.), от общей численности контингента бундесвера — свыше 15 % (!) (230 военнослужащих при общей численности двух миссий в 1,2 тысячи военнослужащих) [3, р. 3-4]. Иными словами, в среднем на 3 военнослужащих мотопехотных подразделений в Мали (в расчет не взяты военные советники, военнослужащие в учебных лагерях и тыловые части) приходится 1 солдат обслуживающих БПЛА команд. При этом группировка разведывательных беспилотных аппаратов ФРГ, особенно после передачи от Нидерландов к Германии руководства над разведкой MINUSMA (апрель 2016 г.) стала действовать в интересах всей миссии.

Однако имеющихся возможностей БПЛА хеера — как с точки зрения их количества, так и дальности полета — недостаточно для контроля ситуации в огромной провинции Томбукту (497 тысяч кв.км), граничащей с Алжиром и Мавританией. Первым путём решения данной проблемы может стать использование модифицированных БПЛА типа «LUNA NG». Их использование, которое (с учётом поставок в бундесвер первой партии БПЛА данного типа в первой половину 2018 г.) может начаться уже в текущем году. Это может существенно повысить возможности бундесвера для осуществления разведки силами хеера на стратегическую глубину, то есть отслеживание перемещений боевиков, техники и создания (переноса) их складов на территории сопредельных с Мали государств. Данное обстоятельство особенно в условиях малочисленности беспилотной разведывательной авиации люфтваффе, которая может быть применена в Сахеле.

Возможности применения разведывательных дронов люфтваффе и космической группировки

В отличие от сухопутных войск, располагающих «линейкой» разведывательных БПЛА (7 типов, причем все либо германского производства, либо в кооперации ФРГ с Францией и Канадой) и использующего их с начала 2000-х гг., люфтваффе использует де-

факто лишь дрон «Герон 1» («Heron 1») израильского производства и «RQ-4E Euro Hawk», выпускаемый в США (см. Таблицу 2). С точки зрения автора, это обусловлено большим масштабом и активным характером использования сухопутных войск по сравнению с ВВС ФРГ, в операциях вне зоны ответственности НАТО. Данное обстоятельство, вкупе с уже отмечавшимся небоевым характером использования бундесвера, позволял хееру обходиться армейской (в основном разведывательной) авиацией, не прибегая к оказанию помощи со стороны люфтваффе.

Таблица 2.

Тактико-технические характеристики дрона «Герон 1»

Самолёт	Характеристики
Длина X высота X размах крыльев	8,5 X 2,3 X 16,6 м
Максимальная стартовая масса	1 150 кг
Полезная нагрузка	250 кг
Высота полёта	До 10 км
Скорость	До 200 км/ч
Продолжительность беспосадочно-го полета	Свыше 30 часов

В течение первой половины 2016 г. на военную базу «лагерь Кастро» в разобранном виде был доставлен БПЛА «Герон 1», с конца лета 2016 г. ставший совершать разведывательные полёты. Острую потребность в данной машине показывает тот факт, что аппарат был взят в лизинг у Израиля (!) [7].

Помимо использования аппаратов «LUNA NG», серьёзное увеличение возможностей контингента бундесвера по осуществлению тактической разведки в Мали осуществимо посредством использования спутниковой группировки. Она была создана в 2006-2008 гг. и состоит из 5 аппаратов типа «SAR-Lupe» (размерами 4 X 3 X 2 м и массой в 720 кг), которые способны предоставлять снимки объектов от 1 м и более с высоким разрешением [8]. Вкупе с качеством радаров это делает военную ценность одного германского аппарата сопоставимой со спутниками ведущих космических игроков, в частности, России и США.

Пункт управления «SAR-Lure» полётами размещён в г. Гельсдорф в окрестностях Бонна, где продолжают оставаться большинство структур центрального аппарата Министерства обороны ФРГ после его формального переезда в Берлин (1999).

В условиях недостаточной численности (5 спутников при условии наличия 24 как признанной нормы полноценной орбитальной группировки) аппараты типа «SAR-Lure» в основном используются для съёмки территорий Северного полушария. Так, с 2015 г. германские спутники (как и французские) передают информацию о перемещениях боевиков «Исламского государства» и других террористических сил на сирийском и иракском театрах военных действий. С 2018 г. планируется начать частичную замену (в условиях превышения формального срока эксплуатации) и усиление спутниковой группировки ФРГ. На первом этапе (2018–2019 гг.) будет закуплено 2 аппарата «SAR-Lure» в комплектации 2008 г. и ещё один — с фазированной антенной решёткой [8]. Её использование позволяет существенно улучшить качество получаемых изображений вне зависимости от погодных условий — в частности, пылевых бурь, которые часто используются боевиками для обеспечения скрытности перемещения.

Использование аппаратов «SAR-Lure» в ещё большей степени, чем применение БПЛА «LUNA NG», обеспечивает проведение разведки боевиков на тактическую глубину, в том числе в специфических условиях (пустыни и саванны) малийского театра военных действий.

* * *

Главным результатом начавшегося процесса роботизации бундесвера является существенное повышение его возможностей в области разведки — в том числе, проводимой в интересах партнёров по миссиям НАТО, ООН и ЕС. Это, во-первых, выступает одной из возможностей обеспечения за Германией роли одной из военных держав внутри евро-атлантической региональной подсистемы. При этом активно используя в интересах партнёров и союзников свои возможности в области разведки, и участвуя в деятельности по миротворчеству и поддержанию мира, Германия тем самым «разгру-

жает» их и даёт возможность выделить больше ресурсов непосредственно для ведения боевых действий. В свою очередь, это снижает остроту критики (в том числе латентной) Германии со стороны стран-участниц ЕС и Североатлантического альянса за последовательный отказ официального Берлина от участия в сколько-нибудь масштабных силовых акциях за пределами Европы.

Во-вторых, в принципе это предоставляет Германии возможность проводить в случае необходимости точечные боевые операции без риска понести серьёзные потери и используя в полной мере фактор тактической внезапности.

Данные преимущества выступают «двигателем» процесса роботизации бундесвера как в целом, так и по отдельным родам войск — в первую очередь, хеера на перспективу. При этом при закупке новых видов робототехники немаловажным критерием будет эффективность их использования в специфических природно-климатических условиях нестабильных стран Африки и Азии.

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**Проект SESAME:
модель для ближневосточного сотрудничества**

Ребекка Бриндза

SESAME: A Model for Middle Eastern Cooperation

Rebecca Brindza

The opportunity for Middle Eastern countries to utilize science diplomacy and international scientific research centers to foster and enhance cross-border relations in the region is described in this paper. The newly opened synchrotron light source, SESAME, in Jordan is used as a case study; other possible instruments that could follow in the facility's footsteps are proposed. The direct and indirect benefits of such facilities are highlighted.

Reintroducing Science Diplomacy

Despite having over 7 099 spoken languages existing in the world today,¹ science, like math, “represents a type of universal language, a vector of transnational communications that poses fundamental questions about the nature of things,” that is void of political as well as ideological affiliations.² At its core, the pursuit of scientific advancement and exploration represents a common ground that can unite even the most opposite of individuals from every corner of the world in a way that has yet to manifest in other disciplines. This notion in and of itself has spurred the emergence of science diplomacy which, as a form of international scientific cooperation tied to national interests, is an effective method of enhancing and promoting inter-state relations amid conflict at both the macro and micro level that has been demonstrated throughout various geographic landscapes and across changing world orders.³ However, while the majority

¹ *Summary by language size* (n.d.). Available at: <https://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size> (accessed 20.08.2017).

² Turekian V. C., Macindoe S., Copeland D., Davis L. S., Patman R. G. and Pozza M. The Emergence of Science Diplomacy. *Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn?* Davis L.S., Patman R.G., eds. London, World Scientific, 2015. Pp. 3-24.

³ For example, the creation of the European Organization for Nuclear Research

of the world has been utilizing science diplomacy as a means to address diplomatic issues, resolve global concerns, foster soft power, defuse international tensions, enhance national interests vis-a-vis each other, induce deeper cross-border relations as well as create transnational openness and knowledge sharing since the early 1950s, this concept has only recently spread to one of the world's most conflicted regions — the Middle East.

Vaughan Turekian, Director of the Center for Science Diplomacy and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), defines science diplomacy as “the process by which states represent themselves and their interests in the international arena when it comes to areas of knowledge — their acquisition, utilization and communication — acquired by the scientific method.”¹ To better explain how exactly science and diplomacy interact in the present day and what benefits can be reaped from its application, Turekian presents a three-part, cross-cutting typography of science diplomacy. ‘*Science in diplomacy*’ refers to how science

(CERN) in 1954, brought historic adversaries, namely Germany and France, together to lay the basis for the European scientific community in the wake of the World War II. In fact, many accredit CERN “as a significant ingredient in efforts to improve inter-state relations” and even a factor that lead to the signing of the 1963 Elysée Treaty signaling Franco-German rapprochement. The 1961 meeting by US President John F. Kennedy and Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in Washington to establish the US-Japan Committee on Science Cooperation in 1961 served as a means of mending the dialogue channels between the two countries’ intellectual communities. Moreover, it is widely known that the plethora of scientific exchanges between Israeli’s Weizmann Institute and Germany’s Max Planck Society after the historic funding agreement between the Institute and the German government in 1964 “helped lay the foundation not only for German-Israeli scientific cooperation, but also for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries one year later”. The most notable example occurred in the tension-ridden climate of the Cold War when the Reagan Administration recognized that collaborations in science and technology served as an effective and apolitical means of promoting cross-cultural exchange with both its allies as well as its adversaries. Turekian V.C., Macindoe S., Copeland D., Davis L.S., Patman R. G. and Pozza M. *The Emergence of Science Diplomacy. Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn?* Davis L.S., Patman R.G., eds. London, World Scientific, 2015. Pp. 3-24.

¹ Ibid.

can be used to both identify as well as solve apparent issues in global as well as foreign policy, with global climate change research being a prime example. This leads to ‘*diplomacy for science*’, or the utilization of diplomatic relations by the scientific community in order to obtain foreign resources for research purposes.¹ For example, no single European State possessed the fiscal nor scientific resources needed to realize the building of European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) on its own, much less the comprehensive brain power required to conduct the grandiose experimentation of a global collider.² Even in the United States, the Oak Ridge neutron spallation source for example, is a nation-wide project composed of parts built by six different laboratories that bring together scientists from all over the world to engage in neutron research.³ Lastly, ‘*science for diplomacy*’ denotes the “application of international science cooperation, motivated by the desire to establish or enhance relationships between societies.”⁴

Current Scientific Collaboration in the Middle East

Within the Middle East there is an all too apparent lack of scientific funding as well as international scientific research centers that enable all regional scientists to collaborate together on large, world renown projects.

¹ Wallin M.R., ed. Science Diplomacy and the Prevention of Conflict. *Proceedings of the USC, Center on Public Diplomacy Conference*. Los Angeles, Annenberg School of Communications (University of Southern California), USC Center on Public Diplomacy, February 4-5, 2010, 67 p. Available at: <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u22281/Science%20Diplomacy%20Proceedings.pdf> (accessed 26.01.2017).

² Quevedo F. The importance of international research institutions for science diplomacy. *Science & Diplomacy*, 2013, no. 2(3).

³ Pynn R. Neutron Production. *Lecture Notes*. Bloomington, Indiana University, Department of Physics, 2006.

⁴ Wallin M.R., ed. Science Diplomacy and the Prevention of Conflict. *Proceedings of the USC, Center on Public Diplomacy Conference*. Los Angeles, Annenberg School of Communications (University of Southern California), USC Center on Public Diplomacy, February 4-5, 2010, 67 p. Available at: <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u22281/Science%20Diplomacy%20Proceedings.pdf> (accessed 26.01.2017).

This lack of opportunity and funding has ultimately led scientists to leave the region to pursue scientific experimentation in some other part of the world where substantial opportunity exists, namely the US and Europe. Due to this exodus of Middle Eastern brain power, a mere 4% of the world's total scientific publication is contributed by the Middle East (this is just so sad and so unfortunate given all the great minds residing within the region). In addition, while some of the region's high rollers have been rather flamboyant on spending "vast amounts on building a gleaming infrastructure for research and development", HRH Princess Sumaya Bint El Hassan of Jordan noted in a speech at the Royal Society, that "multi-lateralism is not a great strength of the Arab World..." and that "the nurturing of true innovation requires more than dollars."¹ According to the analysis by Global Research Report on the interactions between states in the Arabian, Persian & Turkish Middle East, the Princess's words hold true. The report revealed "a lower level of collaboration than is generally true elsewhere," and that "Iran and Turkey have much lower levels of collaboration than do Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, while Syria, Yemen, Oman and Qatar have particularly low levels of research linkage to other countries."² However, this relative scientific vacuum does point towards one thing: the potential that future collaborative efforts could have for the region both in terms of development and cooperation.

SESAME: A Model for Middle Eastern Cooperation

Based on the technological foundations of charged-particle accelerators, synchrotron light sources emit are a jack of all trades when it comes to their beamlines' to contribute to fundamental science (chemistry, physics, biology, molecular medicine), applied research (materials science, medical imaging, pharmaceutical R&D, advanced radiology, etc.) as well as industrial technology (micro-fabrication, micro-analysis, photo-chemistry). Moreover, the practical applications afforded by such research are positively impacting people's lives. Synchrotron light sources, for

¹ Adams J., King C., Pendlebury D., Hook D., Wilsdon J. *Global Research Report Middle East: Exploring the Changing Landscape of Arabian, Persian, and Turkish Research*. Leeds, Thomson Reuters, 2011.

² Ibid.

example, have led to the faster development and increased effectiveness of pharmaceutical drugs. Currently, twenty four countries worldwide possess synchrotron light sources (Iran even has a small 300 MeV light source used for medical and agricultural research), yet only one exists in the Middle East — SESAME.¹

On May 16th, 2017, after roughly 20 years of fiscal and political mishaps, the Middle East opened its doors to a revolutionary act of cooperation as individuals from Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey placed sociopolitical differences aside and joined together in the pursuit of scientific research for what is to be the region's first cross-border as well as international scientific research center, the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) (www.sesame.org.jo).² The name itself alludes to the Arabian Nights notion of “achieving what is normally unattainable”. As the first ever “regional center for cooperation in basic research in the Middle East” SESAME certainly owns up to its legacy.³

The drive to open SESAME, pun intended, and to establish a synchrotron light source within the Middle East came from an initial recommendation proposed by the late Pakistani Nobel laureate, renowned physicist and founder of the International Center for Theoretical Physics, Abdus Salam. However, it was not until “Herman Winick from the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) of the National Accelerator Laboratory, USA, and Gustav-Adolf Voss from the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY), Germany, suggested building a light source in the Middle East using components of the soon-to-be decommissioned BESSY I facility in Berlin” in 1997 that the project became more than just a pipe dream.⁴ In

¹ Khan, S.A. The Middle East Synchrotron Facility Can Bring Regional Cooperation. *DOMES : Digest of Middle East Studies*, 2002, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 57-71. DOI: 10.1111/j.1949-3606.2002.tb00457.x

² Mtingwa S. K., Winick H. SESAME and beyond. *Science*, 26 May 2017, vol. 356, issue 6340, p. 785. DOI: 10.1126/science.aan6880

³ Khan, S.A. The Middle East Synchrotron Facility Can Bring Regional Cooperation. *DOMES : Digest of Middle East Studies*, 2002, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 57-71. DOI: 10.1111/j.1949-3606.2002.tb00457.x

⁴ Smith C.L. SESAME for science and peace. *Nature Photonics*, 2015, vol. 9, issue 9, pp. 550-552.

the ensuing years, the project moved from UNESCO auspices to those of a specially created SESAME Council of member states, and “as the large potential user community in the Middle East became clearer, SESAME evolved into a third-generation, 2.5-GeV light source.”¹

Chris Llewellyn Smith references the project as “a working example of Arab–Israeli–Iranian–Turkish–Cypriot–Pakistani collaboration” amongst scientists and administrators at both the senior and junior level that subsequently acts as a double edged sword.² On the one hand, this “collaboration between peoples with very different creeds and political systems” is cultivating much needed “scientific and technological capacities in the Middle East and neighboring countries.”³ Yet, on the other hand, and this may be the project’s true edge, the working relationships and ensuing mutual professional respect created inside SESAME will ultimately “lead to greater mutual tolerance and understanding of diverse views on non-technical issues.”⁴ Think about it — the fact that the member state representatives sit around the boardroom in alphabetical order, meaning Iran and Israel sit side-by-side, is astonishing within itself. Moreover, the diverse potential of SESAME’s planned research programs are paving the way for an interdisciplinary conglomeration of biologists, material scientists and physicists all working together in a single location.⁵

¹ Mtingwa S. K., Winick H. SESAME and beyond. *Science*, 26 May 2017, vol. 356, issue 6340, p. 785. DOI: 10.1126/science.aan6880

² “Senior scientists and administrators from the region are working together to govern SESAME through the council, with input from scientists from around the world through its advisory committees. Young and senior scientists from the region are collaborating in preparing the scientific programme (at users’ meetings and workshops). And the extensive training programme that covers fellowships, visits and schools is already building scientific and technical capacity in the region.” Smith C.L. SESAME for science and peace. *Nature Photonics*, 2015, vol. 9, issue 9, p. 550-552.

³ Smith C.L. SESAME for science and peace. *Nature Photonics*, 2015, vol. 9, issue 9, p. 550-552.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ For example, structural molecular biology, molecular environmental science, surface and interface science, micro-electromechanical devices, X-ray imaging, archaeological microanalysis, materials characterization, and medical applica-

While the SESAME project is nevertheless in its infancy, the very fact that it exists is a powerful success story proving that multilateral regional governance, multinational scientific cooperation, and interdisciplinary knowledge sharing is more than possible, but now a reality in the Middle East. This in itself brings forth the question, why should the goal of “building regional capacity and promoting understanding, friendship, and peace by bringing together scientists from different countries and ethnicities to perform world-class science”¹ in the Middle East be limited to a single project, especially when there are other technologies, that, if implemented in a similar fashion, could follow suit? It is with this notion that the author of this paper argues that under the right auspices and with the necessary funding, there is no reason why SESAME should not be the start of a chain reaction of international and/or multilateral scientific research institutions that pop up across the Middle East.

Potential Non-Nuclear Scientific Research Centers

Currently there are various hi-tech devices that, if implemented as regional research facilities, would serve as opportune methods to continue on spreading the benefits of science diplomacy throughout the Middle East because the possible military dimension (PMD) of such technologies is conspicuously low and/or virtually nonexistent. Like the synchrotron light source located at SESAME, these devices — for example, high-energy particle accelerators, free-electron lasers (FELs), low-energy particle accelerators, low-energy proton beams and accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) — are neither weapons themselves nor do they produce weapons materials. While they are members of the particle physics community, they are nonnuclear, non-reactor-based mechanisms that make no direct contribution to weapons proliferation. They are solely research based. Yes, there is an iota of possibility that some

tions. Einfeld D., Hasnain S. S., Sayers Z., Schopper H., Winick H. SESAME, A Third Generation Synchrotron Light Source for the Middle East Region. *Radiation physics and chemistry*, 2004, vol. 71, pp. 693-700.

¹ Mtingwa S. K., Winick H. SESAME and beyond. *Science*, 26 May 2017, vol. 356, issue 6340, p. 785. DOI: 10.1126/science.aan6880

brilliant evil mind somewhere could finagle such technologies to have a PMD, the likelihood of this is incredibly low and would likely not be able to go undetected.

That being said, since the purpose of such machines is research, the widespread practical applications presented by such devices would not only seek to promote regional development and cross-cultural scientific cooperation, but could also serve as a collaborative means to counteract specific issues permeating the region such as brain drain, the lack of scientific publication and knowledge sharing, drought and agricultural distress, the influx of cancer prevalence and the lack of therapy methods as well as cultural degradation and failure of archeological preservation. Moreover, if such mechanisms were to be constructed in the region and utilized as research centers, like SESAME, they too could be controlled by a system of multilateral regional governance underpinned by international support that would yet again force Middle Eastern states to work together on the common goal of advancing mankind. Lastly, just as the actual process to realize SESAME was one that required collaboration, donation and compromise, so too would the process to place another scientific research facility in the Middle East. The realization of any of the latter projects would require various technological instruments that would have to be built at relevant facilities around the globe. Thus, a lesson from SESAME's book could be borrowed, and during the construction of such facilities, the Middle Eastern scientists that would be running these future machines could assist the global facilities in building the required instruments.

The actual construction and running of these facilities will not only provide opportunity for world-class research but also foster socio-economic development in and around the communities in which they are built. Internally, you have the contractors that raised the physical walls, the secretaries that answer the phones, the janitors that sweep the halls after hours. Externally, there are the new businesses that will sprout due to the influx of new people to the area. Thus, the impact these facilities can have will benefit the larger regional landscape as well as local.

High-Energy Particle Accelerators

Spallation Neutron Sources

Currently, there are just handful of neutron spallation centers — ISIS in the United Kingdom, SINQ in Switzerland, SNS in the United States and J-PARC in Japan — that are up and running today, and approximately two more under constructions— ESS EU and CSNS China. *Spallation neutron sources* (SNS), also known as neutron proliferation acceleration via scattering, utilize high energy proton accelerators (GeV) and spallation heavy metal targets (Hg–Bi) to create an intense continuous or pulsed neutron beam that is non-reactor based, thus making an SNS research facility an apt and politically viable option for the Middle East. Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of SNS experimentation application and its relative efficiency in neutron use in comparison to traditional fission, reactor-based neutron sources have led these machines to become increasingly popular over the last decade in both fundamental and applied research. Currently, SNS technology can be utilized in the fields of solid state physics, soft matter, biomaterials, nano-materials and astrophysics.¹ Thus, providing the Middle East with an SNS would allow the region to remove the taboo surrounding neutron research but, at the same time, avoid the construction of a civilian fission-reactor.

Free-Electron Lasers (X-FELS)

By using “a relativistic electronbeam from an accelerator as a lasing medium,” *free-electron lasers (FELs)* emit a revolutionary type of pulsed radiation that can operate at various speeds (quasi-continuous to ultrafast).² In non-particle physics speak, FELs are high energy light sources that emit a unique type of x-ray that utilize the same technology as the aforementioned neutron light source, but are far simpler and less expensive. FELs are highly demanded by researchers because they

¹ Comsan M. N. H. *Spallation Neutron Sources For Science And Technology*. Egypt Nuclear Research Center, Atomic Energy Authority, 2011.

² Pelka J. B., Tybor K. R., Nietubyc R., Wrochna G. Applications of Free Electron Lasers in Biology and Medicine. *Acta Physica Polonica A*, 2010, vol. 117, no. 2, pp. 427-432.

are an advance on the radiation emitted by synchrotron light sources, like SESAME, and because they bridge the gap between synchrotron radiation and conventional lasers. Currently, the primary applications of FELs are in medicine and biology, as they provide “new opportunities to study life forms on different levels, from biomolecules and sub-cellular structures up to whole organisms.”¹ As this is a relatively new technology, there are less than a handful of FELs worldwide, thus supplanting one in the Middle East would be an apt way toward further multilateral regional cooperation as well as global research as a whole.

Low-Energy Particle Accelerators & Particle Therapy

Proton Beams

The most common form of radiation treatments used for cancer therapy are linear accelerators (LINAC), however, such photon-based radiation is inherently limited to small superficial tumors since “only the use of multiple beam angles ensures a higher dose to the tumor compared to healthy tissues.”² Proton beams, which are capable of such multi-beam angles, have become the method of choice for cancer radiation therapy because protons allow for greater precision when applying radiation doses to patients. This not only makes treatment more effective, but it deposits less radiation into the patient, the benefit of which is self-explanatory. In addition, proton therapy is more applicable to a greater number of patient cases than older methods of radiation.³

Since particle accelerators — cyclotrons or synchrotrons — are used to generate the energy supply for proton beam radiation therapy, they too, like FELs, would be a natural piggyback to the BESSY I at SESAME. Moreover, what some may see as their challenges — large size and high cost — may not necessarily be true if such an instrument were to be implemented in the form of a regional facility. For example, while proton accelerators for beam

¹ Pelka J. B., Tybor K. R., Nietubyc R., Wrochna G. Applications of Free Electron Lasers in Biology and Medicine. *Acta Physica Polonica A*, 2010, vol. 117, no. 2, pp. 427-432.

² Paganetti H. *Proton Beam Therapy*. Bristol, IOP Publishing, 2017. 23 p.

³ Ibid.

therapy are incredibly large in comparison to a LINAC (LINACs can fit in one room, proton beams cannot), a single machine can generate the energy for several treatment rooms simultaneously.¹ Thus, in a future Middle East Regional Cancer Research and Treatment Center, which would be a facility large enough to serve citizens from multiple states, the size of the facility needed to house the instrument becomes less of an issue. In addition, for a research center of the proposed size that is funded multilaterally, the challenge of the beam's high cost also becomes rather null. Moreover, in the span of the other proposed instruments to be supplanted in the Middle East, this is one of the least expensive, so much so that even a very large national hospital say in Jordan could afford to have one of its own. However, while a state like Jordan could perhaps afford to do this unilaterally, the cost-sharing permitted by the construction of a bilateral facility — for example by Israel and Jordan — would better use fiscal resources and allow for a greater research potential, for example in reducing the size of proton beams. Even more so, such a facility would create an apolitical environment where both science and civil communities could interact together.

Currently, there are no active sites for proton beam therapy, but the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is currently constructing one in coordination with the UK that should be ready by 2018.² While one beam is a significant improvement from none, the fact of the matter is that cancer prevalence in the Middle East is expected to double within the next 20 years. The World Health Organization cites that not only will the Eastern Mediterranean Region experience the “highest increase in incidence among all WHO regions,” it is also the region that is the least prepared for such increase as “cancer is generally diagnosed at a relatively advanced stage” and resources for cancer control are inadequate in the majority of countries of the Region.³

¹ Ibid.

² Chaudhary S. B. Revolutionary New Cancer Treatment Centre in UAE by 2018. *Gulf News*, July 19, 2015. Available at: <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/health/revolutionary-new-cancer-treatment-centre-in-uae-by-2018-1.1552578> (accessed 20.08.2017)

³ WHO estimates that 40% of cancers could be prevented and 40% could be cured if detected early. *Towards a strategy for cancer control in the Eastern Mediterranean Region*. World Health Organization, 2009.

Considering Location and Additional Prospects

In looking at a location for another global research center in the Middle East, options are slightly limited as the ideal location for such would need to be in a country that could include all regional states, especially Israel. Therefore, given the diplomatic climate, the two current options are Jordan and Egypt. As the home to our dear SESAME, Jordan is cited to be the most collaborative state in the region, though Egypt does follow closely due to its “pivotal role in linking within the region as well as into Europe, North Africa and to the USA and Japan.”¹

However, an idea that has yet to be proposed is the construction of an artificial island, off the coast of say the Gulf, that could serve as the Middle East’s hub for international scientific research. With the support of an international organization such as UNESCO, the proposed artificial island could function under full international jurisdiction.

While such an offshore facility could hold all of the aforementioned non-reactor-based devices, it may be worthwhile to consider that it could also be a way to bring a large civilian multi-nuclear reactor, co-located with a water desalination plant and even a uranium bank to the Middle East that would reduce if not eliminate the risk of regional nuclear proliferation. Since the entire site would not be under anyone state’s control, none of the fuel would be nationally owned and all nuclear materials could be safeguarded by the international community. Moreover, as a source for water and electricity, the site could bring in revenues by selling such precious commodities to regional states. Such revenues could be used to maintain the facility as well as provide wages for the sites employees. An approach under these lines would follow the guidelines set out by Tazaki and Kuno for a multilateral nuclear approach (MNA) in the Middle East, but reinvent their idea in a way that would avoid the core issue of placing any type of nuclear reactor inside the territory of a state.² In this respect,

¹ Adams J., King C., Pendlebury D., Hook D., Wilsdon J. *Global Research Report Middle East: Exploring the Changing Landscape of Arabian, Persian, and Turkish Research*. Leeds, Thomson Reuters, 2011.

² Their report discusses placing an MNA inside one of the Gulf States, but the idea ultimately succumbs to challenges of “political instability of MNA member states and the region, as well as political conflicts between MNA member states and

an internationally owned, offshore civilian reactor would guarantee transparency as well as eliminate any surprises or uncertainty related to states' national interests and activities.

Additional opportunities for collaboration that could also follow in the footsteps of SESAME that were not discussed at this time, but would enjoy greater research include: (1) a regional archaeological preservation, storage and research center in a neutral location equipped with a machine for accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) that would enable large scale carbon 14 dating to preserve shared regional heritage as well as equipment for ground radar, lidar scanning, drone imaging and remote sensing that could be lent to less affluent states to ensure that their antiquities are also preserved; (2) a regional climate change facility that can specialize in water research and desertification;¹ and (3) a global collider that could take over and/or supplement an area of research conducted at CERN, though more research needs to be done in this area to see if this would be a viable option for global particle research.

Ultimately, there is more work to be done to test the feasibility of all the aforementioned ideas, and a partnership with an individual with a background in physics would be a welcomed compliment to mine in political science and conflict resolution.

Conclusion

The need exists, so the challenge to promoting future science diplomacy and collaboration within the Middle East depends on funding and finding a location that will maximize access and minimize stepping on toes. Funding for smaller projects — such as the proton beam or regional water research facility located inside a state — could be secured in

other states.” The authors state that “there are no simple measures to overcome such challenges,” yet I believe this idea would. Tazaki M., Kuno Y. Feasibility Analysis of Establishing Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs) in the Asian Region and the Middle East. *Sustainability*, 2014, no. 6, pp. 9398-9417. DOI: 10.3390/su6129398

¹ There are several water research facilities around the globe, but the Middle East is one of the driest places on earth so there is a need for more rather than less in this field.

part by the large philanthropic organizations say the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. However, there are two science and technology giants who may be able to lend a hand if a big project took form— the US and China. During the Obama administration, the United States got on board politically (e.g. President Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s appointment of science envoys in 2010 to the Muslim world) as well as fiscally (allocating \$100 million for new global engagement “including scientific cooperation with the Muslim world”).¹ Moreover, an English theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking even suggested that China’s booming R&D sector be the one to add upon the knowledge learned at CERN by building the next large hadron collider (LHC).² While talks are currently geared for the Shanghai area, perhaps a persuasive argument could be made for the Middle East as its new location. Whatever the case, it’s not rocket science (though space R&D is also lacking in the region, so it could be). The Middle East needs more facilities like SESAME to promote scientific collaboration and groundbreaking research that has the ability to create socioeconomic development for the common citizen and turn even the most political and ideological enemies into partners.

Special thanks is given to my father and mentor, Paul Brindza.

¹ Wallin M.R., ed. Science Diplomacy and the Prevention of Conflict. *Proceedings of the USC, Center on Public Diplomacy Conference*. Los Angeles, Annenberg School of Communications (University of Southern California), USC Center on Public Diplomacy, February 4-5, 2010, 67 p. Available at: <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u22281/Science%20Diplomacy%20Proceedings.pdf> (accessed 26.01.2017).

² Growth of the Chinese R&D sector was up by 7.6% in 2015-2016 and is expected to stay afloat at 7.1% for 2017. *Global R&D Funding Forecast* (Winter 2017). Available at: http://digital.rdmag.com/researchanddevelopment/2017_global_r_d_funding_forecast?pg=1#support (accessed 11.10. 2017).

Миротворческий потенциал Центральной Азии

Муратбек Иманалиев

Peacekeeping Potential in Central Asia

Muratbek Imanaliev

Центральная Азия входит в разные состоявшиеся и двигающиеся в направлении возможного конструирования политические, экономические и цивилизационные пространства, в том числе СНГ, Евразии, тюркоязычного и исламского миров. Вхождение в разные пространства, разумеется, во всяком случае, пока, остается достаточно условным, за исключением, может быть, СНГ. Последнее вообще является уникальным политическим международным сооружением, собранное не из самостоятельных, независимых государств, стремившихся к единению, а из обломков единого, огромного некогда государства. Но сегодня СНГ все-таки не столько международная организация, сколько некий исторический процесс, способствовавший плавному и безболезненному возникновению и существованию новых независимых государств.

Хотя Центральная Азия формально считается частью исламского мира, тем не менее, фактически она еще не стала таковой. В большей степени регион остается до сих пор фрагментом постсоветского пространства и отделен от остального мира, в том числе и исламского, унаследованными, инерционно еще достаточно мощными ценностными емкостями «советского цивилизационного обустройства», в том числе, например, образовательной системой, лингвокультурой, функционирующими до сих пор социалистическими образами и символами и даже некоторыми элементами мировоззренческих конструкций, которые, правда, медленно размываются и разрушаются, но, очевидно и то, что просуществуют они еще довольно долго.

На пролонгацию их функционирования не в последнюю очередь воздействуют и события в географической полосе мусульманских государств от Афганистана до северной Африки: они провоцируют и в общем-то укрепляют стремление государств центральноазиат-

ского региона неким образом отгородиться от всего того, что происходит в этой вот «географической полосе», используя, во-первых, весьма скромные свои возможности, во-вторых, союзнический и партнерский потенциал России и некоторых других стран, и в меньшей степени, в-третьих, военно-политический и иной капитал действующих в регионе международных структур и организаций.

Проблемы, вызовы и угрозы, прежде всего связанные с религиозным экстремизмом, терроризмом и иными проявлениями трансграничной преступности, несмотря на то, что страны Центральной Азии, в основном, населены мусульманами, тем не менее, по содержанию, качеству и даже колориту, в принципе мало чем отличаются от того, что, например, происходит в Европе. Между прочим, отметим, что частота и масштаб экстремистских проявлений и событий в Центрально-Азиатском регионе на порядок ниже, чем во многих других странах мира.

В продолжение темы, для пушей наглядности, напомним лишь об одном весьма, на мой взгляд, поучительном и очевидном факте из жизни Центрально-Азиатских государств. О том, что Ферганская долина вот-вот взорвется и станет ужасающей зоной бесконечных конфликтов, не писал только ленивый, и не только на Западе, и не только на Востоке. Но вот прошло уже двадцать пять лет, и долина живет, в общем-то, почти мирно и почти стабильно. Да, были и конфликты и террористические акты, но, еще раз повторю, не чаще и не страшнее, чем в других регионах планеты. И надеюсь, что так будет и далее.

Однако, вместе с тем, в странах Центральной Азии отчетливо понимают опасности и угрозы, которые несут и нарастающее геополитическое противостояние великих держав, и борьба за ресурсы, и террор, и религиозный экстремизм.

В этой связи хотелось бы сказать несколько слов не о влиянии ислама на формирование и реализацию внешнеполитических интересов, а о некоем возможном совместном прорелигиозном проекте стран нашего региона. Например, о проекте геополитического посредничества.

Но, прежде чем предложить мировому сообществу свои услуги в качестве геополитического и религиозно-культурного посредника между мировым Исламом и другими цивилизационно-культурными ареалами планеты, необходимо, прежде всего, понять, каким потенциалом и ресурсами располагают Центрально-Азиатские государства в совокупности и индивидуально для выполнения такой весьма сложной миссии.

Необходимо признать, что на сегодняшний день возможности Центрально-Азиатских государств ограничены, либо, наоборот, широки настолько, насколько они дееспособны как независимые государства и насколько адекватно и полноценно понимание элитами Центральной Азии значимости региона как реально сконструированного международного политического пространства, в том числе имеющего и глобальное измерение. Очевидно, что от этого во многом зависит проектирование и реализация политических, экономических и культурно-гуманитарных «акций влияния» на внешний мир с последующим формированием и развитием позитивных представлений о Центральной Азии у внерегиональных лидеров и народов, о ее потенциале в том или ином качестве субъекта международной жизни.

Разумеется, что Центрально-Азиатские страны, в свою очередь, испытывают влияние прежде всего ведущих держав и некоторых межстрановых объединений на функционирование и развитие тех или иных политических институтов в государствах региона, социально-экономических контентов, общественных отношений, внешнеполитических стратегий и многого другого. Однако представляется, что влияние сильных мира сего на формирование институционального развития государств региона было и остается не более чем фрагментарным. Например, попытки Запада «демократизировать» Центральную Азию не имели всеобъемлющего и программно-подхода, в частности, право и нравственность как ценностные приоритеты и «ограничители», без которых демократия не более чем анархия и охлократия, были представлены в процессах демократического «всеобуча» секторально (право), либо вообще отсутствовали (нравственность). Тем более, что некоторые

Центрально-Азиатские «ученики» осознанно или по незнанию превращали демократию в некую декорацию, за которой скрывалось безобразное управление, коррупция, криминал и т.д., игнорируя то обстоятельство, что переход к демократии требует все-таки достаточно хорошего уровня экономического развития, что готовность людей к демократии не есть стихия, а некий сгусток, квинтэссенция воли и законности.

При этом, конечно, я разделяю мнение ряда отечественных и зарубежных экспертов о том, что упомянутые проблемы все-таки больше относятся к категории проектных решений внутренними усилиями элит и народов региона, разумеется, при условии, что они не только проявляют интерес, но и в определенной степени готовы к их реализации.

Не секрет, что в странах Центрально-Азиатского региона полностью осознают, что их регион был и остается геополитической периферией, и интересы ведущих государств, окружающих Центральную Азию, весьма и весьма неоднозначны в смыслах, трендах и механизмах, в том числе и в процессе реализации.

Регион должен быть как бы единым, чтобы противостоять современным вызовам и опасностям, не в последнюю очередь сконструированным в силу или в противодействии вот этой вот периферийности. Есть ли способы нейтрализации или нивелирования периферийности? По счастью, они есть и могут быть достаточно эффективными.

Например, могут ли Центрально-Азиатские государства использовать свою относительную фрагментарную инкорпорированность в Европу (ОБСЕ, Совет Европы и т.д.) и формальную принадлежность к миру Ислама (ОИС) для собственного становления в качестве реальных субъектов современной международной жизни, с одной стороны, и формирования диалоговых коммуникаций между, например, теми же европейскими и исламскими странами? Насколько противоречивы, либо вообще антагонистичны ценностные ориентиры Запада и исламского мира, и каков ресурс их влияния и доминирования, в том числе эгоистичных интересов стран и конкретных людей обоих миров, на основе которых выстраиваются

их позиции? Нет нужды еще раз подтверждать вслед за историками, археологами и этнографами то, что историко-культурные и иные необходимые обоснования, в принципе, наличествуют. В частности, Центральная Азия всегда была местом схождения цивилизационно-культурных потоков и мировых религий, при этом играя роль внутриконтинентального связующего коридора, правда без ярко выраженного в смыслах прогресса, как это понималось в Европе, но с функцией интеграционного начала с экстенсивной механикой развития. Последнее в большей степени относится к культуре кочевнической мобильности в контексте политических, экономических и иных потребностей, отражавших мировосприятие евразийских кочевников, историческая миссия которых, на мой взгляд, заключалась в том числе и в перемещении неких, порой виртуализированных ценностных емкостей из одного культурно-цивилизационного пространства в другое, но которыми, как это ни странно, они сами практически не пользовались. Как я понимаю, следует также напомнить, что регион Центральной Азии является и территорией трех лингвокультур — персидской, русской и, собственно, тюркской, в которую на данном этапе активно интегрируются и адаптируются еще и английская и китайская лингвокультуры.

В настоящее время новые государства в Центральной Азии, стремящиеся к построению собственных моделей национальной государственности, одновременно пытаются возродить и реконструировать смыслы (пока в контурах) посредническо-интеграционных традиций, существовавших ранее. Правда, следует признать, что унаследованы, в общем-то, лишь некие фантомные «остатки» этих самых традиций: собственно сами смыслы, к большому сожалению, стерты из памяти. Но абсолютно очевидно, что сегодня в Центральной Азии идет процесс формулирования новых смыслов.

На данный момент некоторые интересные инициативы, которые, откровенно говоря, пока еще с определенной натяжкой можно категориально отнести к формулам подобных традиций, находят понимание и поддержку других государств. Например, казахское Соприкосновение по взаимодействию и мерам доверия в Азии (СВМДА), узбекская «безъядерная зона», таджикские «водные» инициативы

и т.д. Даже туркменский «нейтралитет» в понятном смысле можно рассматривать как стихийно возрожденный внутренний призыв к реставрации этих политических конструкций.

Эти инициативы поддержаны многими европейскими и исламскими государствами. Однако требуется их развитие в сторону не организационно-политических трендов и сиюминутного улучшения имиджа, а распространения их в качестве устойчиво и позитивно воспринимаемых другими странами идей и ценностных ориентиров, большую часть из которых можно реализовать с Россией и другими странами СНГ, ШОС, а некоторые и со странами Европы, Среднего и Ближнего Востока.

В частности, с моей точки зрения, вполне можно было бы использовать создание безъядерной зоны в Центральной Азии для укрепления идей нераспространения и отказа от использования атома не относящимися к Центральной Азии странами в военных целях. И в этом контексте следовало бы более масштабно и полноценно использовать, например, решение евразийского и мусульманского Казахстана, который добровольно отказался от статуса ядерной державы. Отказ — это не просто некая механика внешнеполитической конъюнктуры, а содержательно непростое, не одномоментное и, в общем-то, болезненное и общее, согласованное как внутривосточное, так и международное решение.

Полагаю возможным, что согласованные и активные действия стран Центрально-Азиатского региона при ведущей в этом деле роли Казахстана и поддержке ООН, других международных организаций, отдельных государств были бы способны привлечь к такому процессу широкий круг исламских и европейских стран, включая, например, такую страну, как Иран. Почему бы не подумать о присоединении Афганистана к Центрально-Азиатской «безъядерной» зоне? Может ли Центральная Азия оказаться в тренде содействия странам Ближнего Востока в создании безъядерной зоны в этом регионе?

В данном контексте было бы весьма актуально и полезно для стран региона вынести в повестку дня Центрально-Азиатского сотрудничества проблему нераспространения в ее более насыщенном,

динамичном и конструктивном виде, а не ограничиваться только подписанием договора о создании безъядерной зоны: необходима верстка региональной «безъядерной» политики и ее инструментов. Добавлю лишь то, что актуальность этой проблемы не вызывает ни у кого сомнений, и Центральная Азия, окруженная ядерными державами, а также странами, намеревающимися стать таковыми, должна быть более активной в укреплении и развитии этих идей. Пока из всех Центрально-Азиатских лидеров на этом направлении заметна только деятельность казахстанского Президента Н.Назарбаева.

Очевидно, что важнейшей и ведущей компонентой диалоговых коммуникаций должны быть проблемы безопасности. Трансграничная преступность, выражаемая в перманентной эскалации терроризма, наркотизме, торговле людьми, оружием и т.п. требует большей активности и результативности в рамках совместной деятельности великих и невеликих, в том числе и Центрально-Азиатских, держав, глобальных и региональных международных организаций, неправительственных и общественных объединений.

Нельзя сказать, что необходимые усилия не предпринимаются. Но создается впечатление, что все потуги приводят, как ни странно, к обратному результату, если таковой искомым итог не предусматривался: к отчуждению. Наверное, нужна принципиально иная база и концепция диалога.

В этой связи полагал бы возможным изучить проблему создания конференциального канала контактов, в пределах которых роль некоего «связующего» звена на себя взяли бы страны, находящиеся как бы на стыке исламского и христианского миров и являющиеся одновременно членами Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе и Организации Исламского сотрудничества. В число таких стран, как известно, входят и Центрально-Азиатские государства.

С моей точки зрения чрезвычайно актуальными проблемами повестки дня подобных конференций могут стать не только вопросы терроризма, экстремизма, наркотизма и миграции и т.п., но и культурно-гуманитарного проектного сотрудничества, партнерства в области ядерного разоружения, разработки общих принци-

пов и порядка поведенческой культуры, формирования нового политического и экономического порядков и т.д.

Главная задача такой постоянной действующей конференции заключается не в «усаживании» за общий переговорный стол исламские, европейские и другие страны, а в двусторонней и многосторонней ретрансляции ценностных емкостей и ориентаций, поиска путей их последующей возможной совместимости.

Функционирование такой конференции, вероятно, будет предполагать ее определенную самостоятельность, но не обособленность. Важен компонент «второго и третьего эшелонов» предварительного внутреннего диалога, в том числе деятелей культуры, науки, религиозных, общественных и неправительственных организаций, представляющих не только Европу, но и мусульманские страны, если на это будет их добрая воля.

Представить себе, что Центральнo-Азиатские и другие страны-участницы такой конференции были бы в состоянии влиять на исламские или европейские страны весьма самонадеянно, но формирование в обозримом будущем общеполитических межрегиональных и межконфессиональных диалогов, ориентированных на поиск путей решения общих проблем, вполне вероятно.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЯ

**Приветствие Министра иностранных дел
Российской Федерации С.В. Лаврова
участникам 62-й Международной конференции
Пагуошского движения ученых за мир, разоружение,
международную безопасность и научное сотрудничество**

**РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ
МИНИСТР ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ**

**Участникам 62-й Международной конференции
Пагуошского движения ученых за мир, разоружение,
международную безопасность и научное сотрудничество**

Сердечно приветствую участников 62-й Пагуошской конференции ученых, посвященной знаменательному юбилею — 60-летию со дня проведения международной встречи ученых, положившей начало сотрудничеству всемирно известных деятелей науки.

За шесть десятилетий Пагуошское движение утвердилось в качестве авторитетного и востребованного форума, предоставляющего возможность для экспертного обсуждения актуальных проблем контроля над вооружениями, нераспространения и разоружения. Трудно переоценить его роль в сохранении атмосферы доверия и взаимопонимания в мировых делах, укреплении международного сотрудничества на основе принципов равноправия и учета интересов.

В нынешней непростой ситуации, характеризующейся, в том числе, нарастанием факторов, подрывающих стратегическую стабильность, и распространением конфронтационных подходов к вопросам ядерного разоружения, несущих риски размывания основ режима нераспространения, особенно востребован откровенный

диалог между представителями академических кругов. Его проведение призвано способствовать предпринимаемым Россией и другими государствами усилиям по сокращению и ограничению вооружений, снижению напряженности, обеспечению мира, безопасности и стабильности.

Убежден, что Пагуошское движение будет и впредь в числе наиболее активных участников такого открытого диалога.

Желаю вам плодотворных дискуссий и всего самого доброго.

С. Лавров

г. Москва, 25 августа 2017 года

Адрес Российской академии наук в связи с 60-летием Пагуошского движения ученых и Российского Пагуошского комитета при Президиуме Российской академии наук

РОССИЙСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК

**Председателю Российского Пагуошского комитета,
члену президиума РАН, академику РАН А.А.Дынкину,
членам Российского Пагуошского комитета**

Глубокоуважаемый Александр Александрович!
Глубокоуважаемые члены Российского Пагуошского комитета!

От имени Российской академии наук искренне и сердечно поздравляем Российский Пагуошский комитет с юбилеем — 60-летием Комитета и проведения первой Пагуошской конференции по науке и мировым проблемам!

Созванная в связи с известным Манифестом Рассела-Эйнштейна в июле 1957 года в канадской деревушке Пагуош историческая встреча ученых Запада и Востока по опасностям атомной войны и проблемам социальной ответственности научного сообщества, послужила началом многолетней плодотворной деятельности видных представителей науки многих стран мира, объединенных Пагуошским движением.

Являясь одной из ведущих международных неправительственных научных организаций, Пагуошское движение ученых — лауреат Нобелевской премии мира — внесло общепризнанный вклад в разработку основополагающих межгосударственных правовых актов в области безопасности, разоружения и контроля над вооружениями. Среди них — договоры о запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия в атмосфере, космическом пространстве и под водой, о нераспространении ядерного оружия, об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны, договоры по стратегическим вооружениям, конвенция о запрещении бактериологического (биологического) и токсинного оружия, конвенция о запрещении химического оружия и другие ключевые международные соглашения.

Важнейшей особенностью Пагуошского движения является его приверженность исключительно научному подходу к поиску путей

решения глобальных проблем человечества. Междисциплинарный и независимый характер Пагуоша служит достижению поставленных целей и задач.

Академия наук СССР стояла у истоков Пагуошского движения. Члены Академии с первых дней существования Пагуоша активно участвуют в его работе. В Российской Академии наук с благодарностью вспоминают имена руководителей национального Пагуошского комитета академиков А.В. Топчиева, В.А. Кириллина, М.Д. Миллионщикова, М.А. Маркова, В.И. Гольданского. Большой вклад в деятельность Комитета внесли лауреаты Нобелевской премии академики П.Л. Капица, А.М. Прохоров, А.Д. Сахаров, Н.Н. Семенов, И.Е. Тамм, И.М. Франк, П.А. Черенков. В общей сложности в Пагуошском движении ученых приняли участие 139 членов РАН, в том числе 104 академика, более 250 докторов и кандидатов наук, научных работников, молодых ученых и специалистов нашей страны.

Российский Пагуошский комитет, состоящий со дня своего основания при Президиуме Академии наук, активно способствует укреплению авторитета Академии в мире. В условиях реформирования РАН, Комитет продолжает содействовать Академии наук в реализации возложенных на нее задач, в том числе по расширению международных и межрегиональных научных связей.

В последние три года Комитетом проведена серия научных мероприятий с участием ведущих зарубежных ученых и экспертов ряда стран. По их итогам подготовлены аналитические записки и рекомендации, нашедшие практическое применение в деятельности государственных органов и научных организаций России.

Поздравляем Российский Пагуошский комитет со славным юбилеем и желаем всем «пагуошцам» России здоровья, благополучия, творческой энергии и новых успехов на благо науки, мира и безопасности на планете.

*И.о. президента Российской академии наук
академик РАН В.В. Козлов*

*Главный ученый секретарь президиума Российской академии наук
академик РАН М.А. Пальцев*

г. Москва, 5 июля 2017 года

Заявление Пагуошского Совета по итогам 62-й Международной Пагуошской конференции «Противостояние новым ядерным угрозам»

Statement of the Pugwash Council on the 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs “Confronting New Nuclear Dangers”

The 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
“Confronting New Nuclear Dangers”
25-29 August 2017, Astana, Kazakhstan

Statement of the Pugwash Council

Sixty years ago, the first Pugwash Conference was held to confront the new nuclear dangers of

that age. By 1995, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and one of its founders, Joseph Rotblat, received the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and, in the longer run, to eliminate such arms.” At that time, there was much hope and expectation that the new realities of the post-cold war world would see great progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Yet over the past two decades some governments have continued to rely upon nuclear weapons and are now expanding or upgrading their arsenals. Given the many security crises across the globe we must once more confront the acute dangers nuclear weapons pose.

The Pugwash Council welcomes the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Ban Treaty) which marks a pivotal moment for nuclear disarmament. Such a measure is long overdue and will do much to strengthen the normative and legal framework that ensures that nuclear weapons are never again used in conflict or for testing. It will ultimately lead to the elimination of all such weapons. The agreement would not have been possible without the dedicated engagement of the 124 delegations and the substantive assistance and encouragement of civil society worldwide. The Pugwash Council especially recognizes the long and consistent efforts made by the victims of use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha) as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons.

Yet, the Nuclear Ban Treaty requires follow-through. Supporters must rededicate themselves to promote the treaty's entry into force and

the adoption of national-level legislation to implement and even extend its provisions. They must also engage the states that remain outside the negotiation process, essentially the nuclear-armed states and those in security arrangements with nuclear-armed states or nuclear-sharing arrangements. Indeed, even with the presence of the Ban Treaty, a select group of states may continue to rely on nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the disarmament debate cannot move forward without a revisiting of the fundamental beliefs that have long underwritten nuclear deterrence-based order. Sustaining progress in nuclear disarmament will require the exploration of non-military security alternatives to replace the deterrence function ascribed to nuclear weapons.

Some 15-16,000 nuclear weapons remain in existence, most of which are possessed by the US and

Russia. There are currently no bilateral arms control negotiations between both countries. On the multilateral level the UN Conference on Disarmament remains unable to agree on any agenda, let alone negotiate weapon control agreements. Under those circumstances care must be taken that crucial nuclear arms control treaties currently in force do not lapse. In particular, Russia and the US must continue to fully comply with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and resolve concerns about possible violations by means of high-level discussions. Both countries must furthermore extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) by another five years and aim for new talks to reduce their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals even further.

Worryingly, many nuclear weapons remain on quick reaction alert. Hot spots of nuclear danger

around the globe need to be dealt with urgently: tensions on the Korean Peninsula have escalated as a consequence of the DPRK's continuation of nuclear detonations and testing of possible delivery systems; India and Pakistan remain locked in a nuclear-armed rivalry; and the complicated situation of the Middle East is intensified by the presence of Israeli nuclear weapons. There is a strong risk that short-term political interests may jeopardize the Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA), holding grave consequences for the non-proliferation regime. Expansion or upgrading of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of other countries may

become a shortcut for proliferation (without formally violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT).

On the Korean peninsula, actions to lower tensions are urgently needed. To this effect, track II

dialogue to communicate the shared hope of avoiding large-scale conflict should be encouraged. Unilateral decisions from North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. to gradually reduce missile tests and military exercises in the region would send positive signals that mitigate the risk of inadvertent large-scale conflict. The onus is on both the U.S. and North Korea to engage in some level of dialogue, eventually leading to the opening of formal negotiations without preconditions. One approach could be dual-track discussions with distinct sets of parties and goals. The first track involves a return to six-party talks as a platform for an open dialogue on a range of issues, including a freeze on North Korean nuclear testing, a reduction of missile tests and nuclear disarmament. The second, simultaneous, set of discussions would be between the main participants in the Korean war concerning the modalities of a peace agreement and normalization of relations with North Korea.

The Pugwash Council recognizes the correlation between nuclear dangers and these critical areas

of the world. Pugwash has been addressing conflict resolution efforts where nuclear weapons play a dangerous and destabilizing role. From South Asia (including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India) to North-East Asia to the Middle East, and likewise between Russia and Western States, greater emphasis on diplomacy can help to cool tensions, reduce misunderstandings, and promote cooperation. Equally, track two diplomacy and informal interactions can supplement and enhance such processes. Even in the darkest moments of the Cold War and other intractable conflicts, dialogue across divides has helped to build peace and less dangerous world. The Pugwash Council urges those States to seek or promote diplomatic engagement and eschew rhetoric that exacerbates tensions and conflict.

Similarly, the Pugwash Council calls for greater global commitment to multilateral treaties across the spectrum of weapons of mass destruction. Greater effort must be made to encourage those states not party to those

arms control and disarmament agreements to promptly and without reservation adhere to them. In particular, we call upon those States listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ratify or accede so as to trigger the much-delayed entry into force. The CTBT is an essential instrument in the preservation of the non-proliferation regime and ultimately in the future elimination of nuclear weapons. Equally, the nuclear weapons States should fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to make significant progress to achieve nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia carry a special responsibility to reduce their overwhelming arsenals drastically, and avoid creating the environment of a new cold war.

The Pugwash Council applauds the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and their partners for the establishment of a Low Enriched Uranium bank in Kazakhstan. We urge the international community — governments as well as the nuclear industry — to explore further multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, the consequences of a changing nuclear market on the non-proliferation regime and the associated evolution of safeguards, with a commitment to transparency and accountability. We also invite nuclear newcomers to carefully consider the choices of nuclear power versus renewable sources of energy, in particular with a clear plan for the disposition of spent fuel and the decommissioning of nuclear reactors, within a country-specific context of emerging industry, rational consumption and rapid mitigation of climate change.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has achieved near universality: only four UN Members still have to become a party. However, the DPRK, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan are all located in conflict-prone regions. Verified disarmament as offered by the CWC can contribute to transparency and cooperation, and therefore to reduction of tensions. The Pugwash Council condemns in the strongest terms the continuing use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict by both government forces and non-state actors, as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). Syria is a State Party to the CWC. Furthermore, external parties involved in the conflict should refrain from political or

military action that undermines the integrity of the CWC. Chemical warfare must cease immediately.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) remains an active treaty on the local and regional levels. Over the past few years the number of States Parties has increased rapidly and currently stands at 178. However, the multilateral diplomatic forum has once again stagnated. With the failure of the Eighth Review Conference (2016) States Parties have adopted no work programme for the years leading up to the 2021 Review Conference. The Pugwash Council calls on all States Parties to adopt a meaningful programme of work at the Meeting of States Parties to be held in December 2017. Due to their dual-use characteristics, many advances in the life sciences and the different areas of biotechnology carry risks of weaponization — both by states and non-state actors alike.

Scientists with the relevant expertise should communicate reliable information with involved politicians, policy-makers, and diplomats in the context of crises, emerging technologies, and existing risks. The promotion of research and the exchange of different views remain vitally important. Finally, the Pugwash Council urges the broader disarmament community to help engage, encourage, and embolden young people to take an active role in solving the difficult international security problems we all face. Awareness, education, and intergenerational dialogue are critical aspects of achieving a world free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

* * *

The Pugwash Council Statement is an overview of key thematic points. Pugwash modus operandi is to welcome many viewpoints. Not all Council members subscribe to all points. More than two-hundred-and-fifty participants from 34 countries (including 50 students from 20 countries) gathered in Astana from 25-29 August 2017 for the 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. The Conference was organized by Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the Pugwash 2017 organizing committee. This conference was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan. Pugwash would like to thank The Simons Foundation Canada for its ongoing support for the biennial Simons Symposia, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for support of Pugwash activities.

Астанинская декларация Совета Пагуошского движения ученых

The 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
“Confronting New Nuclear Dangers”
25-29 August 2017, Astana, Kazakhstan

Astana Declaration of the Pugwash Council “From Prohibition of Nuclear Testing toward Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”

INTRODUCTION BY PAOLO COTTA RAMUSINO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF PUGWASH

Kazakhstan has been at the forefront of the campaign against nuclear weapons for quite some time. It suffered enormously from the nuclear testing conducted in the polygon of Semipalatinsk that was shut down by a crucial decision taken by President Nursultan Nazarbayev. He also made sure that all Soviet nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the country after 1992, as well taking leadership in the establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone established in 2006. Pugwash is very grateful to Kazakhstan for having hosted our 62nd international conference and it is a great honor for me to thank the people of Kazakhstan, the Senate President Tokayev, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, and the President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

ASTANA DECLARATION

Since 1945, nuclear weapons testing has played a primary role in the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such testing has also inflicted great damage on the environment and people, especially in areas adjacent to nuclear test ranges but also globally.

The cumulative consequences of more than 2000 nuclear tests conducted since 1945 by nuclear weapons states can be compared to a slow-motion limited nuclear war, waged by them on themselves and on humankind.

One of the initiatives that changed the tide in the fight against nuclear weapons testing was at Semipalatinsk. The decision by Kazakhstan to permanently close the Soviet nuclear test site was promulgated on

29 August 1991. It became one of the significant factors that led to the moratorium on nuclear testing, followed by the successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. However, this treaty will only enter into force when eight key countries decide to adhere. We urge the DPRK, India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the treaty and also China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the USA to ratify it without delay.

For its part, Kazakhstan has been a strong supporter of this goal, including its joint-chairing with Japan of the conference for Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT for the past two years. The case of Kazakhstan is a powerful reminder of the importance of prohibiting nuclear tests, as well as of the humanitarian consequences that nuclear weapons entail, even when not used in war. Cancers of different types, leukemia, infertility, and genetic diseases due to nuclear weapons tests affect many people across the world. Furthermore, radiation damage to the genetic code continues to impact the second and even third generation of those exposed, and has had a devastating ecological impact on land, rivers, and agriculture.

It is more than seventy years since the first two nuclear explosions, when 170,000 people were killed and many more affected by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Still, over 15,000 nuclear warheads continue to pose a threat to humanity. The plight and suffering of Hibakusha around the world, survivors of the legacy of nuclear weapons as well as testing, must jolt us from complacency to finally and comprehensively eliminate nuclear weapons. The recently negotiated Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, agreed upon by 122 States and supported by global civil society, acknowledges the importance of reaching this goal.

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains the serious possibility that a nuclear weapon or device might be detonated. In the current international climate, there is a heightened risk that a conflict can escalate and nuclear dangers would risk spiraling out of control. The absolute imperative of avoiding any nuclear explosion, in any possible conflict or situation, must be emphasized.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the first Pugwash Conference. The tragic results of the Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test by the US in 1954 in the Marshall Islands led Joseph Rotblat to set in motion what has now

become a truly global movement. Here in Astana, on the International Day against Nuclear Tests, and aware of Kazakhstan's important contributions to this cause, the Pugwash Council calls upon all Governments and the people of the world to reflect on the grave and irreversible ecological and humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and to spare no efforts towards achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.

**Обращение к участникам 62-й Международной Пагуошской
конференции Исполнительного секретаря Подготовительной комиссии
Организации по Договору о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных
испытаний (ДВЗЯИ) Лассина Зербо «Ядерные испытания: прошлое
и будущее»
Астана, 25 августа 2017 года**

**Keynote address to the participants of the 62nd Pugwash Conference
on Science and World Affairs by the Executive Secretary of the
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization Dr. Lassina Zerbo
“Nuclear tests: past and future”
Astana, 25 August 2017**

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. It is my pleasure to speak at this International Pugwash conference. Pugwash has been an invaluable advocate for true human and global security since its first meeting in Nova Scotia in 1957.

2. A number of challenges face the international community today. This makes the need for dialogue and discussion between practitioners, academic communities and international organizations more critical than ever before.

3. I am particularly happy to be speaking here because Pugwash has one foot in science and the other in global affairs. As the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), this science-policy nexus is exactly what I have devoted myself to. It feels really enlivening to be around people who share the goal of making the world safer through science and international cooperation.

4. The theme for this conference is confronting new nuclear dangers. In the next days, we are to consider it from regional and global perspectives. I have the experience confronting one particular type of nuclear danger. The danger posed by nuclear weapon testing. It has had a dangerous and destabilizing impact on global security, and terrible effects on human health and environment.

5. Thankfully, nuclear weapons have not been used for their intended purpose since those two terrible cases in 1945, but the absence of wartime use does not mean the absence of victims.

Lessons learnt from Kazakhstan's experience of nuclear tests.

6. Kazakhstan is a vivid example of the risks posed by nuclear explosion tests. On 29 August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear explosive device.

7. Over the next forty years, 456 nuclear explosive tests were conducted at Semipalatinsk, with devastating consequences for the hundreds of thousands of people who lived in the region and for their environment.

8. Though birth defects and leukaemia are no longer so commonplace, other effects have lingered, such as an overall decrease in life expectancy. Some areas are still too dangerous to enter or go near. This experience has given Kazakhstan an added sense of purpose and responsibility pushing for a total ban on nuclear tests.

9. On 29 August 1991, President Nazarbayev permanently closed the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. Leading by example, Kazakhstan also voluntarily renounced the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

CTBT role in promoting nuclear test free world.

10. In his Manifesto, President Nazarbayev rightly points out that the effects of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing cannot be contained in either time or space. They are a global issue which requires global cooperation.

11. Four days from now, on the very same 29 August, we will mark the International Day Against Nuclear Tests. Indeed, the CTBTO works hard every day to make sure that every day is a day against nuclear tests.

12. As we work to consign nuclear testing to history, we must not forget the importance of trust at the regional and international levels. It takes time to build trust and much more to rebuild it. But once it is there, many things become possible.

13. With uncertainties clouding the international political area, it may seem difficult to agree on much. But we can still agree that the world does not need more nuclear weapons or nuclear testing.

14. We all want a world free of nuclear weapons. While there are different views on how to reach that goal, we must remind ourselves that we do not yet have even a nuclear-test free world. This objective — a vital specific step towards nuclear disarmament — is within our reach.

15. It is achievable if there is a strong political will and preference for multilateralism and collective security. The CTBT should serve as a common denominator and a solid basis for continuing dialogue and expanding cooperation. This should especially be considered in light of current tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Putting at least a testing moratorium up front in discussions with the DPRK would be a positive development.

16. The CTBTO is doing important work by giving States confidence that the global moratorium against nuclear testing is being upheld and that no nuclear test or explosion will go undetected.

17. The CTBTO's International Monitoring System, or IMS, can credibly verify compliance with the ban on nuclear testing. The IMS is a global network of monitoring facilities that makes it impossible to conduct a nuclear test without the international community knowing it. Together, the 288 monitoring facilities of the IMS form a global radar system that covers every part of the planet. This system is supported by the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna which processes and analyses data non-stop.

18. The IMS is currently 92% complete. Yet, it has already exceeded expectations in terms of coverage and detection capabilities. The readiness and speed with which 97 seismic stations detected the 2016 DPRK nuclear tests demonstrated the effectiveness of the verification system. It also highlighted the democratic nature of the data collection, which enabled the international community to be provided with impartial evidence.

19. Today, we can say with confidence that even if a country conducting a nuclear test does not announce it, the IMS and IDC would ensure that the international community will get reliable, objective and verifiable data about the situation on the ground.

20. In addition to its verification purpose, our data is useful for many civil and scientific purposes, including tsunami prediction and monitoring

the effects of climate change. This data is shared with all States Signatories. It is also made available to organizations and academics in Member States.

21. The IMS and IDC represent a real achievement for science and diplomacy in making the world a better place. It is a representation of what we can achieve when we work together as the international community rather than individual States.

CTBT: the Way Forward.

22. The CTBT has a unique position in the history of treaties. It is nearly universally adhered to but not yet technically in force. While the Treaty has established an international norm against nuclear testing, action still needs to be taken to secure the future of the Treaty as a firm legal barrier against a return towards nuclear testing.

23. There are also many aspects to the Treaty which only become valid after the Treaty has officially come into force. First of all, the ability of the CTBTO to conduct on-site inspections, similar to the unprecedented onsite field exercises held by the CTBTO in Semipalatinsk in 2008 and Jordan in 2014.

24. To finish what we started, we still need the ratification of the Treaty by the eight remaining States listed in Annex 2 to the CTBT. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty. India, North Korea and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified the Treaty. Many of these States take the position that they will not ratify the Treaty unless some other Annex 2 State does so. The problem arises when States on both sides say the same thing. Someone always has to show leadership.

25. We are working closely with our 183 members to reach the finish line. Every two years CTBT States Signatories meet for an Article XIV Conference to advance the Treaty's entry into force. The last conference, which was presided over by Kazakhstan and Japan, was held in 2015. The next Conference, to be led by Belgium and Iraq, will take place on 20 September 2017 in New York. During the following two years, the Copresidents will employ a targeted approach to reach out to key decisionmakers in the eight remaining Annex 2 States.

26. While such direct engagement with the mentioned eight States will continue, there is also a central role the academic community, civil society

and youth can play in supporting the entry into force of the Treaty. In fact, the Pugwash Conference has been an important forum in this regard.

Conclusion

27. No speech to the Pugwash conference would be complete without a mention of that immortal line from the Russel-Einstein manifesto “remember your humanity and forget the rest.” And I want to close by

considering what it really means, why sometimes living up to it can be so difficult, and what happens when we don’t.

28. Pugwash brings together science and global politics, two fields which can seem, at times, to be quite cold and heartless. But they only seem like this when we forget that the true purpose of science and politics is to benefit humanity, our humanity.

29. We need to ensure that the wellbeing of people will not be sacrificed for false notions of power and prestige in a zero-sum game. The result is suffering, like that of many people around Semipalatinsk. The fear of a mother hoping her baby will be spared the birth defects she has seen happening all around her. The fear of those wondering if their loved one with cancer will survive.

30. This suffering is not “old news,” it continues to this day. It is our duty at these conferences to not only search for ways to ease this suffering, but to simply remember it and hold it in our minds. It reminds us of our humanity, and reminds us of what would happen were we to forget it and allow once again an outbreak of nuclear testing.

31. Thank you. I look forward to our exchange of ideas.

**Обращение к участникам 62-й Международной Пагуошской
конференции Высокого представителя ООН по вопросам разоружения
Изуми Накамитсу
Астана, 25 августа 2017 года**

**Keynote address to the participants of the 62nd Pugwash Conference
on Science and World Affairs by the UN High Representative for
Disarmament Affairs
Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu
Astana, 25 August 2017**

His Excellency Mr Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Chairman of the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan,

Dr Paolo Cotta Ramusino, Secretary General of Pugwash,

Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash,

His Excellency Mr Mikhail Bocharnikov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Kazakhstan,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to be here today. I am well aware of the historic role Pugwash has played in seeking a world free of nuclear weapons, and of the ongoing collaboration with the United Nations.

I would also like to thank the Government of Kazakhstan for hosting this conference. Next Wednesday we will commemorate the International Day against Nuclear Tests, which also coincides with the anniversary of the closing of the Semipalatinsk test site. The institution of the International Day is a signature example of Kazakhstan's commitment to nuclear disarmament.

I am very humbled to speak in the presence of three of my predecessors: Ms Kane, Mr Dhanapala and Mr Duarte.

The theme of this conference is highly pertinent. Our world, as described by Secretary-General Guterres, is one "of new and old conflicts woven in a complex, interconnected web."

This mix of old and new is also true for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As an international community, we've made great

strides since the darkest days of the nuclear era. We have seen massive arsenal reductions, global moratoria on nuclear testing and fissile material production, states renouncing nuclear weapons programmes, and the institution of a near-universal non-proliferation regime. Above all, there has been consensus on the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Ultimately, however, the same danger that has haunted us for over seventy years still exists: thousands of nuclear weapons that could cause mass casualties, environmental devastation, or worse — mass extinction.

At the same time we face a range of new challenges to the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. From deteriorating security conditions and shifting global balances, to a suite of new technologies that are rapidly overhauling the status quo of our world's economy, society and security, these new challenges complicate and exacerbate traditional concerns.

This is what I want to talk about today: the twenty-first century proliferation and arms race challenges; challenges that are a confluence of the old and the new.

Let me be clear, when I say 'proliferation' I mean both vertical and horizontal. The former being the continued qualitative and quantitative improvements to nuclear arsenals, the latter being the ongoing concern about the spread of nuclear weapons.

The cessation of both horizontal and vertical proliferation is at the core of the "grand bargain" enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. Non-proliferation and disarmament are the two sides of the same coin under the NPT. It is a bargain that needs to be preserved and honored. Its erosion will not benefit anyone.

First, the issue of vertical proliferation. As I noted, the world has made significant progress in the last three decades, much of it under the leadership of the two States with the largest arsenals, the Russian Federation and the United States.

However, I think it is inarguable that in recent years that progress has ground to a halt. All nuclear-armed States are engaged in the qualitative improvement of their arsenals through expensive modernisation campaigns that are expected to last for decades. Several continue to expand their stockpiles. Alarming, we have seen heightened rhetoric about the utility of nuclear weapons and hundreds still remain ready to launch at a moment's

notice. Even the significant arms control achievements of the Cold War, such as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, are under threat.

Disappointingly, the deep divisions that have beset our efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons remain.

On a far more positive note, just last month one hundred and twenty-two States joined together to adopt the historic Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty represents an important step and contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons.

This treaty is historic for two reasons: One, it places nuclear weapons on the same level as chemical and biological weapons, which were deemed in 1925 as incompatible with the principles of humanity. Two, it is the first multilateral treaty on nuclear disarmament in more than twenty years.

It is also a manifestation of the frustration that many non-nuclear weapon States continue to feel about the slow pace and opaque manner in which commitments made under Article VI of the NPT are being implemented. As key member states who made the new Treaty emphasized, the Prohibition Treaty aims to reinforce and complement the NPT, and to push the implementation of its Article VI.

No matter where you fall regarding the Prohibition Treaty, it is now an element of the framework of mutually reinforcing treaties that make up the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It will reinforce the global norm against nuclear weapons.

But the most important point to emphasize is that it is past time for our shared disarmament norm to be implemented through concrete actions.

They are several different ways to take these concrete actions. The High Level Panel on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the Group of Governmental Experts on disarmament verification are two useful initiatives.

The 2020 NPT Review Conference, which will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the treaty's entry into force, will be another critical opportunity to take concrete steps. And it is less than three years away. I believe that if we are to truly make further strides towards a world free of nuclear weapons, there is an onus on the nuclear-weapon States to reassume the mantle of leadership and take actual practical steps.

First of all, they should return to dialogue. The argument that security conditions are not right for further disarmament is to me specious

if you are not prepared to at least sit down and talk. We cannot expect a reduction in tensions without the necessary confidence-building measures and transparency that dialogue provides.

A resumption of the P5 dialogue through a ministers' level meeting, for example, would be a good place to start. They could aim to hash out an agreed approach to the Review Conference based, at a minimum, on how to implement the agreed 2010 action plan.

The Russian Federation and the United States still possess some ninety percent of the world's nuclear weapons. Dialogue between the two on how to approach further reductions and other arms control issues is essential. More than any other States, these two have a responsibility to show the way.

Secondly, we should think about what near-term risk reduction, transparency and confidence-building measures can be implemented. Based on the 2010 action plan and the 2015 President's working paper, a first step should be to continue lowering the operational status of nuclear weapons and working to insure non-nuclear weapon States against their accidental use. A second step should be for nuclear-weapon States to fully implement the transparency measures called for in 2010 related to reporting on nuclear disarmament-related undertakings.

Neither of these is a substitute for irreversible reductions in weapons, but they would help improve the current climate and are useful first steps. And they can be done with political will.

Thirdly, the nuclear-weapon States should work together to head off what is looming as a qualitative arms race. They could make a genuine contribution to global stability by agreeing to curtail the development of new nuclear weapons, especially those designed for first strikes.

I want to move now to the second set of twenty-first century challenges, those related to horizontal proliferation.

The non-proliferation regime designed around the NPT is robust. But it was also designed in the 1960s for a treaty that was intended as a stop gap on the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

We have had incredible successes in non-proliferation since the NPT entered into force, as States have shown near universal commitment to the Treaty and their undertakings.

Unfortunately, the example of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its illicit, destabilising and dangerous actions are a pointed reminder of the need for constant vigilance when it comes to nuclear proliferation. The introduction of nuclear weapons into already volatile regional conflicts adds an existential level of danger.

The world of the twenty-first century is one of open borders and global markets. People and goods move with unprecedented ease. So, we must ask some fundamental questions. Do we have the standards necessary to guard against proliferation when confronted with modern communications, transportation and business practices? Do we have the highest standards for our safeguards system? What other tools do we have at our disposal to improve the efficacy of the non-proliferation regime? What else might we need?

The United Nations might not be the forum to address such questions, but as experts in science and technology, I pose the questions to you. The international community will somehow have to tackle these questions soon.

The third issue I want to raise today relates to the global wave of technological revolution that is washing over us. The gains in information and communications technology made over the last two decades, coupled with more recent explosions in artificial intelligence capacity, as well as leaps in areas such as sensor technology, are impacting the global economy and international society.

Combined with concurrent developments in military technology, they will have radical implications for peace and security. They will also pose significant nuclear proliferation challenges.

For vertical proliferation, advanced new weapons such as long-range conventional missiles may induce fear in nuclear-armed States that their nuclear arsenals are being undermined and spur them to seek greater offensive or defensive capabilities, leading to destabilizing arms races, or to double down on nuclear weapons as the guarantor of their security, leading to their increased entrenchment in military postures.

Moreover, warfare that is guided by information technology and artificial intelligence will dramatically increase the speed of battle, leading to problems such as attribution, accidental launch and escalation control — a worrying prospect for nuclear-armed States.

Concerns have repeatedly been raised about cyber vulnerabilities of nuclear weapons, from the hacking of command and control to actually launch a weapon, to the ‘spoofing’ of early warning systems to thinking they are under attack.

For horizontal proliferation, States that are unable to match technological advances may seek nuclear weapons as asymmetric counters or to undermine nuclear weapons through lower cost technology such as cyber capabilities. The portability of much of the new technology means it will become increasingly available to non-state actors, further muddying issues such as attribution.

I am not sure if the international community fully understands the risks posed by these emerging technologies, especially when it comes to the proliferation and even use of nuclear weapons, largely because their effects cannot be judged individually but must be seen as a matrix of cross-cutting implications.

Consequently, there is an urgent need to develop such an understanding, as well as the necessary measures and mechanisms to ensure international peace and stability. In doing so, we need to assemble the coalitions needed for the twenty-first century. This necessitates doing a better job of incorporating industry — from where much of this technology is emanating — but also bringing civil society and academia onto the same page as States.

I appreciate that the picture I have drawn today is a complex one that poses many challenges. But there will also be many opportunities to realise the shared vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. The key is getting to work immediately in a constructive, comprehensive and cooperative fashion. This entails building bridges and seeking out the common ground that characterised so many of the achievements of the last three decades.

We can start by reaffirming our united and solid commitment to nuclear disarmament and engaging in the inclusive dialogue necessary to make it happen. As new UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I would like to think through, with your help, how to re-energise the cause of disarmament, and re-establish the political and thought-leadership of the United Nations in support of its member states.

Thank you.

Роль молодежи в Пагуошском движении ученых. По материалам 10-й конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения «Мировой ядерный порядок: глобальные и региональные проблемы безопасности и перспективы сотрудничества» г. Астана (Казахстан), август 2017 г.

The role of youth in the Pugwash movement of scientists. Based on the materials of the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference “Nuclear World Order: Global and Regional Security Issues and Prospects for Cooperation” Astana (Kazakhstan), August 2017.

Пагуошское движение зародилось в 1955 г., когда одиннадцать всемирно известных ученых: А. Эйнштейн, Ф. Жолио-Кюри, Б. Рассел, М. Борн, П. У. Бриджмен, Л. Инфельд, Г. Дж. Мёллер, Л. Полинг, С. Ф. Пауэлл, Дж. Ротблат, Х. Юкава выступили с манифестом против использования ядерного оружия. В 1957 г. при поддержке американского промышленника С. Итона в канадском городе Пагуош, от которого движение и получило свое название, прошла первая встреча ученых, где были рассмотрены угрозы человечеству от последствий ядерной войны.

Сегодня Пагуошское движение выступает за мир, разоружение и научное сотрудничество. Немалую роль в поддержке основополагающих идей Пагуошского движения играет молодежь. Дж. Ротблат, генеральный секретарь Пагуошского движения в 1957-1973 гг., отводил большое внимание привлечению молодежи к работе Пагуоша. В 1995 г., когда Пагуошскому движению ученых совместно с Дж. Ротблатом была присуждена Нобелевская премия мира, Дж. Ротблат пригласил на сцену молодых людей, чтобы разделить этот момент с ними, тем самым подчеркнув особую роль новых поколений для Пагуошского движения.

Идея создания национальных молодежных групп Пагуошского движения ученых получила интенсивное развитие благодаря 10 генеральному секретарю М. Каплану в конце 1970-х гг. Уже в 1979 г. на базе Университета Калифорнии в Сан-Диего был создан международный

студенческий Пагуош, в 80-х гг. ставший Американским молодежным Пагуошским отделением (SPUSA). Постепенно отделения сформировались в более чем 30 стран мира.

Первая международная молодежная Пагуошская конференция прошла в 1988 г. В этом же году было образовано молодежное отделение Российского Пагуошского комитета как Советская студенческая и молодежная Пагуошская группа. В 2018 г. молодежному отделению Российского Пагуошского комитета при Президиуме РАН исполняется 30 лет.

К 30-летию молодежного отделения Российского Пагуошского комитета во время работы X конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения 2017 г. в г. Астане была подготовлена серия интервью о роли молодежи в Пагуошском движении ученых.

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Выдержки из выступления Дж. Дханалы, Президента международного Пагуошского движения ученых (2007-2017 гг.), перед участниками X конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения, г. Астана (Казахстан), август 2017 г.

Запись подготовили Е. Шанченко, Е. Широбокова, (молодежное отделение Российского Пагуошского комитета при Президиуме РАН), П. Корзун (Российский Пагуошский комитет при Президиуме РАН)

В моей профессиональной карьере было большое количество запоминающихся моментов, но должен признаться, что именно взаимодействие с молодежной Пагуошской группой стало одной из наиболее ярких страниц. Я рад, что молодежь готовит и направляет своих делегатов в Совет Пагуошского движения, как в случае с Каримом Кадри из Египта. Надеюсь, что такая практика продолжится, и вы, и другие молодые ученые будете участвовать в работе Совета. Мне действительно кажется очень важным, чтобы Пагуош как организация мог опираться на поддержку молодежи, на исходящие от нее новые идеи и инициативы. В качестве президента Пагуошского движения в мою задачу входит забота о будущем организации, и, конечно, этим будущим являетесь именно вы.

В своем выступлении я бы хотел коснуться нескольких важных с моей точки зрения тем, которые также имеют отношение к будущему.

Во время последней встречи в Давосе, организованной Всемирным экономическим форумом, особенное внимание уделялось так называемой четвертой индустриальной революции. В то время как первая индустриальная революция была вызвана появлением паровой машины, а последующие привнесли электричество и электронику, четвертая индустриальная революция теперь уже связана с такими технологиями, как 3D-принтеры. Новые технологии оказывают влияние на способы производства новых видов вооружений. Уже вызывает беспокойство вопрос создания так называемых «роботов-убийц», когда применение летального оружия

происходит без человеческого участия. Таким образом, реальной становится возможность участия в вооруженном конфликте робота, который, в отличие от солдата, не осознает разницы между маленьким ребенком, просто перебегающим дорогу, и вооруженным военным. В сотрудничестве с различными неправительственными организациями Пагуошское движение участвует в обсуждении рисков, связанных с разработкой и производством отдельных видов оружия, включая автономное летальное оружие.

На сегодняшний день в ряде стран проводятся эксперименты, связанные с использованием новейших технологий в области вооружений. Хотя сами государства, как правило, не признают свою причастность к этому, Соединенные Штаты, Великобритания, Китай, Индия и некоторые другие страны, тем не менее, испытывают новые виды оружия. Но прежде чем оно сможет быть протестировано и размещено, мы предпринимаем попытки привлечь внимание стран-участников Конвенции по конкретным видам обычного оружия, чтобы они договорились о запрещении новых видов оружия. Как вы знаете, реализация такого рода задач требует немало времени — вспомните принятие Конвенции о запрещении противопехотных мин или Конвенции по кассетным боеприпасам. Только совсем недавно сформировалась группа связанных с национальными правительствами экспертов по разработке соглашения, которое, как мы надеемся, станет всеобщим призывом к запрещению «негуманного» оружия. Это пример деятельности Пагуошского движения, направленной на прогнозирование событий и предотвращение появления отдельных видов вооружений, которые могут нанести непоправимый ущерб всем жителям нашей планеты. Надеюсь, вы как молодые ученые, многие из которых пришли именно из сферы естественных наук, сможете разработать механизмы, предотвращающие создание нового опасного оружия.

Еще одной темой, о которой я хотел бы сказать, является кибербезопасность. Многие сюжеты, которые сегодня находятся в центре внимания, касаются этой темы — например, о якобы имевшем место вмешательстве России в выборы в крупнейших демократиях мира. Но предпринимается ли что-то в этой сфере? Разговоры могут

вестись еще долго, но делает ли кто-то практические шаги, чтобы, например, предотвратить угрозу кибератак со стороны террористов на запуск ядерного оружия?

Так что вашему поколению еще предстоит найти ответы на эти и другие возникающие проблемы, связанные с развитием информационных технологий и их применением в военной сфере. Огромные средства сейчас тратятся в Японии, Израиле и, конечно, США на создание систем противоракетной обороны, которые зачастую экспортируются союзникам в другие страны. При этом многие ученые подвергают эффективность таких систем серьезной критике и, по сути, развенчивают, приводя научные аргументы, целесообразность их использования. Одна из причин этого — уязвимость противоракетной обороны перед технологиями дезориентирования, а также появление все новых более сложных ракетных технологий. Поэтому я думаю, что еще предстоит внимательно посмотреть на работу индустрии вооружений и обеспечить более рациональный порядок расходов на оборону.

Еще одна тема, о которой мне хотелось бы упомянуть, связана с этическими аспектами работы ученых. Я всегда чувствовал большую важность этой темы. Помню как в своем выступлении в память о Дороти Ходжкин, английском химике, лауреате Нобелевской премии по химии, в 2003 г. в Галифаксе, я говорил о том, что в научном мире следует ввести традицию давать клятву наподобие клятвы Гиппократова. Смысл ее заключался бы в том, что ученые не будут использовать свои научные знания для производства оружия, которое может стать причиной массовой гибели людей. Я думаю, что это вполне легко реализуемо, если национальные научные академии поддержат такую идею и обеспечат, что молодой ученый на пороге своей научной карьеры подпишется под таким обязательством. Даже если в дальнейшем развитии своей профессиональной карьеры ему предстоит оказаться в Лос-Аламосской национальной лаборатории или каком-либо другом месте, где производится ядерное оружие, он смог бы не дать втянуть себя в эту чудовищную работу и поступил бы также, как в свое время Джозеф Ротблат, ставший единственным ученым, участвовавшим в создании американского ядерного оружия

и ушедшим из Лос-Аламоса по личным убеждениям до испытания ядерного заряда. Я думаю, что такой шаг, такое взятое на себя обязательство, имело бы огромное значение в карьере ученых, работающих для оборонной промышленности. Я знаю, что производители вооружений платят огромные деньги молодым ученым за их исследования. Но для научного сообщества должно иметь принципиальное значение, чтобы такие исследования соответствовали гуманитарным нормам и их результаты не могли привести к массовой гибели людей или производству роботов-убийц.

Думаю, важно также не забывать, что в последние годы надежды на практические шаги в деле ядерного разоружения были связаны в основном с гуманитарной инициативой. Как вы знаете, гуманитарные последствия применения ядерного оружия и связанная с ними необходимость дальнейшего разоружения обсуждаются уже довольно продолжительное время. Реальные подвижки в этом направлении наметились после того, как в 2013 г. в Осло прошла первая конференция под названием «Гуманитарные последствия применения ядерного оружия», в которой участвовали официальные представители 127 государств, не обладающих ядерным оружием, а затем в 2014 г. Мексика и Австрия провели еще две Конференции по гуманитарным последствиям применения ядерного оружия. Этим трем конференциям предшествовало Совместное заявление о гуманитарных последствиях ядерного оружия, принятое в 2012 году в Первом комитете Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Данная цепочка связанных между собой событий образовала общее течение, которое в итоге вылилось в принятие Договора о запрещении ядерного оружия на конференции в Нью-Йорке в июле 2017 года. Так что роль гуманитарной инициативы в том результате, который удалось достичь к сегодняшнему дню, очень велика, и нам всем важно помнить об этом и поддерживать ее дальнейшее развитие.

Я довольно долго работал в области многосторонней дипломатии. Такие страны, как США, Великобритания, другие западные ядерные державы и их союзники по НАТО всегда были решительно настроены против любых попыток со стороны государств Движения неприсоединения (среди которых и моя родная Шри-Ланка) переве-

сти вопросы, связанные с ядерным разоружением, в плоскость прав человека или в область экономики. На самом деле ядерные державы хотели бы, чтобы обсуждение этой темы оставалось исключительно прерогативой Конференции по разоружению ООН и Первого комитета Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Так что все наши предложения, стран Движения неприсоединения, долгое время оказывались блокированными, нам не было позволено переходить границы установленных форматов, в рамках которых было предусмотрено обсуждение вопросов ядерного разоружения. Но сейчас существует понимание того, что данная тема охватывает самые разные сферы и имеет множество аспектов. Можно говорить о ней в контексте обеспечения базовых прав человека или указывать при ее обсуждении на отсутствие границ между политическими и экономическими вопросами. Подобным образом проблема изменения климата оказывает влияние как на политическую, так и на экономическую сферу общественной жизни, и в той и другой области ведутся взаимодополняющие дискуссии по указанной проблематике. Вопросы, связанные с ядерным оружием, как и вопросы изменения климата, безусловно, являются многоплановыми. Для их регулирования необходимо межотраслевое соглашение, в разработке которого участвовали бы эксперты в области защиты окружающей среды, экономики и политических наук. И я убежден, что молодежные участники Пагуошского движения смогут внести значительный вклад в эту работу.

Extracts from the address of Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (2007-2017), to the participants of the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference, Astana (Kazakhstan), August 2017.

Record transcribed by E.Schanchenko, E.Schirobokova (Russian Student/Young Pugwash), P.Korzun (Russian Pugwash Committee)

Throughout my career and particularly during my 10 years of Pugwash presidency one of the brightest features has been the opportunity to interact with Student Pugwash members. I am glad that a seat in the

Pugwash Council has been created for K. Kadry from Egypt who used to be a part of the International Student/Young Pugwash Group (ISYP) before. Hopefully you will follow his example, and more young professionals will join the Pugwash Council. I think that the ISYP should play a supportive role, role which brings in new enthusiasm, new expertise and new ideas. My task as the President of Pugwash is to look to the future, and obviously you are the future.

I would like to touch upon a few subjects with regard to the future.

As you might know, Davos meeting conducted by the World Economic Forum emphasized the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on future developments. We know, that the First Industrial Revolution was created by steam power, then you had electricity, and after that electronics. But the Fourth Industrial Revolution is geared by the cutting-edge technologies, like 3D-printing and so on. And that is going to affect the way in which weapons are being made. Already we are very concerned about the way in which killer robots are being manufactured with no human element in between the operator and the actual robot itself. There is a risk that one can be confronted with a robot in an armed conflict situation which has no possibility of evaluating whether an individual in its path is a civilian or a combatant. So, the distinction which a soldier would have of distinguishing between a little child crossing the road and an armed combatant is not there. So we are trying in a coalition of NGOs — and I brought Pugwash into that coalition — to ban these weapons before they get produced. There are already a lot of experiments being carried on and we know that prototypes have been built by a lot of countries. They do not admit it, but the United States, UK, China, India and others are testing these weapons. But before they test them and deploy, we are trying to persuade members of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to pass a treaty which would forbid these weapons. It is a very slow process — as you know the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention took a long time, the Convention on Cluster Munitions took a long time as well. But we are in the process now when a group of governmental experts is trying to come up with a treaty which hopefully will have universal appeal. So that is one example of looking ahead and trying to prevent the creation of weapons which can cause incalculable damage to the human beings on this planet.

The second area is cybersecurity. We talk a lot about cybersecurity and this is a factor that will definitely determine the future. For example, we will need to devise a fool-proof technology to ensure that nobody interferes with the launches of nuclear weapons. Because it would be a disaster if there is some kind of cyber-interference into a nuclear launch technology so that some terrorists can get access to it and provoke unsuspected launch of nuclear weapon.

I think there are a lot of areas in which young scientists can work on defensive methods, among which are the anti-ballistic missile system technologies. Theodore Postol from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), whose name you may know, has written extensively debunking the methods of ballistic missile defense. In his writings he has shown that decoys can be used in cases of ballistic missile defense to make it very unlikely that a missile is shot down. Huge amounts of money are being spent on ballistic missile defense not only by Japan, but by Israel and of course by the United States. And these weapon systems are being exported and sold to various allies, but they only trigger more and more sophisticated missile launchings. So I think we have to once again look at the technologies of weapon manufacturing and make sure that those amounts of money are being wisely spent in terms of defense.

Another area looking ahead is to make sure that technologies conform to existing laws and are not used for production of new destructive weapons. In my Dorothy Hodgkin memorial lecture — I think it was in 2003 in Halifax — I mentioned that we should have (as the doctors have) a Hippocratic Oath, so that scientists have an oath in the beginning of their scientific career preventing them from engaging in any weapon manufacture which contributes to the killing of people or mass killings of people. And I think that is very easy if national academies of sciences launch this kind of idea and ensure that a young scientist at the threshold of his career signs such an obligation, so that if he joins Los Alamos or some other weapon manufacturer he could do what Joseph Rotblat did and that is not to engage with the horrendous system like the production of nuclear weapons. From my point of view, that is an extremely important professional aspect for the scientific career of people who work in the defense industry. I know that defense manufacturers pay huge amounts

of money to young scientists for research. But it is really important to make sure that research is in fact humanitarian and does not support the production of killing machines.

It is also important I think to remember that the trust for nuclear disarmament process in the last few years was largely on the humanitarian side. As you know, the humanitarian aspects of disarmament have been talked about for a long time; but it was only after Norway had launched the Oslo process that we had a conference in Mexico and finally in Austria. These three conferences followed the 2012 General Assembly First Committee session, highlighting the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and calling on all states to intensify their efforts to outlaw those weapons.

Those streams finally fed into the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination, which in July 2017 came out with the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. So, the humanitarian initiative which launched that process, I think, is a very important one for us all to remember, and we should not lose sight of humanitarian aspect.

I have been in multilateral diplomacy for a very long time. The United States, UK and other Western nuclear-weapon states and their supporters in NATO were very strongly objecting to countries from the Non-Aligned Movement like mine taking up disarmament issues in the context of human rights or economy. In fact, the nuclear weapon states would have preferred that the discussions on those issues were confined only to the Conference on Disarmament or the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. They knew that in that frameworks we were sufficiently isolated from making an impact on the general agenda. So we were penned in one area and not allowed to cross borders. But now, of course, everybody realizes that disarmament issue is a very broad one, it comprises a variety of aspects, including human rights. And I think that the comprehensive nature of disarmament is something that we have to insist on in order to ensure that the debates on this topic include as wide range of connected issues as possible. There is actually no border between politics and economics when you discuss disarmament. Likewise, climate change affects both political and

economic developments, and there is a mutually supporting discussion on this subject in both areas.

I think all of you can contribute with your expertise to the multidisciplinary approach toward disarmament in order to foster a cross-border agreement on this issue.

*Интервью с А. Песцели, председателем Исполнительного совета
Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения.*

*Записано на 62-й Пагуошской конференции ученых
в г. Астане (Казахстан) в августе 2017 г.*

*Запись подготовил П. Корзун (Российский Пагуошский комитет при
Президиуме РАН)*

Как произошло ваше знакомство с ISYP?

А. Песцели (А.П.): Все началось с моего научного руководителя в Венгрии Эржебет Роза, которая была членом Пагуошского движения и посещала Пагуошские конференции по крайней мере лет двадцать. Вскоре после того, как я начала писать свою диссертацию, она рассказала мне о предстоящей конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения и переслала анонс с приглашением отправить свою работу на отборочный конкурс для участия. Моим первым опытом стало посещение конференции в Берлине в 2011 г. и после этого я участвовала во всех Пагуошских встречах.

Какими самыми яркими моментами, с которыми вы сталкивались во время работы в ISYP, вы могли бы поделиться?

А.П.: Когда я вспоминаю прошлые Пагуошские конференции, то прихожу к выводу, что одними из лучших моментов все же были встречи молодежного Пагуоша. Это связано с тем, что на таких встречах мы оставляем достаточно времени на вопросы и ответы, мы действительно стараемся помочь друг другу усовершенствовать исследовательский проект за счет информативного обмена мнениями. Даже когда мы критикуем друг друга, то стремимся делать это конструктивно. Думаю, что общий дружеский подъем и энтузиазм

создают особенную атмосферу молодежных конференциях. Безусловно, посещение последующих «взрослых» конференций является для нас невероятной возможностью. Ведь там мы можем встретить наших героев — тех, кто вдохновляет нас на то, чтобы связать свою профессиональную жизнь с исследованием проблем мира и безопасности. Но в то же время конференции Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения давали возможность креативно осмыслить наиболее сложные международные конфликты и стимулировали нас к продолжению собственного профессионального развития.

Почему вы считаете важным участие молодых людей в обсуждении вопросов, которые традиционно рассматриваются уже состоявшимися учеными и дипломатами? Есть какая-то особая ценность взгляда молодежи на эти вопросы?

А.П.: Многие старшие члены Пагуошского движения осознают, что через какое-то время они выйдут на пенсию, а самому движению нужны будут новые люди, чтобы осуществлять миссию Пагуоша. И этого можно добиться только если привлекать людей на ранней стадии их карьерного развития, начинать знакомить их с Пагуошскими мероприятиями, с общей атмосферой встреч, с направлением мысли в отношении определенных вопросов, а также развивать критический подход к собственным идеям. Помимо исследователей и ученых мирового класса, Пагуошское движение также включает в себя многих нынешних или бывших дипломатов и практиков, которые могут рассказать, как в реальности происходят международные переговоры и что остается за кулисами. Так что я думаю, что участие в Пагуошских конференциях дает молодым исследователям прекрасную возможность узнать много нового. Другим замечательным преимуществом является возможность общения. Молодежный Пагуош объединяет людей из разных стран мира, мы все знакомимся на наших конференциях и потом присоединяемся к работе «старшей» Пагуошской конференции. Там у нас есть возможность напрямую пообщаться с послами, высокопоставленными чиновниками международных

организаций и национальных правительств. Мы можем задать вопросы, чтобы улучшить наш исследовательский проект или разобраться в том, чему долгое время не могли найти объяснение. По своему личному опыту могу сказать, что до сих пор все старшие участники Пагуошских конференций всегда находили время, чтобы пообщаться с молодежью и поделиться своими взглядами и экспертными оценками.

Чем могли бы помочь российские молодые ученые и эксперты, пусть пока и не являющиеся частью ISYP, вашей практической работе и решению тех международных вопросов, которые обсуждаются в рамках вашей группы?

А.П.: Я считаю, что российская Пагуошская группа — одна из самых сильных среди тех национальных групп, с которыми я когда-либо встречалась. Она одна из немногих, кто организует мероприятия между основными конференциями, а также публикует на регулярной основе результаты состоявшихся дискуссий в форме отчетов или тематических сборников. После Пагуошской конференции в г. Нагасаки в 2015 г. некоторые молодежные участники из России, а также члены Международного студенческого и молодежного Пагуошского движения получили возможность опубликовать свои работы в специальном издании, подготовленном при участии Российской Пагуошской группы. Так что я думаю, что российские пагуошцы на самом деле вносят очень существенный вклад в деятельность всего движения. Они привносят на пагуошские встречи свой экспертный опыт и взгляд на вещи, которые так необходимы для поиска решений основных проблем в сфере контроля над вооружениями. Такие встречи предоставляют хорошую возможность для того, чтобы американцы и европейцы могли сесть за один стол с российскими коллегами и попробовать определить области для сотрудничества, а также подходы к решению ключевых вопросов международной повестки дня. Вообще российская Пагуошская группа показывает пример своей невероятной активностью всем остальным национальным группам.

Может ли рассматриваться возможность проведения научного семинара с участием ISYP в России? Если да, какие практические шаги нужно для этого предпринять?

А.П.: Вообще я думаю, что Международное студенческое и молодежное Пагуошское движение должно обязательно организовывать мероприятия, направленные на вовлечение в свою деятельность большего числа ученых. Пагуош имеет давнюю традицию по оказанию содействия в проведении встреч советских и американских ученых в наиболее напряженные годы холодной войны. На таких встречах велись мирные и конструктивные дискуссии о стратегической стабильности, продолжающейся гонке вооружений и ядерной политике двух сверхдержав. Так что Пагуошское движение имеет большой опыт в приглашении ученых за стол переговоров, где можно откровенно обсудить волнующие темы, технические вопросы и выдвинуть предложения по сглаживанию противоречий между лидерами обеих стран. Я убеждена в том, что в будущем нам нужно продолжать организовывать такие мероприятия с привлечением ученых, и, таким образом, вернуться к главной Пагуошской традиции. В этой связи я считаю, что российская Пагуошская группа может помочь нам в выявлении молодых российских ученых, которых мы могли бы пригласить на встречи международного молодежного Пагуошского движения.

Если научный семинар будет организован в России, то со стороны Исполнительного совета международного молодежного Пагуоша мы, безусловно, будем рады принять в нем участие. Я знаю, что в России есть большое количество перспективных молодых ученых и что нам просто нужно найти способ активнее вовлекать их в наши дискуссии.

Какие могут быть практические результаты деятельности ISYP для улучшения мира, в котором мы живем?

А.П.: Думаю, что есть большое количество возможностей для молодых участников Пагуошского движения оказать влияние на то, что происходит вокруг. Такие возможности могут возникнуть,

к примеру, во время перерыва на кофе или на обед в ходе конференции. Представьте, что за одним столом с молодежным участником окажется посол, которого не оставит равнодушным высказанная молодым коллегой нестандартная идея, над которой никто ранее не задумывался. Возможно, что такая идея изменит отношение этого человека к определенным вопросам или станет побудителем для того, чтобы по-новому выстраивать стратегию ведения международных переговоров. Возможности влияния есть у молодежных участников и во время рабочих групп в рамках конференции, где изначально заведено, что представители молодежи воспринимаются как равные участники дискуссии и выражение их взглядов считается таким же важным вкладом в общее обсуждение, как и взгляды старших пагуошцев.

Это примеры тех возможностей, которые есть у молодежи в Пагуошском движении, чтобы их голоса были услышаны. Еще один путь для этого — использовать пленарные сессии конференции. На первой пленарной сессии конференции в Астане почти половину вопросов задали молодежные участники Пагуошского движения. Потом я видела многих из них на встрече с Исполнительным секретарем Подготовительной комиссии Организации по Договору о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний (ДВЗЯИ) Лассина Зербо, где они снова задавали вопросы: «Здравствуйте, я из Индии; а я приехала из Пакистана; мы из тех стран, которые не подписали ДВЗЯИ, но считаем, что это необходимо исправить. Что я могу сделать для этого? Как мне оказать влияние? Давайте обсудим это! Расскажите нам, как вы на это смотрите!». И после такого обмена мнениями молодежные участники вернутся обратно в свои страны, привезут с собой обсужденные и окрепшие идеи и будут отстаивать их посредством гражданской активности, научной деятельности или работы в правительстве. Они смогут реально влиять на мысли людей и на деятельность правительства в своих странах.

Transcript of the interview with Anna Peczeli, Chair of the ISYP Executive Board, recorded at the 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs "Confronting New Nuclear Dangers" in Astana, Kazakhstan, in August 2017

Record transcribed by P.Korzun (Russian Pugwash Committee)

How did you get acquainted with the ISYP?

A. Peczeli (A.P.): I've got involved in the Pugwash movement through my Hungarian mentor, Erzsébet Rózsa, who is also a Pugwash member. She has been attending Pugwash Conferences for at least two decades. When I started to write my PhD dissertation she told me about the forthcoming Student/Young Pugwash meeting and forwarded me the call for papers. My first Conference was the 2011 Berlin meeting and since then I have participated at all Pugwash meetings.

What are the most remarkable moments that you have encountered while working in the ISYP?

A.P.: I think when you go through the whole discussions at the Pugwash conferences in retrospect, you always come to the conclusion that one of the best part of the conference was actually the young Pugwash meeting. That is because we really pay attention to leaving plenty of time for questions and answers, and we are genuinely trying to help each other to improve our research projects with useful comments. Even when we are critical to each other, it is with a constructive mindset. And I believe that the whole friendly atmosphere, vibrant and energetic feelings make the ISYP meetings special. It is of course an incredible opportunity to attend the senior Pugwash gatherings and meet some of our heroes who have inspired us to pursue a career in peace and security studies, but each ISYP conference brought creative thinking on the most pressing conflicts of the international security system and incited us to keep going.

Why do you consider that it's important for young people to participate in discussing issues which traditionally relate to leading scientists and diplomats? Is there some special value of youth view on these issues?

A.P: Most of the senior members seem to believe that after a while they will retire, and the organization will need new people to carry on the torch and promote the mission of Pugwash. You can only do that when you start involving young people early on in their careers, get them familiar with these events, the meetings, the atmosphere, get them exposed to conventional thinking about certain issues, and also challenge their ideas. Besides the world class academics and scientists, Pugwash also includes many current or former diplomats and practitioners who can tell you how these negotiations and discussions happen and what is behind the scenes. So I think that it is a great learning opportunity for young researchers to be at the Pugwash conferences. Another great advantage is the networking. We are a network of people from all around the world — we get to know our young colleagues at the ISYP meetings, and after that we join the senior conference, where we have a chance to directly engage with ambassadors, and officials of different international organizations and national governments. We have an opportunity to ask our questions, and they can help us improve our research or clarify things that we have been struggling to understand. So far, according to my personal view, all of the senior pugwashites have been happy to share their experience and talk to young people.

How can Russian young scientists and experts, even if they are not yet a part of ISYP, help in your practical work and how can they contribute to solving the international issues that are discussed within ISYP?

A.P: I think that the Russian Pugwash group has been one of the most active national groups that I have seen since I joined the organization. This is one of the few national groups which organizes events in between the major conferences and also publishes regularly the outcomes of the discussions in the form of reports or even dedicated books. After the 2015 Pugwash meeting in Nagasaki some members of the Russian Young Pugwash group and also some ISYP participants were selected to publish their works in an edited volume that was published by the Russian National Pugwash group. So, I think that the Russian pugwashites are actually bringing a very important contribution to the organization. At our meetings they bring their expertise and Russian mindset to the table which

is sorely needed to address some of the greatest dilemmas of arms control. Such discussions offer a good opportunity for Europeans and Americans to sit together with Russians and try to find areas where we can cooperate, try to find constructive ways of solving the problems that we have in the international arena. It is a very important contribution of the Russian Pugwash that they are so incredibly active on the national level. I think they are actually setting a good example for other national groups.

Is there any possibility of holding a scientific seminar with the participation of ISYP in Russia? If Yes, what practical steps we need to take?

A.P. I actually believe that it is something the ISYP group should do: try to reach out to involve more scientists. Pugwash has the tradition of hosting Soviet and American scientists during the worst years of the Cold War, where peaceful and constructive discussions took place about strategic stability, the ongoing arms race, and the nuclear policy of the two superpowers. So these meetings provide the core tradition of Pugwash: inviting scientists to talk about technical issues, where they can have an honest conversation to come up with creative solutions for the problems between the leaders of the two countries. I believe this is something we should do in the future: involve more young scientists in order to return, to a certain extent, to the main traditions of Pugwash. In this respect I think that the Russian Pugwash group can help us a lot in identifying young scientists whom we can invite to future events. The ISYP leadership is also happy to get engaged, and if there is an opportunity for us to attend a meeting organized in Russia, I am sure that we would be happy to delegate somebody from the Board. I know that there are plenty of upcoming young scientists in Russia, we just need to find a way to involve them in our conversation.

What might be the practical results of the activities of ISYP to improve the world in which we live?

A.P. I think there are multiple opportunities for young Pugwash members to have an influence. It can happen during the coffee breaks, or during a dinner, sitting on the other side of a table with an ambassador, where an ISYP members might mention a creative new idea that no one has thought about before. Maybe that will be a sparkle of inspiration for the ambassador, which can change

the thinking of that particular person, or it can incite him or her to take the necessary politically important steps to change the course of negotiations. But it can also happen through the working groups, where traditionally from the very beginning, young Pugwash participants are considered equal members of the table, so their views are considered just as important contributions as those of the senior Pugwash members. So, this is the primary way for young Pugwash members to make a difference and to get their voices heard. Probably another possibility is just to use the plenary sessions. At the first plenary session of the conference in Astana almost half of the questions were coming from the young Pugwash participants. And during the special meeting with Dr. Lassina Zerbo from the CTBTO Preparatory Commission I saw many of the ISYP members asking questions again: “Hey, I am from India; Hey, I am from Pakistan, we are all from countries which are not signatories to the CTBT, but we think that this should be changed. What can I do? How I can play a role? Let’s discuss it, share your opinion with us!”. And after these exchanges they will go home, they will carry the message back and defend it through activism, or high-level academic work, or by getting a position in government. They can really influence the thinking of the people of that country and be the key people who change the behavior of their governments.

*Интервью с П. Корзуном, председателем молодежного отделения
Российского Пагуошского комитета при Президиуме РАН с 2012 по 2017 гг.*

*Записано на 62-й Пагуошской конференции ученых в г. Астане
(Казахстан) в августе 2017 г.*

*Запись подготовила Н. Самойловская (Председатель молодежного
отделения Российского Пагуошского комитета при Президиуме РАН)*

Вы на протяжении многих лет были председателем молодежного отделения Российской Пагуошской группы, а также членом координационного комитета международного молодежного Пагуоша, в чем ценность молодежного Пагуоша по Вашему мнению?

П. Корзун (П.К.): Молодежное Пагуошское движение в целом дает возможность больше узнать о мире, в котором мы живем. Это,

на мой взгляд, большая ценность. Участвовать в работе молодежного отделения Российского Пагуошского комитета — особенная привилегия, с учетом обширной истории Российского Пагуошского комитета и той роли, которую сыграли российские и советские ученые, политики и общественные деятели в сохранении мира, совершенствовании механизмов международной безопасности и развитии сотрудничества и взаимопонимания между народами. Участие в молодежном Пагуоше позволяет развивать контакты и работать над совместными проектами с коллегами и единомышленниками из разных стран мира. Благодаря этому появляется возможность взглянуть на мир, на проблемы, стоящие перед ним, по-новому, по-иному, с позиции других стран и людей.

Какой вклад вносит Российское молодежное отделение?

П.К.: Российское молодежное отделение использует различные возможности в своей деятельности: налаживает взаимодействие с молодежными Пагуошскими группами из других стран, готовит научные публикации и проводит встречи со студентами. Для всего этого нужна просто инициатива и понимание актуальности рассматриваемых Пагуошским движением проблем. При этом особенно ценной всегда была неизменная поддержка молодежных инициатив со стороны старших участников Российского Пагуошского комитета. В целом вклад молодежного отделения состоит в распространении информации и пробуждении интереса со стороны студентов, молодых ученых и экспертов к важнейшим вопросам мировой политики и международной безопасности.

Вы могли бы рассказать о самых запомнившихся моментах во время Вашей работы в молодежном Пагуоше?

П.К.: Одним из самых запоминающихся моментов было общение с Хибакуша — пережившими атомные бомбардировки жителями Японии. Такая возможность представилась участникам конференции международного молодежного и студенческого Пагуошского движения в г. Нагасаки (Япония) в 2015 г. Свидетельства этих людей поражают тем, что в них нет места ненависти, но есть желание рас-

сказать как можно большему числу людей о пережитой трагедии, чтобы она никогда больше не повторилась.

Что, на Ваш взгляд, может быть важным опытом для российской молодежи от результатов деятельности ISYP?

П.К.: Международное студенческое и молодежное Пагуошское движение — это глобальное и междисциплинарное объединение студентов и молодых ученых, занимающихся исследованиями в области фундаментальных и общественных наук, технологий и этики. Российские молодые специалисты могут привнести в это движение свои исследовательские наработки и научные подходы к решению проблем разоружения и нераспространения ядерного оружия, урегулирования региональных конфликтов. Опыт участия в молодежном международном Пагуоше — это возможность на практике использовать свои знания и результаты научной работы для преодоления комплексных проблем международной безопасности. Для международного молодежного Пагуоша, в свою очередь, поддержание диалога с российскими молодыми учеными очень важно для всесторонней и эффективной работы по снижению угроз глобальной безопасности.

Interview with Petr Korzun, Chair of the Pugwash Student/Young group 2012-2017; recorded at the 62nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs "Confronting New Nuclear Dangers" in Astana, Kazakhstan, in August 2017.

Record transcribed by Natalia Samoylovskaya (Chair of the Russian Student/Young Pugwash)

For many years you was a chairman of the youth branch of the Russian Pugwash group and a member of the coordinating Committee of international youth Pugwash, what is the value of youth in Pugwash in your opinion?

P. Korzun (P.K.): The Young/Student Pugwash Movement provides an opportunity to learn more about the world in which we live. This, in my opinion, is of great value. Now, being a part of the Youth group of the Russian Pugwash

Committee is really a special privilege, given the vast history of the Russian Pugwash Committee and the role played by Russian and Soviet scientists, politicians and public figures in preserving peace, improving international security mechanisms and promoting cooperation and mutual understanding among peoples. In general, participation in the Young/Student Pugwash allows developing contacts and working on joint projects with colleagues and like-minded professionals from around the world. Thanks to this, it becomes possible to look at the world, at the problems which it faces, in a new way, in a different way, from the perspective of other countries and peoples.

What is the contribution of the Russian young Pugwash group?

P.K.: The Russian young Pugwash group uses various opportunities in its work: it promotes interaction with youth Pugwash groups from other countries, prepares scientific publications and holds meetings with the students. For all this, we need simply an initiative and an understanding of the urgency of the problems which are within the scope of attention of the Pugwash movement. Especially valuable has always been the continued support of the youth initiatives from the senior members of the Russian Pugwash Committee.

On the whole, the contribution of the young Pugwash group consists in disseminating information and awakening the interest of students, young scientists and experts to the crucial issues of world politics and international security.

Could you tell us about the most remarkable moments during your work in the Young/Student Pugwash?

P.K.: One of the most memorable moments was meeting with the Hibakusha — Japanese survivors of the atomic bombings. This opportunity was granted to the participants of the International Student/Young Pugwash conference in Nagasaki (Japan) in 2015. Testimonies of those people are impressive by the fact that they have no place for hatred, but instead a desire to tell as many people as possible about the tragedy that they experienced, so that it is never ever repeated.

What in your opinion can be an important experience for Russian youth from the ISYP?

P.K.: The International/Student Young Pugwash (ISYP) is a global and interdisciplinary union of students and young scientists, engaged in research in the field of fundamental and social sciences, technology and ethics. Russian young specialists can bring their research findings and scientific approach to defining solutions for such problems as disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, settlement of regional conflicts. Participation in the ISYP is an opportunity for Russian experts to use in practice their knowledge and research outcomes to overcome complex problems in international security. For the ISYP, in turn, maintaining a dialogue with Russian young scientists is very important for a comprehensive and effective work to reduce existing threats to international security.

ОБ АВТОРАХ

Бриндза Ребекка, член студенческой и молодежной Пагуошской группы Израиля. В настоящее время получает степень магистра в Университете Тель-Авива по направлению «здравоохранение» со специализацией на оказании помощи в чрезвычайных ситуациях и борьбе со стихийными бедствиями. Работает в качестве консультанта по вопросам, связанным с миротворческими операциями, в рамках программы гражданской журналистики Академии YaLa. К темам исследований относятся цифровая дипломатия, научная дипломатия и инновационные технологии для гражданского взаимодействия и развития в регионе Большого Ближнего Востока.

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Сборник научных статей

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ПРОБЛЕМЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА**

Компьютерная верстка *М.А. Ивановой*

Дизайн обложки *Д.О. Новиковой*

Подписано в печать 24.10.2018. Формат 60×84/16. Печать цифровая.
Усл. печ. л. 13,37. Тираж 100. Заказ 160.

Выпущено ООО «Медиапапир»
194021, Санкт-Петербург, 2-й Муринский пр., д. 49, лит. А, пом. 208.
Тел.: (812) 987-75-26.